22 ideas
11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Many definitions have three elements: the term that is defined, an expression containing the defined term (the 'definiendum'), and another expression (the 'definiens') that is equated by the definition with this expression. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2) | |
A reaction: He notes that the definiendum and the definiens are assumed to be in the 'same logical category', which is a right can of worms. |
11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Notable examples of definitions in philosophy have been Plato's (e.g. of piety, in 'Euthyphro'), Anselm's definition of God, the Frege-Russell definition of number, and Tarski's definition of truth. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: All of these are notable for the extensive metaphysical conclusions which then flow from what seems like a fairly neutral definition. We would expect that if we were defining essences, but not if we were just defining word usage. |
11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
Full Idea: In a modal logic in which names are non-vacuous and rigid, not only must existence and uniqueness in a definition be shown to hold necessarily, it must be shown that the definiens is satisfied by the same object across possible worlds. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The 'revision theory' of definitions says definitions impart a hypothetical character, giving a rule of revision rather than a rule of application. ...The output interpretation is better than the input one. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.7) | |
A reaction: Gupta mentions the question of whether such definitions can extend into the trans-finite. |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Traditional definitions are generalized identities (so definiendum and definiens can replace each other), in which the sentential is primary (for use in argument), and they involve reduction (and hence eliminability in a ground language). | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.2) |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
Full Idea: A traditional definition requires that the definiendum contains the defined term, that definiendum and definiens are of the same logical category, and the definition is conservative (adding nothing new), and makes elimination possible. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
Full Idea: A definition is 'extensionally adequate' iff there are no actual counterexamples to it. It is 'intensionally adequate' iff there are no possible counterexamples to it. It is 'sense adequate' (or 'analytic') iff it endows the term with the right sense. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.4) |
11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The chemist aims at real definition, whereas the lexicographer aims at nominal definition. ...Perhaps real definitions investigate the thing denoted, and nominal definitions investigate meaning and use. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Very helpful. I really think we should talk much more about the neglected chemists when we discuss science. Theirs is the single most successful branch of science, the paradigm case of what the whole enterprise aims at. |
11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Some definitions aim at precision, others at fairness, or at accuracy, or at clarity, or at fecundity. But if definitions 'give the essence of things' (the Aristotelian formula), then it may not be a unitary kind of activity. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: We don't have to accept this conclusion so quickly. Human interests may shift the emphasis, but there may be a single ideal definition of which these various examples are mere parts. |
11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Stipulative definition imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.3) | |
A reaction: A nice question is how far one can go in stretching received usage. If I define 'democracy' as 'everyone is involved in decisions', that is sort of right, but pushing the boundaries (children, criminals etc). |
11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Ostensive definitions look simple (say 'this stick is one meter long', while showing a stick), but they are effective only because a complex linguistic and conceptual capacity is operative in the background, of which it is hard to give an account. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The full horror of the situation is brought out in Quine's 'gavagai' example (Idea 6312) |
11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}. This does captures its essential uses. Pairs <x,y> <u,v> are identical iff x=u and y=v, and the definition satisfies this. Function matters here, not meaning. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is offered as an example of Carnap's 'explications', rather than pure definitions. Quine extols it as a philosophical paradigm (1960:§53). |
15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
Full Idea: Maybe peaceful co-existence between absolute logical necessity and absolute metaphysical necessity can be secured, ..and absolute necessity is their union. ...However, a truth would then qualify as absolutely necessary in two quite different ways. | |
From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 4) | |
A reaction: Hale is addressing a really big question for metaphysic (absolute necessity) which others avoid. In the end he votes for rejecting 'metaphysical' necessity. I am tempted to vote for rejecting logical necessity (as being relative). 'Absolute' is an ideal. |
8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
Full Idea: It might be metaphysically necessary that p but logically possible that not-p, so that metaphysical necessity is not, after all, absolute. | |
From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996]), quoted by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Lowe presents this as dilemma, but it sounds fine to me. Flying pigs etc. have no apparent logical problems, but I can't conceive of a possible world where pigs like ours fly in a world like ours. Earthbound pigs may be metaphysically necessary. |
15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
Full Idea: One type of necessity may be said to be 'stronger' than another when the first always entails the second, but not conversely. This will obtain only if the possibility of the first is weaker than the possibility of the second. | |
From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 1) | |
A reaction: Thus we would normally say that if something is logically necessary (a very strong claim) then it will have to be naturally necessary. If something is naturally possible, then clearly it will have to be logically possible. Sounds OK. |
15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
Full Idea: Necessity is 'relative' if a claim of φ-necessary that p just claims that it is a logical consequence of some statements Φ that p. We have a 'strong' version if we add that the statements in Φ are all true, and a 'weak' version if not. | |
From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 1) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure about 'logical' consequence here. It may be necessary that a thing be a certain way in order to qualify for some category (which would be 'relative'), but that seems like 'sortal' necessity rather than logical. |
15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
Full Idea: Friends of metaphysical necessity would want to hold that when it is metaphysically necessary that p, there is no good sense of 'possible' (except, perhaps, an epistemic one) in which it is possible that not-p. | |
From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 2) | |
A reaction: We might want to say which possible worlds this refers to (and presumably it won't just be in the actual world). The normal claim would refer to all possible worlds. Adding a '...provided that' clause moves it from absolute to relative necessity. |
15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
Full Idea: 'Broadly' logical necessities are propositions whose truth derives entirely from the concepts involved in them (together, of course, with relevant structure). | |
From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 3) | |
A reaction: Is the 'logical' part of this necessity bestowed by the concepts, or by the 'structure' (which I take to be a logical structure)? |
15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
Full Idea: The logical necessities can be taken to be the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. | |
From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], p.10) | |
A reaction: This is part of his story of essences giving rise to necessities. His proposal sounds narrow, but logical concepts may have the highest degree of generality which it is possible to have. It must be how the concepts connect that causes the necessities. |
15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
Full Idea: Conceptual necessities can be taken to be propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts. | |
From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], p.9) | |
A reaction: Fine endorse essences for these concepts. Could we then come up with a new concept which contradicted all the others, and destroyed the necessity? Yes, presumably. Presumably witchcraft and astrology are full of 'conceptual necessities'. |
2596 | Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Two clocks in perfect agreement must be by natural influence, or the control of a craftsman, or their perfect construction at the beginning. Only the third way (of "preestablished harmony" by God) is possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Nature and Communication of Substance [1690], p.121) | |
A reaction: Presumably 'natural influence' would cover the possibility that (unnoticed by you, apparently) one clock is attached to the other clock at the relevant points. If they are unconnected, presumably they are quite unaware of one another's existence. |
2595 | If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The perfect agreement of so many substances which have no communication whatever with each other can only come from a common source. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Nature and Communication of Substance [1690], p.120) |