6 ideas
| 12430 | Classical logic is our preconditions for assessing empirical evidence [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: In my terminology, classical logic (or at least, its most central tenets) consists of propositional preconditions for our assessing empirical evidence in the way we do. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §VII) | |
| A reaction: I like an even stronger version of this - that classical logic arises out of our experiences of things, and so we are just assessing empirical evidence in terms of other (generalised) empirical evidence. Logic results from induction. Very unfashionable. |
| 12431 | I believe classical logic because I was taught it and use it, but it could be undermined [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: I believe the laws of classical logic, in part because I was taught them, and in part because I think I see how those laws are used in assessing evidence. But my belief could easily be undermined by experience. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §VII) | |
| A reaction: Quine has one genuine follower! The trouble is his first sentence would fit witch-doctoring just as well. Kitcher went to Cambridge; I hope he doesn't just believe things because he was taught them, or because he 'sees how they are used'! |
| 12428 | Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: There are plenty of necessary truths that we are unable to express, let alone know a priori. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §II) | |
| A reaction: This certainly seems to put paid to any simplistic idea that the a priori and the necessary are totally coextensive. We might, I suppose, claim that all necessities are a priori for the Archangel Gabriel (or even a very bright cherub). Cf. Idea 12429. |
| 12429 | Knowing our own existence is a priori, but not necessary [Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: What is known a priori may not be necessary, if we know a priori that we ourselves exist and are actual. | |
| From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §II) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 12428, which challenges the inverse of this relationship. This one looks equally convincing, and Kripke adds other examples of contingent a priori truths, such as those referring to the metre rule in Paris. |
| 19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
| Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified. | |
| From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5) | |
| A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome. |
| 1497 | For Anaximenes nature is air, which takes different forms by rarefaction and condensation [Anaximenes, by Simplicius] |
| Full Idea: Unlike Anaximander, Anaximenes' underlying nature is not boundless, but specific, since he says that it is air, and claims that it is thanks to rarefaction and condensation that it manifests in different forms in different things. | |
| From: report of Anaximenes (fragments/reports [c.546 BCE], A5) by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.24.26- |