64 ideas
11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Many definitions have three elements: the term that is defined, an expression containing the defined term (the 'definiendum'), and another expression (the 'definiens') that is equated by the definition with this expression. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2) | |
A reaction: He notes that the definiendum and the definiens are assumed to be in the 'same logical category', which is a right can of worms. |
11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Notable examples of definitions in philosophy have been Plato's (e.g. of piety, in 'Euthyphro'), Anselm's definition of God, the Frege-Russell definition of number, and Tarski's definition of truth. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: All of these are notable for the extensive metaphysical conclusions which then flow from what seems like a fairly neutral definition. We would expect that if we were defining essences, but not if we were just defining word usage. |
11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
Full Idea: In a modal logic in which names are non-vacuous and rigid, not only must existence and uniqueness in a definition be shown to hold necessarily, it must be shown that the definiens is satisfied by the same object across possible worlds. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The 'revision theory' of definitions says definitions impart a hypothetical character, giving a rule of revision rather than a rule of application. ...The output interpretation is better than the input one. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.7) | |
A reaction: Gupta mentions the question of whether such definitions can extend into the trans-finite. |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Traditional definitions are generalized identities (so definiendum and definiens can replace each other), in which the sentential is primary (for use in argument), and they involve reduction (and hence eliminability in a ground language). | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.2) |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
Full Idea: A traditional definition requires that the definiendum contains the defined term, that definiendum and definiens are of the same logical category, and the definition is conservative (adding nothing new), and makes elimination possible. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
Full Idea: A definition is 'extensionally adequate' iff there are no actual counterexamples to it. It is 'intensionally adequate' iff there are no possible counterexamples to it. It is 'sense adequate' (or 'analytic') iff it endows the term with the right sense. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.4) |
11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The chemist aims at real definition, whereas the lexicographer aims at nominal definition. ...Perhaps real definitions investigate the thing denoted, and nominal definitions investigate meaning and use. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Very helpful. I really think we should talk much more about the neglected chemists when we discuss science. Theirs is the single most successful branch of science, the paradigm case of what the whole enterprise aims at. |
11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Some definitions aim at precision, others at fairness, or at accuracy, or at clarity, or at fecundity. But if definitions 'give the essence of things' (the Aristotelian formula), then it may not be a unitary kind of activity. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: We don't have to accept this conclusion so quickly. Human interests may shift the emphasis, but there may be a single ideal definition of which these various examples are mere parts. |
11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Stipulative definition imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.3) | |
A reaction: A nice question is how far one can go in stretching received usage. If I define 'democracy' as 'everyone is involved in decisions', that is sort of right, but pushing the boundaries (children, criminals etc). |
11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Ostensive definitions look simple (say 'this stick is one meter long', while showing a stick), but they are effective only because a complex linguistic and conceptual capacity is operative in the background, of which it is hard to give an account. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The full horror of the situation is brought out in Quine's 'gavagai' example (Idea 6312) |
11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}. This does captures its essential uses. Pairs <x,y> <u,v> are identical iff x=u and y=v, and the definition satisfies this. Function matters here, not meaning. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is offered as an example of Carnap's 'explications', rather than pure definitions. Quine extols it as a philosophical paradigm (1960:§53). |
6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Syntactical methods of proof (e.g.'natural deduction') have regard only to the formal structure of premises and conclusions, whereas semantic methods (e.g. truth-tables) consider their possible interpretations as expressing true or false propositions. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This is highly significant, because the first method of reasoning could be mechanical, whereas the second requires truth, and hence meaning, and hence (presumably) consciousness. Is full rationality possible with 'natural deduction'? |
6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
Full Idea: By 'substance', in the context of the mind, we mean a persisting object or thing which can undergo changes in its properties over time while remaining one and the same thing. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: A neat account of the traditional philosophical notion of a substance. It invites the obvious question of how you know that a thing is the same if all of its properties seem to have changed (as with Descartes' wax). Epistemology discredits ontology. |
6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The causal theory of beliefs seems condemned to treat all beliefs as true, which is absurd, …and we do not want to say that tomorrow's rain 'causes' today's belief that it will rain tomorrow. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Fodor. A false belief might be caused by reality if one had one's internal wires crossed, and a belief about the future might be caused by events happening now. This theory is not dead. |
6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Perhaps the 'I' in 'I think' no more serves to pick out a certain object than does the 'it' in 'it is raining'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: A nice example to remind us that not all English pronouns have genuine reference. You could reply that 'it' does refer, to the weather; or that you can switch to 'you think', but not to 'they/we are raining'. |
6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The 'ecological' approach to perception resists the idea that our brains have to construct information about our environment by inference from sensations, because the information is already present in the environment, available to well-tuned senses. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: The psychologist J.J.Gibson is the source of this view. This pushes us towards direct realism, and away from representative theories, which are based too much on problems arising from illusions (which are freak cases). Interesting. |
6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A bare knowledge that tables have a particular form will not enable one to recognise a table visually, unless one knows how something with such a form typically appears or looks from a variety of different angles. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather significant point, if we are trying to work out how concepts and models operate in the process of perception. Lowe points out that with electrons, we have some knowledge of the form, but no capacity for recognition. |
6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Computational psychologists object to the 'ecological' approach to perception (with its externalist, direct realist picture), because it leaves us entirely in the dark as to how our senses 'pick up' information about the environment. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: I find myself siding with the computationalists, but then I have always favoured the representational view of perception among philosophers. Lowe comments that both approaches neglect actual experience. We construct models, e.g. of London. |
6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: When two objects, one of them rotated, are compared, the length of time it takes the subjects to determine they are of the same shape is roughly proportional to the size of angle of rotation, ...which suggests analogue modes of representation. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: I consider this to be highly significant for our whole understanding of the mind, which I think of as a set of models organised like a database. Think about the weather, phenomenalism, London, the Renaissance, your leg. You play with models. |
6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says that we have either veridical perception or else hallucination, but there is no common element in the form of a 'perceptual experience' which would be present in either case and merely caused in different ways. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: McDowell is associated with this view. It seems to be another attempt to get rid of sense-data. It seems odd, though, to say that a hallucination of a dagger has nothing in common at all with experience of real daggers. Why did hallucinations evolve? |
6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A causal theorist can be a 'direct realist' in the sense that he can hold that the only objects of perception are external objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: There still seem to be problems with perceiving reflections, or very distant objects (the time-lag problem), or perceiving 'secondary' qualities. |
6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If we don't need to have perceptual experiences in order to see things (as 'blindsight' might suggest), the causal theory of perception cannot be correct. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This is because the causal theory implies a chain of events culminating in experience as the last stage. There is no suggestion, though, that unconscious perception would be non-causal, as it bypasses all the problems about consciousness. |
6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: How could one paraphrase the sense-datum report 'I am aware of a red square sense-datum to the right of a blue round sense-datum' in an adverbial way? 'I am appeared to redly and squarely and roundly and bluely'? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: It is a nice question, but not an instant refutation of the adverbial theory. Vision may be a complex tangle of modes of seeing things, rather than a large collection of sense-data. As I look out of the window, how many sense-data do I experience? |
6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Memory of facts is quite different from memory of practical skills, and both are quite distinct from what is sometimes called personal or autobiographical memory. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: If we accept David Marshall's proposal (Idea 6668), then all of the mind is memory, of many different types, and so the above analysis will be much too simple. |
19544 | Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske] |
Full Idea: Closure is the epistemological principle that if S knows that P is true and knows that P implies Q, then, evidentially speaking, this is enough for S to know that Q is true. Nothing more is needed. | |
From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.25) | |
A reaction: [Dretske was the first to raise this issue] It is 'closure' because it applies to every case of Q, which is every implication of P that is known. The issue is whether we really do know all such Qs. Dretske doubts it. See his zebra case. |
19545 | We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske] |
Full Idea: One doesn't have to regret everything one knows to be implied by what one regrets. Tom regrets drinking three martinis, but doesn't regret what he knows to be implied by this - that he drank 'something', or that the past is real. | |
From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.28) | |
A reaction: A nice case of analogy! He's right about regret. Perceptual and inferential knowledge have different grounds. To deny inferential knowledge seems to be a denial that modus ponens can be a justification. But MP gives truth, not knowledge. |
19547 | Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske] |
Full Idea: Some reasons for believing P do not transmit to things, Q, known to be implied by P. | |
From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.29) | |
A reaction: That seems true enough. I see someone limping, but infer that their leg is damaged. The only question is whether I should accept the inference. How can I accept that inference, but then back out of that knowledge? |
19546 | Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske] |
Full Idea: A way of knowing there are cookies in the jar - visual perception - is not a way of knowing what one knows to be implied by this - that visual appearances are not misleading. | |
From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.29) | |
A reaction: Why is the 'way of knowing' relevant? Isn't the only question that of whether implication of a truth is in infallible route to a truth (modus ponens)? If you know THAT it is true, then you must believe it, and implication is top quality justification. No? |
19548 | The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske] |
Full Idea: The only way to preserve knowledge of homely truths, the truths everyone takes themselves to know, is to abandon closure. | |
From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.32) | |
A reaction: His point is that knowledge of homely truths seems to imply knowledge of the background facts needed to support them, which he takes to be an unreasonable requirement. I recommend pursuing contextualism, rather than abandoning closure. |
19549 | P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske] |
Full Idea: The evidence that gives me knowledge of P (there are cookies in the jar) can exist without evidence for knowing Q (they are not fake), despite my knowing that P implies Q. So closure fails. | |
From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.33) | |
A reaction: His more famous example is the zebra. How can P imply Q if there is no evidence for Q? Maybe 'there are cookies in the jar' does not entail they are not fake, once you disambiguate what is being said? |
19550 | We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske] |
Full Idea: The reality of the past (a 'heavyweight implication') ...is something we know to be implied by things we remember, but it is not itself something we remember. | |
From: Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.35) | |
A reaction: If I begin to doubt that the past is real, then I must necessarily begin to doubt my ordinary memories. This seems to be the modus tollens of knowledge closure. Doesn't that imply that the modus ponens was valid, and closure is correct? |
6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Psychologists point out that illusions almost always occur in unnatural environments in which subjects are prevented from exploiting the natural interplay between perception and action. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: It has always struck me that philosophers make a great deal out of illusions, but I don't think I have ever had one. I don't know anyone who has seen a non-existent dagger. |
6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Externalism maintains that our minds 'reach out' into our physical environment, at least in the sense that our states of mind can depend for their very existence and identity upon what things that environment contains. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: A nice statement of the externalist view. Does this mean that a brain in a vat would not have a mind? Does a photograph 'reach out' to its subject-matter? |
6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Philosophy of mind seems to address the questions of whether the mind is distinct from the body, and whether the mind has properties, such as consciousness, which are unique to it. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: Simple enough, but the modern debate seems to centre on the second question, which is here stated nice and clearly. Of course, wild garlic has a unique smell, but that doesn't quite qualify as a 'unique property'. Are the properties of mind unpredictable? |
6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There is 'phenomenal' consciousness, which is what is distinctive of qualitative states of experience, and 'apperceptive' consciousness, which is awareness of all of one's mental states, including beliefs and desires. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: I am not convinced that this distinction is sharp enough to be useful, though I approve of trying to analyse the components of consciousness. Is there 'intentional' consciousness? Desires, and even beliefs, can have qualities. |
6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some physiologists maintain that the human brain is equipped with two different visual systems, an older one and a more recently evolved one, only the first of which is intact in blindsight subjects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Ramachandran (on TV) suggested that lizards lack the newer system, and therefore may not actually be conscious. The proposal of two systems seems to make nice sense of an odd phenomenon. We clearly have a non-conscious route to visual information. |
6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I suggest that persons are selves - that is, they are subjects of experience which have the capacity to recognised themselves as being individual subjects of experience; selves possess reflexive self-knowledge. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I would express this as 'a capacity for meta-thought'. I increasingly see that as the hallmark of homo sapiens, and the key quality I look for in assessing the intelligence of aliens. Very intelligent people are exceptionally self-aware. |
6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If, as seems intuitively plausible, I could survive with my brain detached from the rest of my body, I most certainly cannot be identical with my whole body. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: A key mistake is to treat the notion of 'I' as all-or-nothing. My surviving brain is much more like me than my surviving kidney, but the notion of my brain saying to my family 'it's me in that jar over there' sounds wrong. It is a bit of me. |
6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It seems impossible for me to acquire perfectly general concepts of thought and feeling, applicable to other people as well as to myself, purely from some queer kind of mental self-observation, but this is what the observational model demands. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I don't understand the word 'queer' here, which seems part of an odd modern fashion for denigrating introspection. It is right, though, that the acquisition of general mental concepts from my mind seems to depend on analogy, which is a suspect method. |
6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Every human language appears to have a word or expression equivalent to the English word 'I'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: If this is true (what is his evidence?) I take it to be very significant support for what I take to be obvious anyway, that the mind/brain has a central controlling core, which understands and decides, and which is the most valued part of us. |
6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The idea that 'qualia' exist but are causally inert is difficult to sustain: for if they are causally inert, how can we even know about them? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: The brain might be a special case. I can't know about a 'causally inert' object in my kitchen, but I might know about it if in some way I AM that object. Personally, though, I think everything that exists is causally active. |
6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
Full Idea: One must already understand what it means to ascribe to someone a belief that it is raining in order to be able to generate the items on the list of rain-behaviour, so the list cannot be used to explain what it means to ascribe to someone such a belief. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This is thought by many to be a decisive objection of behaviourism, because it makes the enterprise hopelessly circular. If I put up an umbrella when it was dry, you would probably infer that I believed it was raining. |
6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A computer executing its program is not equivalent to the English-speaker in the Chinese Room, but to the combination of the English-speaker and the operation manual. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: Searle replies that there would be no understanding even if the person learned the manual off by heart. However, if we ask 'Is there any understanding of the universe in Newton's book?' the answer has to be 'yes'. So the manual contains understanding. |
6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Functionalism seems to commit us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This goes with the tendency of functionalism to imply epiphenomenalism - that is, to make the intrinsic character of mental states irrelevant to thinking. I'd love to eavesdrop on two zombies in an art gallery. |
6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It seems that functionalism can recognise no difference between my colour experiences and yours, in the case of spectrum inversion, suggesting that it fails to characterise colour experience adequately, by omitting its qualitative character. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This is a standard objection to functionalism, but then it is an objection to most other theories as well. Even dualism just offers a mystery as to why experiences have qualities. Observing a patch of red involves about three billion brain connections. |
6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Functionalism has nothing positive to say about the intrinsic properties of mental states, only something about their relational properties. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This seems to me highly significant. All references to function (e.g. in Aristotle) invite the question of what enables something to have that function. Maybe the core question of philosophy of mind is whether mental states are intrinsic or relational. |
6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The rejection of type-type identity and acceptance of token-token identity is referred to as 'non-reductive physicalism', and is usually link with the idea that mental state types are not identical with physical state types, but 'supervene' on them. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: A nice summary of the view (built on the arguments of Davidson) which has also become known as 'property dualism'. Personally I regard it as dangerous nonsense. If two things 'supervene' on one another, the first question to ask is: why? |
6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Physicalists will, it seems, be committed to the notion of narrow content, because if a person and their counterpart are neurological duplicates, they must exemplify the same mental state types, and thus possess beliefs with the same contents. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Very important. How many philosophers currently believe in both wide content and reductive physicalism? However, if content is physical brain-plus-environment, we might reply that the whole package must be identical for same content. Cf Idea 7884! |
6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Eliminative materialism may be accused of incoherence, insofar as is threatens to eliminate reason and truth along with the propositional attitudes. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: Lowe does not enlarge on this intriguing suggestion. I don't see a threat to truth, if brain events represent the outer world, as they can do it more or less well. Logic is built on truth. Reason grows out of logic. Evidence seems okay… Hm. |
6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some behaviourists have held the view that thinking just is, in effect, suppressed speech. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: He cites J.B.Watson. This would imply that infants and animals can't think. Introspecting my own case, I don't believe it. When I am navigating through a town, for example, I directly relate to my mental map; I see little sign of anything verbal. |
6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
Full Idea: In the 'cab problem' (what colour was the cab in the accident?) most people estimate an 80% probability of it being a blue cab, but Bayes' Theorem calculates the probability at 41%, suggesting people put too much faith in eyewitness testimony. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: For details of the 'cab problem', see Lowe p.200. My suspicion is that people get into a tangle when confronted with numbers in a theoretical situation, but are much better at it when faced with a real life problem, like 'who ate my chocolate?' |
6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
Full Idea: 'Base rate neglect' (attending to the witness or evidence, and ignoring background information) is responsible for doctors exaggerating the significance of positive results in diagnosis of relatively rare medical conditions. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This seems to be one of the clearest cases where people's behaviour is irrational, though I suspect that people are much more rational about things if the case is simple and non-numerical. However, people are very credulous about wonderful events. |
6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The 'Frame Problem' in artificial intelligence is how to write a program which not only embodies people's general knowledge, but specifies how that knowledge is to be applied appropriately, when circumstances can't be specified in advance. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: As Lowe observes, this is a problem, but not necessarily an impossibility. There should be a way to symbolically map the concepts of knowledge onto the concepts of perception, just as we must do. |
6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Lack of motivation and curiosity are perhaps the most fundamental reason for denying that computers could be, in any literal sense, rational beings. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: I don't see why programmers couldn't move those two priorities to the top of the list in the program. When you switch on a robot, its first words could be 'Teach me something!', or 'Let's do something interesting!' Every piece of software has priorities. |
6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The Turing test is open to the objection that it is inspired by behaviourist assumptions and focuses too narrowly on verbal evidence of intelligence. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This is part of the objection that the test exhibits human chauvinism, and robots and aliens are wasting their time trying to pass it. You need human behaviour, especially speech, to do well. Inarticulate people can exhibit high practical intelligence. |
6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The leading naturalistic theories of what it is that confers a specific content upon a given attitudinal state are the causal theory, and the teleological theory, both of which contain serious difficulties. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: 'Causal' theories (Fodor) say the world directly causes content; 'teleological' theories (Millikan, Papineau) are based on the evolutionary purpose of content for the subject. I agree that neither seems adequate… |
6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The implication of considerations of Twin Earth cases is that even beliefs about the properties of kinds of stuff are implicitly indexical, or context-dependent, in character. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: This is a significant connection, between debates about the nature of indexicals (such as 'I' and 'this') and externalism about content generally. Is there no distinction between objective reference and contextual reference? |
6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
Full Idea: We use the same that-clause ('that snow is white') to specify the contents of both a person's utterances and of their beliefs, because it is the same proposition. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Certainly to say 'he believes that we should declare war' seems to refer to something non-linguistic, but it doesn't demonstrate that anything concrete or real is being referred to. It may be an abstract account of dispositions and desires. |
6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If propositions are abstract entities, more like the objects of mathematics, it seems mysterious that states of mind should depend for their causal powers upon the propositions which allegedly constitute their 'contents'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], 70) | |
A reaction: Compare standard objections to Platonic Forms (e.g. Idea 3353). You can't believe in abstract propositions, but be a reductive physicalist about the mind. So propositions are dynamic brain structures. Easy. |
6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The two alternatives to volitionism in explaining action are (firstly) certain complexes of belief and desire, and (secondly) causation by an agent. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: A helpful framework. A key test case seems to that of trying to perform an action and failing (e.g. through paralysis), and this goes against the whole 'agent' being the most basic concept. One also needs room for reasons, and this supports volitionism. |
6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Libet's experiments (on conscious and non-conscious choice) seem to provide empirical support for the concept of 'volition', conceived as a special kind of 'executive' mental operation. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Despite the strictures of Hobbes (Idea 2362) and Williams (Idea 2171), the will strikes me as a genuine item, clearly observable by introspection, and offering the best explanation of human behaviour. I take it to be part of the brain's frontal lobes. |
6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
Full Idea: When we choose how to act in the light of our beliefs and desires, we do not feel our choices to be caused by them, but we conceive of them as giving us reasons to choose. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: I agree, though this 'feeling' could be a delusion, and we certainly don't need to start talking about a 'free' will. The best account of action seems to be that the will operates on the raw material of beliefs and desires. The will is our 'decision box'. |
6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
Full Idea: When we ask why people act in the ways that they do, we are sometimes enquiring into people's motives, at other times we want to uncover their reasons, and at others we want to know the causes of their actions. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Helpful distinctions. Any one of these explanations might be collapsed into the others. Kantians, utilitarians and contractarians can study reasons, nihilists can study causes, and virtue theorists I take to be concerned with motives. |