14 ideas
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: Chalmers' two-dimensional conceivability account of possibility offers a defence of a priori conceptual analysis, and foundations on which a priori philosophy can be furthered. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I think I prefer Williamson's more scientific account of possibility through counterfactual conceivability, rather than Chalmers' optimistic a priori account. Deep topic, though, and the jury is still out. |
| 21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
| Full Idea: By a 'propositional function' I mean something which contains a variable x, and expresses a proposition as soon as a value is assigned to x. That is to say, it differs from a proposition solely by the fact that it is ambiguous. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.216) | |
| A reaction: This is Frege's notion of a 'concept', as an assertion of a predicate which still lacks a subject. |
| 21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Such a proposition as 'all the judgements made by Epimenedes are true' will only be prima facie capable of truth if all his judgements are of the same order. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.227) | |
| A reaction: This is an attempt to use his theory of types to solve the Liar. Tarski's invocation of a meta-language is clearly in the same territory. |
| 23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of types meant that features common to different levels of the hierarchy became uncapturable (since any attempt to capture them would involve a predicate which disobeyed the hierarchy restrictions). | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910]) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2H | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear whether this is the main reason why type theory was abandoned. Ramsey was an important critic. |
| 21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
| Full Idea: In Russell's mature 1910 theory of types classes are defined in terms of propositional functions, and functions themselves are regimented by a ramified theory of types mitigated by the axiom of reducibility. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.133 |
| 21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We will define a function of one variable as 'predicative' when it is of the next order above that of its arguments, i.e. of the lowest order compatible with its having an argument. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.237) | |
| A reaction: 'Predicative' just means it produces a set. This is Russell's strict restriction on which functions are predicative. |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: When P is an essence of O it follows that P is a necessary property of O. However, P can be a necessary property of O without being an essence of O. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Knowledge') | |
| A reaction: This summarises the Kit Fine view with which I sympathise. However, I dislike presenting essence as a mere list of properties, which is only done for the convenience of logicians. But was Jessie Owens a great athlete after he lost his speed? |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: Conceivability as evidence for possibility needs four interpretations. How is 'conceivable' defined or explained? How strongly is the idea endorsed? How does inconceivability fit in? And what kind of possibility (logical, physical etc) is implied? | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
| A reaction: [some compression] Williamson's counterfactual account helps with the first one. The strength largely depends on whether your conceptions are well informed. Inconceivability may be your own failure. All types of possibility can be implied. |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: If we aim to derive impossibility from inconceivability, we may either face a failure to conceive something, or arrive at a state of incoherence in conceiving. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
| A reaction: [summary] Thus I can't manage to conceive a multi-dimensional hypercube, but I don't even try to conceive a circular square. In both cases, we must consider whether the inconceivability results from our own inadequacy, rather than from the facts. |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: Is it possible for an individual to possess objectual understanding without knowing they possess the objectual understanding? | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Objections') | |
| A reaction: Hm. A nice new question to loose sleep over. We can't demand a regress of meta-understandings, so at some point you just understand. Birds understand nests. Equivalent: can you understand P, but can't explain P? Skilled, but inarticulate. |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: In the Gettier case of deductive justification, what we have is a separation between the source of the justification and the truthmaker for the belief. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Distinction') | |
| A reaction: A very illuminating insight into the Gettier problem. As a fan of truthmakers, I'm wondering if this might quickly solve it. |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: The disjunctive belief that 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona', which Smith believes, derives its justification from the left disjunct, and its truth from the right disjunct. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
| A reaction: The example is from Gettier's original article. Have we finally got a decent account of the original Gettier problem, after fifty years of debate? Philosophical moves with delightful slowness. |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: A representation cannot accidentally be about an object. Aboutness is in general an intentional relation. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Objections') | |
| A reaction: 'Intentional' with a 't', not with an 's'. This strikes me as important. Critics dislike the idea of 'representation' because if you passively place a representation and its subject together, what makes the image do the representing job? Answer: I do! |
| 21125 | Liberals must respect family freedom - but families are the great oppressors of women [Nussbaum] |
| Full Idea: A liberal society should give people considerable latitude to form families as they choose. …On the other hand the family …is one of the most notorious homes of sex hierarchy, denial of sexual opportunity, and sex-based violence and humiliation. | |
| From: Martha Nussbaum (Rawls and Feminism [2003], 03), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory | |
| A reaction: The question of how the state might intervene in the family rarely seems to turn up in standard political theory. This idea shows why that is a mistake. |