3 ideas
| 19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this. |
| 6587 | It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford] |
| Full Idea: It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. | |
| From: William K. Clifford (works [1870]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This is a famous remark, but is in danger of being tautological unless one gives some account of what 'insufficient' means. If Clifford means the evidence must be conclusive, this is nonsense. 'Never believe if there is no evidence' is better. |
| 22235 | Feelings are not unchanging, but have a history (especially if they are noble) [Foucault] |
| Full Idea: We believe that feelings are immutable, but every sentiment, particularly the most noble and disinterested, has a history. | |
| From: Michel Foucault (Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971], p.86), quoted by Johanna Oksala - How to Read Foucault 5 | |
| A reaction: This is the sort of remark that makes me think Foucault is worth reading. Aristotle thought you could teach correct feelings. That implies that you can also teach incorrect feelings. |