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All the ideas for 'The Epistemology of Modality', 'works' and 'Probability and Logic of Rational Belief'

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3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox

6368	If my ticket won't win the lottery (and it won't), no other tickets will either [Kyburg, by Pollock/Cruz]
	Full Idea: The Lottery Paradox says you should rationally conclude that your ticket will not win the lottery, and then apply the same reasoning to all the other tickets, and conclude that no ticket will win the lottery.
	From: report of Henry E. Kyburg Jr (Probability and Logic of Rational Belief [1961]) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) §7.2.8
	A reaction: (Very compressed by me). I doubt whether this is a very deep paradox; the conclusion that I will not win is a rational assessment of likelihood, but it is not the result of strict logic.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible

19440	How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
	Full Idea: The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility.
	From: Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2)
	A reaction: [He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism

3449	If parallelism is true, how does the mind know about the body? [Crease]
	Full Idea: In parallelism, the idea that we have a body is like an astronaut hearing shouting on the moon, and reasoning that as this is impossible he must be simultaneously imagining shouting AND there is real shouting taking place!
	From: Jason Crease (works [2001]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: This seems to capture the absurdity of Leibniz's proposal. I experience what my brain is doing, but not because my brain is doing it. I would never know if God had made a slight error in setting His two 'clocks'; their accuracy is just a pious hope.