Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Necessity', 'Rights of Man' and 'Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals''

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7 ideas

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism

18383	Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
	Full Idea: Plantinga rejects other possible worlds, but adds to our world an uncountable multitude of sets of propositions, each set a way that the world might have been, but is in fact not. (Roughly, for each Lewis world, Plantinga has such a set).
	From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974]) by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 07.2
	A reaction: To me it seems as ontologically extravagant to postulate unexpressed propositions as to postulate concrete possible worlds. I think the best line is that there is just the actual world, with the possibilities implied in its dispositions.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation

11891	Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
	Full Idea: Plantinga says for an individual to exist with certain properties in some possible world is simply for it to be true that, had that possible world obtained, that individual would have existed with those properties.
	From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 5.1
	A reaction: This is intended to dissolve the problem of transworld identity, and is certainly a flat rejection of counterparts. I take the point to be that the individual is the key element in defining the possible world, so can't possibly be different.

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts

10645	We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH]
	Full Idea: We have three different ways in which we arrive at concepts or universals: there is a clarification, where we have a ready-made concept and define it; we have a combination (where a definition creates a concept); and an experience can lead to a habit.
	From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.190)
	A reaction: [very compressed] He cites Russell as calling the third one a 'condensed induction'. There seems to an intellectualist and non-intellectualist strand in the abstractionist tradition.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection

10644	A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH]
	Full Idea: A 'felt familiarity' with universals seems to be more primitive than explicit abstraction.
	From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.188)
	A reaction: This I take to be part of the 'given' of the abstractionist view, which is quite well described in the first instance by Aristotle. Price says that it is 'pre-verbal'.

10646	Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH]
	Full Idea: Whether you call it inductive or not, our understanding of such a word as 'dog' or 'house' does arise from a repeated experience of concomitances.
	From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.191)
	A reaction: Philosophers don't use phrases like that last one any more. How else could we form the concept of 'dog' - if we are actually allowed to discuss the question of concept-formation, instead of just the logic of concepts.

24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions

23261	A people, not government, creates a constitution, which is essential for legitimacy [Paine]
	Full Idea: A constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people constituting a government, and a government without a constitution is power without right.
	From: Thomas Paine (Rights of Man [1792], Ch.7), quoted by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 5
	A reaction: A constitution looks like the ultimate focus of a social contract (though Greeks had them long ago). It is hard to say why a government should consider itself to be sovereign if it hasn't got it in writing.

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof

20704	A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B]
	Full Idea: Plantinga reformulates Malcolm's argument thus: 1) There is a possible world in which there exists a being with maximal greatness, 2) A being has maximal greatness in a world only if it exists in every world.
	From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974], p.213) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 4 'b Descartes'
	A reaction: This is only Plantinga's starting point, which says nothing about the nature of God, but only that this 'great' being exists in all worlds. I would like to know why it is a 'being' rather than a 'thing'. Malcolm says if it is possible it is necessary.