Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Epistemology of Modality', 'The Flow of Time' and 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest'

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6 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

15453	The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The leading rivals to a theory of universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory.
	From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.110)
	A reaction: If that is the complete menu, I choose resemblance nominalism. All discussion of properties in terms of classes is wildly misguided (because properties come first). Why not 'natural' tropes?

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object

15452	We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
	Full Idea: We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
	From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
	A reaction: This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible

19440	How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
	Full Idea: The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility.
	From: Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2)
	A reaction: [He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism

22974	Presentists lack the materials for a realist view of change [Price,H]
	Full Idea: The presentist view seems to have lost the materials for a realist view of passage, change or temporal transition.
	From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 2)
	A reaction: It is a nice point. How can a presentist talk of change if the only component that exists is the present time slice? Price says change can only be a kind of fiction for the presentist. Change in existence and in properties are distinct concepts.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series

22973	The present moment, time's direction, and time's dynamic quality seem to be objective facts [Price,H]
	Full Idea: The flow of time seems to be an objective feature of reality because of 1) the present moment can be objectively distinguished, 2) time has an objective direction, of earlier and later, and 3) there is something objectively dynamic about time.
	From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 1.1)
	A reaction: Price sets out to undermine all three of these claims, in implicit defence of a psychological view. I disagree with him.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow

22975	We must explain either the existence of a time direction, or our psychological sense of it [Price,H]
	Full Idea: If the world comes equipped with a time orientation, where does it come from? If it doesn't, what explains our psychological feeling of a direction for time?
	From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 3.5)
	A reaction: The chances of 'explaining' either one look slim to me. That is, the fact would explain our experience, but the experience without the fact looks ridiculous, and I cannot conceive of any time-free entity which could explain the fact.