Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Epistemology of Modality', 'Human Freedom and Divine choice' and 'A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence

16755	The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: Aristotle seems to have a possible basis for the belief [in individual forms], namely that forms are real and active principles in the world, which is denied by any right-minded modern.
	From: report of Kit Fine (A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form [1994], p.19) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3 n8
	A reaction: Pasnau says this is the view of forms promoted by the scholastics, whereas Aristotle's own view should be understood as 'metaphysical'.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

13083	The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Of the essence of a particular thing is what pertains to it necessarily and perpetually; of the concept of an individual thing on the other hand is what pertains to it contingently or per accidens.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Human Freedom and Divine choice [1690], Grua 383), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.3.1
	A reaction: This arbitrates on the apparent conflict between his remarks in Idea 13077 and Idea 10382. There seems to be a distinction between the 'concept' of a thing, and the 'complete concept', the latter including the contingent properties.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible

19440	How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
	Full Idea: The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility.
	From: Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2)
	A reaction: [He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this.