26 ideas
23027 | Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: To T.H. Green an ideal was no creation of an idle imagination, metaphysics no mere play of the speculative reason. Ideals were the most solid, and metaphysics the most practical thing about a man. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I | |
A reaction: This is despite the fact that Green was an idealist in the Hegelian tradition. I like this. I see it not just as ideals having practical guiding influence, but also that ideals themselves arising out of experience. |
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: Chalmers' two-dimensional conceivability account of possibility offers a defence of a priori conceptual analysis, and foundations on which a priori philosophy can be furthered. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: I think I prefer Williamson's more scientific account of possibility through counterfactual conceivability, rather than Chalmers' optimistic a priori account. Deep topic, though, and the jury is still out. |
23030 | Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: When we speak of anything as true or false, we do so on the ground of its relation to a whole of organised knowledge existing actually in no human mind, but prefigured in every mind which is possessed of reason. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I n1 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the super-idealist view of the coherence account of truth. I have no idea what 'prefigured' means here. |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: When P is an essence of O it follows that P is a necessary property of O. However, P can be a necessary property of O without being an essence of O. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Knowledge') | |
A reaction: This summarises the Kit Fine view with which I sympathise. However, I dislike presenting essence as a mere list of properties, which is only done for the convenience of logicians. But was Jessie Owens a great athlete after he lost his speed? |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: Conceivability as evidence for possibility needs four interpretations. How is 'conceivable' defined or explained? How strongly is the idea endorsed? How does inconceivability fit in? And what kind of possibility (logical, physical etc) is implied? | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
A reaction: [some compression] Williamson's counterfactual account helps with the first one. The strength largely depends on whether your conceptions are well informed. Inconceivability may be your own failure. All types of possibility can be implied. |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: If we aim to derive impossibility from inconceivability, we may either face a failure to conceive something, or arrive at a state of incoherence in conceiving. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
A reaction: [summary] Thus I can't manage to conceive a multi-dimensional hypercube, but I don't even try to conceive a circular square. In both cases, we must consider whether the inconceivability results from our own inadequacy, rather than from the facts. |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: Is it possible for an individual to possess objectual understanding without knowing they possess the objectual understanding? | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: Hm. A nice new question to loose sleep over. We can't demand a regress of meta-understandings, so at some point you just understand. Birds understand nests. Equivalent: can you understand P, but can't explain P? Skilled, but inarticulate. |
23044 | All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: All knowledge is seen on ultimate analysis to rest upon the idea of a fundamental unity between subject and object, between the knower and that which there is to be known. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III | |
A reaction: I don't really understand this thought, but I think it embodies the essence of Hegelian idealism. If I know a tree in the wood, any 'unity' between us strikes as merely imaginary. If the tree isn't separate, what does 'knowing' it mean? |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: In the Gettier case of deductive justification, what we have is a separation between the source of the justification and the truthmaker for the belief. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Distinction') | |
A reaction: A very illuminating insight into the Gettier problem. As a fan of truthmakers, I'm wondering if this might quickly solve it. |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: The disjunctive belief that 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona', which Smith believes, derives its justification from the left disjunct, and its truth from the right disjunct. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
A reaction: The example is from Gettier's original article. Have we finally got a decent account of the original Gettier problem, after fifty years of debate? Philosophical moves with delightful slowness. |
23034 | The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: Systematic interdependence in the world of nature is the ultimate test of truth. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: Green (or Muirhead) drifts between coherence as the nature of truth and coherence as the nature of justification. He it is the 'test' for truth, which was Russell's view. |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
Full Idea: A representation cannot accidentally be about an object. Aboutness is in general an intentional relation. | |
From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: 'Intentional' with a 't', not with an 's'. This strikes me as important. Critics dislike the idea of 'representation' because if you passively place a representation and its subject together, what makes the image do the representing job? Answer: I do! |
23032 | What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: All that is distinctively human in the life of man springs not from the desire to possess this or that object, and so far to realise a better, but to be something more and better than he is. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: An example of Victorian optimism, I think. I'm guessing that people who are not motivated by this impulse are not behaving in a way that is 'distinctively human'. That said, this is an interesting aspect of human nature. |
13550 | To be always happy is to lack knowledge of one half of nature [Seneca] |
Full Idea: To be always happy and to pass through life without any mental distress is to lack knowledge of one half of nature. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §4) | |
A reaction: These kind of paradoxes plague virtue theory, and any theory which aims at an ideal. Heaven, for example, seems to have no problems to solve, which spells boredom. The fascination of corrupt people is their superior knowledge of the world. |
23033 | Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: Hedonism failed because it offered as an end of human aspiration an object in which the human spirit, pledged by its own nature to self-betterment, …could never find satisfaction. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: It is always both sad and amusing to see that 150 years ago someone wrote of a doctrine that is still with us that it has 'failed'. Nowadays they try to say the same of physicalism. His objection rests on optimism about humanity. |
13549 | Nothing bad can happen to a good man [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Nothing bad can happen to a good man. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §2) | |
A reaction: This is a pithy summary of a well know ancient attitude - one that is rejected by Aristotle, but defended by Socrates. It depends what you mean by 'bad' - but that is a rather modern response. |
23045 | Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: Where laws and institutions are apparently the work of deliberate volition, they are in reality the result of a compromise, which while by a kind of social contract it has the acquiescence of all, expresses the will of none. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III | |
A reaction: Politicians who claim to be enacting the 'will of the people' (e.g. when they won a referendum 52-48) are simply lying. Committees usually end up enacting one person's will, but often without realising what has happened. |
23050 | The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: With all seriousness and reverence we may hope and pray for a condition of English society in which all honest citizens will recognise themselves and be recognised by each other as gentlemen. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV | |
A reaction: Call me old fashioned but, as long as we expand this to include ladies, I like this thought. Chaucer's knight (in his Prologue) should be our national role model. The true gentleman is an Aristotelian ideal. |
23052 | Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: Enfranchisement of the people is an end in itself. …Only citizenship makes the moral man; only citizenship gives that respect which is the true basis of the respect for others. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii:436), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV | |
A reaction: Should people respect their betters? If so, that is a sort of deferential respect which is different from the mutual respect between equals. That said, I wholly approve of this idea. |
23036 | The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: The modern idea of the good has developed in respect of the range of persons who have the capacity and therefore the right to participate in this good. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: Green is a notable Victorian liberal, starting from an idealist metaphysics. This is an intriguing view of liberal values. The concept of the good should be what suits persons with full capacity. Having the capacity bestows the right of access to it. Hm. |
23039 | A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: In so far as society commits itself to the principle of individuality of its citizens does it realise the unity and stability that constitute it a true 'State'. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: This asserts the liberal vision of a state, rather than asserting a fact. A state consistently mostly of slaves still seems to be a state, and may achieve a lot. |
23038 | People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
Full Idea: In so far as the individual commits himself to the principle of co-operation in a social whole does he realise his end as individual personality. | |
From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: This makes for a very communitarian type of liberalism. The question is whether we create insitutions which suck our free citizens into a communal way of life, or whether that is a matter of their own initiative. |
23040 | If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: To anyone who understands a process of development, the result being developed is the reality; and it is its ability to become this that the subject undergoing development has its true nature. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii: 224), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: Although this contains the dubious Hegelian idea that development tends towards some 'end', presented as fixed and final, it still seems important that anything accepted as a 'development' is the expression of some natural potential. |
13548 | The ocean changes in volume in proportion to the attraction of the moon [Seneca] |
Full Idea: The waves increase by degrees, approaching to the hour and day proportionately larger or smaller in volume as they are attracted by the star we call the moon, whose power controls the ocean's surge. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §1) | |
A reaction: ....just in case anyone thought that Isaac Newton had invented gravity. |
23031 | God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: God is a subject which is eternally all that the self-conscious subject as developed in time has the possibility of becoming. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I | |
A reaction: [Ethics p.197] Reminiscent of Peirce's account of truth, as the ideal end of enquiry. If God is a human ideal, we either limit God, or exaggerate our powers of idealisation. |
23041 | God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH] |
Full Idea: God is identical with the self of every man in the sense of being the realisation of its determinate possibilities.…In being conscious of himself man is conscious of God and thus knows that God is, but only in so far as he knows what he himself really is. | |
From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii:226-7), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II | |
A reaction: Does this, by the transitivity of identity, imply the identity of all individual men? Do we all contain identical possibilities, which converge on a unified concept of God? I always take the monotheistic God to far exceed mere human possibilities. |