Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Treatise 4: The Moral Sense' and 'Answer to 'What is Enlightenment?''

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Anaximander produced the first philosophy book (and maybe the first book) [Anaximander, by Bodnár]
     Full Idea: Anaximander was the first to produce a philosophical book (later conventionally titled 'On Nature'), if not the first to produce a book at all.
     From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by István Bodnár - Anaximander
     A reaction: Wow! Presumably there were Egyptian 'books', but this still sounds like a stupendous claim to fame.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: Reason is our power of finding out true propositions.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a very good definition. I don't see how you can define reason without mentioning truth, and you can't believe in reason if you don't believe in truth. The concept of reason entails the concept of a good reason.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Something which is established in the centre and has equality in relation to the extremes has no more reason to move up than it has down or to the sides (so the earth is stationary)
     From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], A26) by Aristotle - On the Heavens 295b11
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Anaximander saw the contradiction in the world - that its own qualities destroy it [Anaximander, by Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Anaximander discovers the contradictory character of our world: it perishes from its own qualities.
     From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 19 [239]
     A reaction: A lovely gloss on Anaximander, though I am not sure that I understand what Nietzsche means.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: Can there not be a right and wrong state of our moral sense, as there is in our other senses?
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV)
     A reaction: Hutcheson replies by saying something like they are both fully reliable in normal conditions. It remains, though, a very good question for the intuitionist to face, as the moral sense is supposed to be direct and reliable, but how do you check?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: In the following discourse, happiness denotes pleasant sensation of any kind, or continued state of such sensations.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], Intro)
     A reaction: This is a very long way from Greek eudaimonia. Hutcheson seems to imply that I would be happy if I got high on drugs after my family had just burnt to death. Socrates points out that scratching an itch is a very pleasant sensation (Idea 132).
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: What rule of actions can be formed, without relation to some end proposed? Or what end can be proposed, without presupposing instincts, desires, affections, or a moral sense, it will not be easy to explain.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV)
     A reaction: We have no reason to think that 'instincts, desires and affections' will give us the remotest guidance on how to behave morally well (though we would expect them to aid our survival). How could a moral sense give a reason, without spotting a rule?
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Enlightenment requires the free use of reason in the public realm [Kant]
     Full Idea: The public use of man's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men; the private use of reason may quite often be very narrowly restricted (…in a particular civil post or office).
     From: Immanuel Kant (Answer to 'What is Enlightenment?' [1784], p.55)
     A reaction: The private aspect seems to be the common restriction on speech by employees of the state. Does free speech have only instrumental value? Is the life of virtue possible without it?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless [Anaximander]
     Full Idea: The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless.
     From: Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], B2), quoted by (who?) - where?
The Boundless cannot exist on its own, and must have something contrary to it [Aristotle on Anaximander]
     Full Idea: Those thinkers are in error who postulate ...a single matter, for this cannot exist without some 'perceptible contrariety': this Boundless, which they identify with the 'original real', must be either light or heavy, either hot or cold.
     From: comment on Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 329a10
     A reaction: A dubious objection, I would say. If there has to be a contrasting cold thing to any hot thing, what happens when the cold thing is removed?
Things begin and end in the Unlimited, and are balanced over time according to justice [Anaximander]
     Full Idea: The non-limited is the original material of existing things; their source is also that to which they return after destruction, according to necessity; they give justice and make reparation to each other for injustice, according to the arrangement of Time.
     From: Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], B1), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 24.13-
     A reaction: Simplicius is quoting Theophrastus
Anaximander introduced the idea that the first principle and element of things was the Boundless [Anaximander, by Simplicius]
     Full Idea: Anaximander said that the first principle and element of existing things was the boundless; it was he who originally introduced this name for the first principle.
     From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], A09) by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.24.14-
     A reaction: Simplicius is quoting Theophrastus
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable [Anaximander, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable.
     From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.An.2
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: The reasons assigned for actions are such as 'It is the end proposed by the Deity'. But why do we approve concurring with the divine ends? The reason is given 'He is our benefactor', but then, for what reason do we approve concurrence with a benefactor?
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I)
     A reaction: Characteristic of what MacIntyre calls the 'Enlightenment Project', which is the application of Cartesian scepticism to proving the foundations of morals. Proof beyond proof is continually demanded. If you could meet God, you would obey without question.
Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: Why may not the Deity have something of a superior kind, analogous to our moral sense, essential to him?
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I)
     A reaction: This is Plato's notion of the gods, as beings who are profoundly wise, and understand all the great moral truths, but are not the actual originators of those truths. The idea that God creates morality actually serves to undermine morality.