15452
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We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
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From:
David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
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A reaction:
This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.
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22973
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The present moment, time's direction, and time's dynamic quality seem to be objective facts [Price,H]
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Full Idea:
The flow of time seems to be an objective feature of reality because of 1) the present moment can be objectively distinguished, 2) time has an objective direction, of earlier and later, and 3) there is something objectively dynamic about time.
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From:
Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 1.1)
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A reaction:
Price sets out to undermine all three of these claims, in implicit defence of a psychological view. I disagree with him.
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22975
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We must explain either the existence of a time direction, or our psychological sense of it [Price,H]
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Full Idea:
If the world comes equipped with a time orientation, where does it come from? If it doesn't, what explains our psychological feeling of a direction for time?
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From:
Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 3.5)
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A reaction:
The chances of 'explaining' either one look slim to me. That is, the fact would explain our experience, but the experience without the fact looks ridiculous, and I cannot conceive of any time-free entity which could explain the fact.
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