Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Epistemology of Modality', 'Mathematical Logic (revised)' and 'Mental Models'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
12221 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine]
     Full Idea: A 'quasi-quotation' [corner quotes, Quine quotes] designates that (unspecified) expression which is obtained from the contents of the corners by replacing the Greek letters by the (unspecified) expressions which they designate.
     From: Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940], 1.6)
     A reaction: Filed under 'variables', as they seem to be variables that can refer to actual expressions, like algebra. Quine was determined to distinguish clearly between 'mention' and 'use'. 'Half-hearted substitutional quantification', says Fine.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
19321 We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham]
     Full Idea: Quine suggests that we can have a language with just predicates and no names. Thus for 'Ralph is red' we say 'x Ralphises and x is red'.
     From: report of Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.6
     A reaction: Kirkham discusses this as a way of getting round the lack of names in Tarski's theory of truth (which just uses objects, predicates and quantifiers). Otherwise you must supplement Tarski with an account of what the names refer to.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
19440 How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
     Full Idea: The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility.
     From: Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 7. Scientific Models
3214 The models we use in reasoning may be more like perceptions than like language [Johnson-Laird]
     Full Idea: The models that people use to reason are more likely to resemble perception or conception of the events (from a God's-eye view) than a string of symbols directly corresponding to the linguistic form of the premises and then applying rules of inference.
     From: P. Johnson-Laird (Mental Models [1983], p.53), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 10.1.2
     A reaction: My intuition is that imagination is the single most important faculty in any conscious mind, and that even small animals have an inkling of the God's-eye view. Decisions need 'what-if' scenarios.