33 ideas
| 10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
| Full Idea: I understand questions about the Fregean notion of an object to be inseparable from questions in the philosophy of language - questions of the existence of objects are tantamount to questions about non-vacuous singular terms of a certain kind. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This view hovers somewhere between Quine and J.L. Austin, and Dummett is its originator. I am instinctively deeply opposed to the identification of metaphysics with semantics. |
| 10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
| Full Idea: An expression ... should be reckoned a genuine singular term only if it resists elimination by paraphrase. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as extraordinarily optimistic. It will be relative to a language, and the resources of a given speaker, and seems open to the invention of new expressions to do the job (e.g. an equivalent adjective for every noun in the dictionary). |
| 19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: Idealists do not believe that there is an ontological distinction between beliefs and what makes beliefs true. From their perspective, reality is something like a collection of beliefs. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §2.1) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem to me to wholly reject truthmakers, since beliefs can still be truthmakers for one another. This is something like Davidson's view, that only beliefs can justify other beliefs. |
| 19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: Coherence theories of truth differ on their accounts of the coherence relation, and on their accounts of the set (or sets) of propositions with which true propositions occur (the 'specified set'). | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1) | |
| A reaction: Coherence is clearly more than consistency or mutual entailment, and I like to invoke explanation. The set has to be large, or the theory is absurd (as two absurdities can 'cohere'). So very large, or very very large, or maximally large? |
| 19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: It is unsatisfactory for the coherence relation to be consistency, because two propositions could be consistent with a 'specified set', and yet be inconsistent with each other. That would imply they are both true, which is impossible. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1) | |
| A reaction: I'm not convinced by this. You first accept P because it is consistent with the set; then Q turns up, which is consistent with everything in the set except P. So you have to choose between them, and might eject P. Your set was too small. |
| 19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: One extreme for the specified set is the largest consistent set of propositions currently believed by actual people. A moderate position makes it the limit of people's enquiries. The other extreme is what would be believed by an omniscient being. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1) | |
| A reaction: One not considered is the set of propositions believed by each individual person. Thoroughgoing relativists might well embrace that one. Peirce and Putnam liked the moderate one. I'm taken with the last one, since truth is an ideal, not a phenomenon. |
| 19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: It must be remembered that coherentists do not believe that the truth of a proposition consists in coherence with an arbitrarily chosen set of propositions; the coherence is with a set of beliefs, or a set of propositions held to be true. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §3.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a very good response to critics who cite bizarre sets of beliefs which happen to have internal coherence. You have to ask why they are not actually believed, and the answer must be that the coherence is not extensive enough. |
| 19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: The two main objections to the coherence theory of truth are that there is no way to identify the 'specified set' of propositions without contradiction, ...and that some propositions are true which cohere with no set of beliefs. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §3.1/2) | |
| A reaction: The point of the first is that you need a prior knowledge of truth to say which of two sets is the better one. The second one is thinking of long-lost tiny details from the past, which seem to be true without evidence. A huge set might beat the first one. |
| 19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: Unlike deflationary theories, the coherence and correspondence theories both hold that truth is a property of propositions that can be analyzed in terms of the sorts of truth-conditions propositions have, and the relation propositions stand in to them. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is presumably because deflationary theories reject the external relations of a proposition as a feature of its truth. This evidently leaves them in need of a theory of meaning, which may be fairly minimal. Horwich would be an example. |
| 10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The criteria for a genuine singular term should pick out not the singular terms themselves but their uses, since they may be genuine in one context and not another. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: [rephrased] This will certainly meet problems with vagueness (e.g. as the reference of a singular term is gradually clarified). |
| 10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
| Full Idea: In 'the whale is increasingly scarce' and 'the whale is much improved today' (our pet whale), we cannot infer that there is something that is much improved and increasingly scarce, so this singular term fails Dummett's criterion based on inference. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: [much rephrased] This is not just a problem for a few cunningly selected examples. With contortions almost any singular term can be undermined in this way. Singular terms are simply not a useful guide to the existence of abstracta. |
| 10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Some examples where a definite singular noun phrase is not 'genuine' (giving ontological commitment): 'left us in the lurch'; 'for my mother's sake'; 'given the sack'; 'in the nick of time', 'the whereabouts of the PM', 'the identity of the murderer'. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: These are not just freakish examples. If I 'go on a journey', that doesn't involve extra entities called 'journeys', just because the meaning is clearer and a more commonplace part of the language. |
| 10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
| Full Idea: If we lack any general, language-neutral characterization of singular terms, must not a parallel linguistic relativity infect the objects which are to be thought of as their non-linguistic correlates? | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.III) | |
| A reaction: Hale thinks he can answer this, but I would have thought that this problem dooms the linguistic approach from the start. There needs to be more imagination about how very different a language could be, while still qualifying as a language. |
| 10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The 'concrete/abstract' distinction has a strong intuitive feel, and can seem to be drawable by familiar contrasts, between what can/cannot be perceived, what can/cannot be involved in causal interactions, and is/is not located in space and time. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.I) | |
| A reaction: Problems arise, needless to say. The idea of an abstraction can be causal, and abstractions seem to change. If universals are abstract, we seem to perceive some of them. They can hardly be non-spatial if they have a temporal beginning and end. |
| 10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
| Full Idea: It might seem that colours would qualify both as concrete and as abstract objects. ...and geometrical points also seem to be borderline. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.II) | |
| A reaction: The theory of tropes exploits this uncertainty. Dummett (1973:ch.14) notes that we can point to colours, but also slip from an adjectival to a noun usage of colour-terms. He concludes that colours are concrete. I think I agree. |
| 10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Noonan suggests that the distinction between abstract and concrete objects should be seen as derivative from a difference between the relations centrally involved in criteria of identity associated with names of objects. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Noonan 1976, but I've lost it] I don't understand this, but collect it as a lead to something that might be interesting. A careful reading of Hale might reveal what Noonan meant. |
| 10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
| Full Idea: In familiar, though doubtless not wholly problematic jargon, token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: This is indeed problematic. The marks may be tokens, but the preliminary to identifying the type is to see that the marks are in fact words. To grasp the concrete, grasp the abstraction. An excellent example of the blurring of the distinction. |
| 10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The domain of the abstract can be seen as exemplifying a hierarchical structure, with differences of level reflecting the number of steps of abstraction, via appropriate equivalence relations, required for recognition at different levels. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: I think this is right, and so does almost everyone else, since people cheerfully talk of 'somewhat' abstract and 'highly' abstract. Don't dream of a neat picture though. You might reach a level by two steps from one direction, and four from another. |
| 10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
| Full Idea: If Fs are incapable of spatial location, it is impossible for a and b to be at the same time in different places and yet be the same F. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: A passing remark from Hale which strikes me as incredibly significant. The very idea of a 'one-over-many' is that there are many locations for the thing, so to conclude that the thing is therefore non-located seems to negate the original problem. |
| 10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The traditional conception of universals, resting as it does upon the idea that some single type of entity is picked out by expressions of such radically different logical types as predicates and abstract nouns, is of doubtful coherence. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3 Intro) | |
| A reaction: A striking case of linguistic metaphysics in action. I don't believe in universals, but I don't find this persuasive, as our capacity to express the same proposition by means of extremely varied syntax is obvious. Is 'horse' an abstract noun? |
| 10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
| Full Idea: On the traditional realist's view abstract qualities (universals) are the common referents of two quite different sorts of expression - of ordinary adjectives (predicates), and of abstract nouns referring to them. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: This fact alone should make us suspicious, especially as there isn't an isomorphism between the nouns and the adjectives, and the match-up will vary between languages. |
| 10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Objections to Frege's argument for abstract objects: that the objects would not have the right sort of independence; that we could have no knowledge of them; that the singular term statements can't be had; that thoughts of abstracta can't be identified. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] [See Idea 10309 for the original argument] It is helpful to have this list, even if Hale rejects them all. They are also created but then indestructible, and exist in unlimited profusion, and seem relative to a language. Etc! |
| 10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
| Full Idea: While a shape or a direction is necessarily of something, games, musical compositions or dance routines are not of anything at all. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.II) | |
| A reaction: This seems important, because Frege's abstraction principle works nicely for abstractions 'of' some objects, but is not so clear for abstracta that are sui generis. |
| 10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
| Full Idea: There are many plausible example of abstract objects which, though non-spatial, do not appear to satisfy the suggested requirement of atemporality, such as chess, or the English language. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.1) | |
| A reaction: Given the point that modern physics is committed to 'space-time', with no conceivable separation of them, this looks dubious. Though I think the physics could be challenged. Try Idea 7621, for example. |
| 10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
| Full Idea: If mental events are genuinely non-spatial, but not atemporal, its effect is to classify them as abstract; the distinction between the abstract and the mental simply collapses. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.1) | |
| A reaction: This is important. You can't discuss this sort of metaphysics in isolation from debates about the ontology of mind. Functionalists do treat mental events as abstractions. |
| 10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The abstract/concrete distinction is, roughly, between those sortals whose grounding relations can hold between abstract things which are spatially but not temporally separated, those concrete things whose grounding relations cannot so hold. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: Thus being a father is based on 'begat', which does not involve spatial separation, and so is concrete. The relation is one of equivalence. |
| 10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The notion of an 'object' first introduced by Frege is much broader than that of most comparable ordinary uses of 'object', and is now fairly standard and familiar. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This makes it very difficult to get to grips with the metaphysical issues involved, since the ontological claims disappear into a mist of semantic vagueness. |
| 10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Onotological outrage at such objects as the 'whereabouts of the Prime Minister' derives from the fact that we seem beggared for any convincing answer to the question 'What kind of objects are they?' | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: I go further and ask of any object 'what is it made of?' When I receive the answer that I am being silly, and that abstract objects are not 'made' of anything, I am tempted to become sarcastic, and say 'thank you - that makes it much clearer'. |
| 10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The relations which are featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: This will only apply to strict identity. If I say 'a is almost identical to b', this will obviously not be endlessly transitive (as when we get to k we may have lost the near-identity to a). Are 'two threes' identical to 'three twos'? |
| 10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Not every (apparent) judgement of identity involves application of anything properly describable as a criterion of identity, ...such as being able to pronounce that mercy is the quality of being merciful. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: This suggests some distinction between internal criteria (e.g. grammatical, conceptual) and external criteria (existent, sensed). |
| 19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this. |
| 19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: For the coherence theory of truth, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are ... objective features of the world. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro) | |
| A reaction: It is obviously rather important for your truth-conditions theory of meaning that you are clear about your theory of truth. A correspondence theory is evidently taken for granted, even in possible worlds versions. |
| 19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: Coherence theorists can argue that the truth conditions of a proposition are those under which speakers tend to assert it, ...and that speakers can only make a practice of asserting a proposition under conditions they can recognise as justifying it. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §2.2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This sounds rather verificationist, and hence wrong, since if you then asserted anything for which you didn't know the justification, that would remove its truth, and thus make it meaningless. |