10 ideas
23326 | In the third century Stoicism died out, replaced by Platonism, with Aristotelian ethics [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: By the second century CE Aristotelianism and Platonism had begun to eclipse Stoicism, and by the end of the third century Stoicism had no followers. All philosophers now opted for some form of Platonism, but including Aristotle's ethical principles. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 04) | |
A reaction: The idea that Aristotelian ethics dominated that period is new to me. Stoic influence remained strong in Augustine, and hence in Christianity. |
23335 | In late antiquity nearly all philosophers were monotheists [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: I am inclined to think that almost all philosophers in late antiquity were monotheists. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure when late antiquity begins, in this remark. Maybe as early as 100 CE. Epictetus talks of Zeus as if he is supreme. |
18776 | Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: A 'contextual' definition shows how to eliminate a description from a context. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 2) | |
A reaction: I'm trying to think of an example, but what I come up with are better described as 'paraphrases' than as 'definitions'. |
18774 | Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: Definite descriptions seem to have a logical structure in a way that proper names do not. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 1.1.1) | |
A reaction: Thus descriptions have implications which plain names do not. |
19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this. |
23334 | For Christians man has free will by creation in God's image (as in Genesis) [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Christian view, following Genesis, is that man is created in the image of God, and this is understood as crucially involving the idea that man has a free will in the image of God's will. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
A reaction: The idea of free will evidently originated with Epictetus, but was taken up by Christians because it fitted doctrinal needs. Even Epictetus saw free will as originating in Zeus. |
23333 | The idea of free will achieved universal acceptance because of Christianity [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: There is no doubt that the notion of a free will found almost universal acceptance owing to the influence of Christianity. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 07) | |
A reaction: This is presumably because a free will not only elevates us above the animals, qualifying us for immortality, but also gives us absolute and ultimate responsibility for our lives, which thus justifies either salvation or damnation. |
23337 | The Stoics needed free will, to allow human choices in a divinely providential cosmos [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Stoics said that everything happens according to a divine providential plan, so they had to explain how this was compatible with human choices. They tried to do this with their doctrine of freedom and a free will. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 10) | |
A reaction: Epictetus made our ability to choose central to moral life, so he particularly needed (and thus created, it seems) this doctrine. |
23336 | There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle do not have a notion of a will, since for them a willing, a desire of reason, is a direct result of one's cognitive state: once one sees something to be good, one will it. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 09) | |
A reaction: The point is that their decisions are 'direct', whereas the will introduces the concept of a final arbiter which weighs up the desires, reasons and drives. The historical steps were first the meta-choosing, then the will as entity, then the will as free. |
23313 | The Gnostic demiurge (creator) is deluded, and doesn't care about us [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Gnostics thought the demiurge or creator pursues its own interests without regard for what this does to us, a being lacking in wisdom and goodness, as seen by its deluding itself into thinking that it is God, and demanding worship. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], Intro) | |
A reaction: Frede mentions Irenaeus as a source of this view. The idea that the Great Being doesn't care about us seems a fairly accurate observation. |