24 ideas
| 1765 | Diogenes said avoidance of philosophy is the lack of a desire to live properly [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: When a man said that he was not suited to philosophy, Diogenes said to him, 'Why then do you live, if you have no desire to live properly.' | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 | |
| A reaction: Meaning philosophy is already more practice than theory. |
| 11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Many definitions have three elements: the term that is defined, an expression containing the defined term (the 'definiendum'), and another expression (the 'definiens') that is equated by the definition with this expression. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2) | |
| A reaction: He notes that the definiendum and the definiens are assumed to be in the 'same logical category', which is a right can of worms. |
| 11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Notable examples of definitions in philosophy have been Plato's (e.g. of piety, in 'Euthyphro'), Anselm's definition of God, the Frege-Russell definition of number, and Tarski's definition of truth. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], Intro) | |
| A reaction: All of these are notable for the extensive metaphysical conclusions which then flow from what seems like a fairly neutral definition. We would expect that if we were defining essences, but not if we were just defining word usage. |
| 11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: In a modal logic in which names are non-vacuous and rigid, not only must existence and uniqueness in a definition be shown to hold necessarily, it must be shown that the definiens is satisfied by the same object across possible worlds. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
| 11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: The 'revision theory' of definitions says definitions impart a hypothetical character, giving a rule of revision rather than a rule of application. ...The output interpretation is better than the input one. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.7) | |
| A reaction: Gupta mentions the question of whether such definitions can extend into the trans-finite. |
| 11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Traditional definitions are generalized identities (so definiendum and definiens can replace each other), in which the sentential is primary (for use in argument), and they involve reduction (and hence eliminability in a ground language). | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.2) |
| 11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: A traditional definition requires that the definiendum contains the defined term, that definiendum and definiens are of the same logical category, and the definition is conservative (adding nothing new), and makes elimination possible. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
| 11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: A definition is 'extensionally adequate' iff there are no actual counterexamples to it. It is 'intensionally adequate' iff there are no possible counterexamples to it. It is 'sense adequate' (or 'analytic') iff it endows the term with the right sense. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.4) |
| 11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: The chemist aims at real definition, whereas the lexicographer aims at nominal definition. ...Perhaps real definitions investigate the thing denoted, and nominal definitions investigate meaning and use. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Very helpful. I really think we should talk much more about the neglected chemists when we discuss science. Theirs is the single most successful branch of science, the paradigm case of what the whole enterprise aims at. |
| 11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Some definitions aim at precision, others at fairness, or at accuracy, or at clarity, or at fecundity. But if definitions 'give the essence of things' (the Aristotelian formula), then it may not be a unitary kind of activity. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1) | |
| A reaction: We don't have to accept this conclusion so quickly. Human interests may shift the emphasis, but there may be a single ideal definition of which these various examples are mere parts. |
| 11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Stipulative definition imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice question is how far one can go in stretching received usage. If I define 'democracy' as 'everyone is involved in decisions', that is sort of right, but pushing the boundaries (children, criminals etc). |
| 11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Ostensive definitions look simple (say 'this stick is one meter long', while showing a stick), but they are effective only because a complex linguistic and conceptual capacity is operative in the background, of which it is hard to give an account. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: The full horror of the situation is brought out in Quine's 'gavagai' example (Idea 6312) |
| 11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}. This does captures its essential uses. Pairs <x,y> <u,v> are identical iff x=u and y=v, and the definition satisfies this. Function matters here, not meaning. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: This is offered as an example of Carnap's 'explications', rather than pure definitions. Quine extols it as a philosophical paradigm (1960:§53). |
| 1762 | When someone denied motion, Diogenes got up and walked away [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes replied to one who asserted that there was no such thing as motion by getting up and walking away. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 |
| 7813 | Cynicism was open to anyone, and needed neither education nor sophistication [Diogenes of Sin., by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: An advantage of Cynicism was that it was open to anyone who could grasp its simple teachings. Understanding it required neither education nor sophistication. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This was the source of the well-known opposition of Diogenes to Plato's Academy, and it makes him a key predecessor of the teachings of Jesus. Personally I think the really good life is difficult, and it needs education and careful rational thought. |
| 4867 | Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: I do not attribute to nature either beauty or deformity, order or confusion. Only in relation to our imagination can things be called beautiful or deformed, ordered or confused. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Oldenburg [1665], 1665?) | |
| A reaction: This is clearly a statement of Hume's famous later opinion that there are no values ('ought') in nature ('is'). It is a rejection of Aristotelian and Greek teleology. It is hard to argue with, but I have strong sales resistance, rooted in virtue theory. |
| 1763 | Diogenes said a plucked chicken fits Plato's definition of man [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Plato defined man as a two-footed featherless animal, so Diogenes plucked a cock and brought it into the school, and said, 'This is Plato's man'. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 | |
| A reaction: You have to be very serious about your philosophy to enact your counterexamples, rather than just suggest them. Which university will actually reconstruct the Trolley Problem? |
| 5071 | The Cynics rejected what is conventional as irrational, and aimed to live by nature [Taylor,R on Diogenes of Sin.] |
| Full Idea: The Cynics were convinced of the purely conventional foundation of Athenian values, which meant they had no rational foundation at all. They therefore rejected them in favour of what is correct and worthwhile by nature. | |
| From: comment on Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Richard Taylor - Virtue Ethics: an Introduction Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: This shows how the Cynics are key players in the progress of the nomos-physis debate, which keeps resurfacing as relativism vs absolutism, cognitivism vs non-cognitivism, and even romanticism vs classicism. The trouble is, convention is natural! |
| 7812 | For peace of mind, you need self-government, indifference and independence [Diogenes of Sin.] |
| Full Idea: There are three essential conditions for peace of mind: autarchy, apathy and freedom. Autarchy is self-government and self-sufficiency; apathy is indifference to what the world can do to you; the freedom is from dependence and possessions. | |
| From: Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]), quoted by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Quite good advice, but I don't see 'peace of mind' as the highest human ideal. The basic suggestion here is live alone and do nothing. Certainly don't get married, or have children, or try to achieve anything. |
| 1764 | Diogenes said he was a citizen of the world [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes said he was a citizen of no country, but of the world. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 |
| 5968 | Diogenes masturbated in public, wishing he could get rid of hunger so easily [Diogenes of Sin., by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus praises Diogenes for saying to bystanders as he masturbated in public, "Would that I could thus rub the hunger too out of my belly". | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1044b | |
| A reaction: So it is not quite true that people only need corn and water. Diogenes' remark doesn't explain why he did it in public. Was it to defy local convention (as befits a citizen of the world), or was it to teach? |
| 1766 | Diogenes said that the most excellent thing among men was freedom of speech [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes said that the most excellent thing among men was freedom of speech. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 |
| 4866 | God is a being with infinite attributes, each of them infinite or perfect [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: I define God as a being consisting in infinite attributes, whereof each is infinite or supremely perfect. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Oldenburg [1665], 1661) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me the glorious culmination of the hyperbolic conception of God that expands steadily from wood spirits through Zeus, to eventually mop up everything in nature, and then everything that can be imagined beyond nature. All very silly. |
| 4868 | Trying to prove God's existence through miracles is proving the obscure by the more obscure [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Those who endeavour to establish God's existence and the truth of religion by means of miracles seek to prove the obscure by what is more obscure. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Oldenburg [1665], 1675?) | |
| A reaction: Nicely put. On the whole this has to be right, but one must leave open a possibility. If there is a God, and He seeks to prove Himself by a deed, are we saying this is impossible? Divine intervention might be the best explanation of something. |