Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Actualism and Possible Worlds', 'Naming and Necessity preface' and 'On the Basis of Morality'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
16985 Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
     Full Idea: The main and the original motivation for the 'possible worlds analysis' - and the way it clarified modal logic - was that it enabled modal logic to be treated by the same set theoretic techniques of model theory used successfully in extensional logic.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18)
     A reaction: So they should be ascribed the same value that we attribute to classical model theory, whatever that is.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16982 A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
     Full Idea: Two totally distinct 'historical chains' that be sheer accident assign the same name to the same man should probably count as creating distinct names despite the identity of the referents.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.08 n9)
     A reaction: A nice puzzle for his own theory. 'What's you name?' 'Alice, and Alice!'
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
14664 Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: A 'necessary being' is one that exists in every possible world; and only some objects - numbers, properties, pure sets, propositions, states of affairs, God - have this distinction.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 2)
     A reaction: This a very odd list, though it is fairly orthodox among philosophers trained in modern modal logic. At the very least it looks rather parochial to me.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
14666 Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Socrates is a contingent being; his essence, however, is not. Properties, like propositions and possible worlds, are necessary beings. If Socrates had not existed, his essence would have been unexemplified, but not non-existent.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 4)
     A reaction: This is a distinctive Plantinga view, of which I can make little sense. I take it that Socrates used to have an essence. Being dead, the essence no longer exists, but when we talk about Socrates it is largely this essence to which we refer. OK?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
16981 With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
     Full Idea: It is clear from (x)□(x=x) and Leibniz's Law that identity is an 'internal' relation: (x)(y)(x=y ⊃ □x=y). What pairs (w,y) could be counterexamples? Not pairs of distinct objects, …nor an object and itself.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.03)
     A reaction: I take 'internal' to mean that the necessity of identity is intrinsic to the item(s), and not imposed by some other force.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
4942 The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that the Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (not to be confused with the identity of indiscernibles) is as self-evident as the law of contradiction.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.03)
     A reaction: This seems obviously correct, as it says no more than that a thing has whatever properties it has. If a difference is discerned, either you have made a mistake, or it isn't identical.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
16984 I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
     Full Idea: I do not think of 'possible worlds' as providing a reductive analysis in any philosophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate nature, from either an epistemological or a metaphysical view, of modal operators, propositions etc.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18)
     A reaction: I think this remark opens the door for Kit Fine's approach, of showing what modality is by specifying its sources. Possible worlds model the behaviour of modal inferences.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
9385 The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
     Full Idea: If a speaker introduced a designator into a language by a ceremony, then in virtue of his very linguistic act, he would be in a position to say 'I know that Fa', but nevertheless 'Fa' would be a contingent truth (provided F is not an essential property).
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.14)
     A reaction: If someone else does the designation, I seem to have contingent knowledge that the ceremony has taken place. You needn't experience the object, but you must experience the ceremony, even if you perform it.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
14662 Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: The idea of possible worlds has delivered insights on logical possibility (de dicto and de re), propositions, properties and sets, counterfactuals, time and temporal relations, causal determinism, the ontological argument, and the problem of evil.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], Intro)
     A reaction: This date (1976) seems to be the high-water mark for enthusiasm about possible worlds. I suppose if we just stick to 'insights' rather than 'answers' then the big claim might still be acceptable. Which problems are created by possible worlds?
4943 Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
     Full Idea: We should remind ourselves the 'possible worlds' terminology can always be replaced by modal talk, such as "It is possible that…"
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.15)
     A reaction: Coming from an originator of the possible worlds idea, this is a useful reminder that we don't have to get too excited about the ontological commitments involved. It may be just a 'way to talk', and hence a tool, rather than a truth about reality.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16472 Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Plantinga's critics worry that the metaphysics is actualist in name only, since it is achieved only by populating the actual world with entities whose nature is explained in terms of merely possible things that would exemplify them if anything did.
     From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: Plantinga seems a long way from the usual motivation for actualism, which is probably sceptical empiricism, and building a system on what is smack in front of you. Possibilities have to be true, though. That's why you need dispositions in actuality.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16983 Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
     Full Idea: In studying probabilities with dice, we are introduced at a tender age to a set of 36 (miniature) possible worlds, if we (fictively) ignore everything except the two dice. …The possibilities are abstract states of the dice, not physical entities.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.16)
     A reaction: Interesting for the introduction by the great man of the words 'fictional' and 'abstract' into the discussion. He says elsewhere that he takes worlds to be less than real, but more than mere technical devices.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16469 Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: The domains in Plantinga's interpretation of Kripke's semantics are sets of essences, and the values of variables are essences. The values of predicates have to be functions from possible worlds to essences.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: I begin to think this is quite nice, as long as one doesn't take the commitment to the essences too seriously. For 'essence' read 'minimal identity'? But I take essences to be more than minimal, so use identities (which Kripke does?).
16470 Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
     Full Idea: For Plantinga, essences are entities in their own right and will have properties different from what instantiates them. Hence he will need individual essences of individual essences, distinct from the essences. I see no way to avoid a hierarchy of them.
     From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: This sounds devastating for Plantinga, but it is a challenge for traditional Aristotelians. Only a logician suffers from a hierarchy, but a scientist might have to live with an essence, which contains a super-essence.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
14663 Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1)
     A reaction: Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
21375 Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Reasonable and vicious are quite consistent with each other, in fact, only through their union are great and far-reaching crimes possible.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.83), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: This is opposed to Kant, who always looks wildly optimistic in his hope that high rationality entails a morally good will. Good people seem to have a fairly irrational empathy with their fellow citizens.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
21379 Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice and compassion, are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.192), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Egoism'
     A reaction: A well chosen trio. Kant would be shocked that he has left out duty, which is supposed to rise above such feelings.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
21376 Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: In philosophical morals animals are mere 'things', mere means to any end whatsoever. ...Shame on such a morality, that fails to recognise the eternal essence that lives in every living thing, and shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.96), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: Good. I find Kant's theoretical indifference to animals very creepy (despite his kind attitude to them). And I also think the utilitarians are wrong to only value animals for their pain, as if any animal could be shredded for fun, if it felt no pain.