5 ideas
22333 | Only language is understandable Being [Gadamer] |
Full Idea: Being that can be understood is language. | |
From: Hans-Georg Gadamer (Truth and Method [1960], p.450), quoted by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 5.2 | |
A reaction: [also 1967 p.19] Glock quotes this to show that continental philosophers are just as linguistic in their approach as the analytic school. I think the main aim of representational painting is to grasp non-linguistic Being. |
19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this. |
4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
Full Idea: If there were nothing more to our mind than our conscious awareness, then we would be unable to see anything or to process speech. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Making of a Philosopher [2002], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: A vital point. Traditional dualism has left us a simplistic exaggeration of the role of consciousness, and the misapprehension that most of what we do is conscious - which it clearly isn't, once you think about it. |
4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |
Full Idea: The importance of Grice's analysis of speaker meaning is that it offers the prospect of analysing the whole phenomenon of linguistic meaning in terms of propositional attitudes… thus turning semantics into a department of the philosophy of mind. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Making of a Philosopher [2002], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Although meaning being truth conditions is the most cited theory, the reduction of semantics to an aspect of mind also seems almost orthodox now. But how do the symbols 'represent' the attitudes? |
20928 | Facts don't oppose values; they are integrated into each person's aspirations [Gadamer, by Zimmermann,J] |
Full Idea: Gadamer shows that we cannot oppose facts to values, but that all facts are integrated into meaningful wholes through a personal commitment to some kind of vision of how things ought to be. | |
From: report of Hans-Georg Gadamer (Truth and Method [1960]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction | |
A reaction: Straw man here. Whoever said that facts were 'opposed' to values? Certainly not David Hume. Any sensible empiricist of that type would try to develop values that integrated nicely with the facts. Gadamer seems to be denying facts. |