3 ideas
14401 | Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Every proposition, no matter what subject matter it may have, is entirely about being. | |
From: David Lewis (Things qua Truthmakers [2003], p.26), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Truth and Ontology 4.VI | |
A reaction: Since Lewis's propositions are sets of possible worlds, I presume this claim is made because proposition relates to all of the possible worlds, which therefore presumably embody Being. |
19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this. |
6456 | Sense-data are neutral uninterpreted experiences, separated from objects and judgements [Angeles] |
Full Idea: Sense-data are that which is given to us directly and immediately such as colour, shape, smell, without identification of them as specific material objects; they are usually thought to be devoid of judgment, interpretation, bias, preconception. | |
From: Peter A. Angeles (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1981], p.254) | |
A reaction: This definition makes them clearly mental (rather than being qualities of objects), and they sound like Hume's 'impressions'. They are not features of the external world, but the first steps we make towards experience. |