Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Bhagavad Gita', 'Letter to Menoeceus' and 'Science and Method'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Serene wisdom is freedom from ties, and indifference to fortune [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Who everywhere is free from all ties, who neither rejoices nor sorrows if fortune is good or is ill, his is a serene wisdom.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.57)
     A reaction: This is very similar to the 'apatheia' of the Stoics, though they are always more committed to rationality. This is quite a good strategy when times are hard, but as a general rule it offers a bogus state of 'wisdom' which is really half way to death.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Let no one delay the study of philosophy while young nor weary of it when old; for no one is either too young or too old for the health of the soul.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 122)
     A reaction: I agree with this on both accounts. I think the correct age to begin the study of philosophy is four, and it is vital to continue its study up to the point where you can no longer remember your own name. 'Health of the soul' sounds right too.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.49)
     A reaction: Quotations like this can usually be counterbalanced in eastern philosophy by wild irrationality, but they certainly felt to tug of reason. Only the Dhaoists seem really opposed to reason (e.g. Idea 7289).
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
     Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.
     From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
I am all the beauty and goodness of things, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: I am the beauty of all things beautiful; ...I am the goodness of those who are good, says Krishna.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.36)
     A reaction: Another attempt to annexe everything which is admirable to the nature of God. This sounds strikingly Platonic (c.f. Idea 7992, which seems Aristotelian). One scholar dates the text to 150 BCE. I think there is influence, one way or the other.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.22)
     A reaction: Everything grand seems to be claimed for God at this stage of culture, but I am not sure how coherent this view is, unless this is pantheism. In what sense could we possibly be Krishna, when none of us (except Arjuna) is aware of it?
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: It would be better to follow the stories told about the gods than to be a slave to the fate of the natural philosophers.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 134)
     A reaction: At this point in history there is a blurring between autonomous decisions and what we now call free will, and also between fate and determinism, which we try to keep distinct.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: The best men have no belief in necessity (set up by some as mistress of all), but refer some things to fortune, some to ourselves, because necessity is irresponsible, and fortune is unstable, while our own will is free.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 133), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Whatever a man does, good or bad, in thought, word or deed, has these five sources of action: the body, the lower 'I am', the means of perception, the means of action, and Fate.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 18.14/15)
     A reaction: The 'means of action' will presumably take care of anything we haven't thought of! Nothing quite matches the idea of 'the will' here. A twitch from the first, eating from the second, a startled jump from the third, struck by lightning from the fifth.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: The greatest good in avoiding confusion of the soul is prudence [phronesis], on which account prudence is something more valuable than even philosophy.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: What occurs by our own agency is autonomous, and it is to this that praise and blame are attached.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 133)
     A reaction: I don't think this should be understand as an assertion of free will in the modern sense. The 'swerve' of the atoms just means that decisions can arise out of us - not that they are somehow outside of nature.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Hate and lust have their roots in man's lower nature [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Hate and lust for things of nature have their roots in man's lower nature.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 3.34)
     A reaction: It seems outmoded now (since Freud) to label parts of human nature as 'higher' and 'lower'. I would defend the distinction, but it is not self-evident. The basis of morality is good citizenship, and parts of our nature are detrimental to that.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 125)
     A reaction: This is a fairly accurate observation. To fear not being in this life is a bit like fearing not being in Vancouver next Tuesday. It also involves the paradox of the present moment. E.g. Idea 1904.
It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: He is a fool who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful when it is still to come.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 125)
     A reaction: Not very plausible, I'm afraid. It provides a good argument in favour of smoking, if the lung cancer is far in the future. Paralysing fear is daft, but some remote fears should be heeded.
The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: The same kind of practice produces a good life and a good death.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 126)
     A reaction: This is the kind of old fashioned observation which we would do well to hang on to. The ideal of dying well has vanished from our culture.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Pleasure is the beginning and end of living happily, and we recognise this as the first good.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 128)
     A reaction: We might enquire what we would live for if our capacities for pleasure were surgically removed. Would we still experience intellectual curiosity, or an aspiration to some cold and remote goodness?
Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: When we say that pleasure is the goal we do not mean the pleasures of the profligate or the pleasures of consumption, but rather the lack of pain in the body and disturbance in the soul.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 131)
     A reaction: I don't really understand the aspiration to a 'calm mind'. No one likes stress, but total calmness sounds close to non-existence. The mean! There is no achievement without pain.
All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Every pleasure is a good thing, since it has a nature congenial to us, but not every one is to be chosen, just as every pain is a bad thing, but not every one is such as to be always avoided.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 129)
     A reaction: This kind of sensible remark would be wholly endorsed by Bentham and Mill. This fits in with the excellent distinction between what is right and what is good.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: It is better for a good decision not to turn out right in action than for a bad decision to turn out right because of chance.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 135)
     A reaction: This sounds right, and on the whole the law agrees. Notice that what we need is a 'good decision', and not just to 'mean well'. The well-meaning fool is wicked. I am opposed to consequentialism, and agree with this idea.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: It is not drinking bouts or enjoying boys and women or consuming fish which produces the pleasant life, but sober calculation which searches out reasons for every choice, and drives out opinions which produce turmoil of the soul.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132)
     A reaction: This more or less sums up what I would call the philosophical life. Spontaneity is good, and some pleasures are killed by excessive thought, but on the whole actions are always better if good reasons are found, and error brings chaos.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: When we say that pleasure is the chief good, we do not mean debauchery, but freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion…. which requires sober contemplation.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 131), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27
     A reaction: I'm not clear how lack of pain and confusion counts as pleasure. Also the concepts of debauchery held by the puritan and the sybarite are wildly different.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: We are in need of pleasure only when we are in pain because of the absence of pleasure, and when we are not in pain, then we no longer need pleasure.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 128)
     A reaction: This Buddhist aspiration to eliminate desire has no appeal for me. It just sounds like a recipe for boredom, and an aversion to risk-taking. Start by asking what is best in life; it inevitably involves pleasure of some sort. Anyway, desire isn't painful.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Prudence is the principle of the rational life and is the greatest good. That is why prudence is more valuable than philosophy, for prudence is the source of all the other virtues.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 132)
     A reaction: ['prudence' will be Greek 'phronesis']The interest of this is that it is almost copied straight out of Aristotle's Ethics. Epicurus was an opponent of the Peripatetics, but greatly influenced by them.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in a just war [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in righteous war.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.31)
     A reaction: What worries me now is not the urging to fight, as long as a good cause can be found, but the idea that someone should see his social role as 'warrior'. The modern 'soldier' is ready to fight, but a traditional 'warrior' is obliged to fight.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The visible forms of nature are earth, water, fire, air, ether; mind, reason, and the sense of 'I' [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: The visible forms of nature are eight: earth, water, fire, air, ether; the mind, reason, and the sense of 'I'.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 7.4)
     A reaction: Presumably there is an implication that there are also invisible forms. The Bhuddists launched an attack on 'I' as one of the categories. The first five appear to be Aristotle's, which must be of scholarly (and chronological) interest.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
Everything, including the gods, comes from me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: All the gods come from me, says Krishna. ...I am the one source of all
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.2/8)
     A reaction: This seems very close to monotheism, and sounds very similar to the position that Zeus seems to occupy in later Greek religion, where he is shading off into a supreme and spiritual entity.
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Brahman is supreme, Atman his spirit in man, and Karma is the force of creation [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Brahman is supreme, the Eternal. Atman is his Spirit in man. Karma is the force of creation, wherefrom all things have their life.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 8.3)
     A reaction: I can't help wondering how they know all this stuff, but then I'm just a typical product of my culture. We seem to have a trinity here. Who's in charge? Is Atman just a servant? Is Karma totally under the control of Brahman?
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Only by love can men see me, know me, and come to me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Only by love can men see me, and know me, and come unto me, says Krishna
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 11.54)
     A reaction: There seems to be a paradox here, as it is unclear how you can love Krishna, if you have not already seen him in some way. This is another paradox of fideism - that faith cannot possibly be the first step in a religion, as faith needs a target.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / e. Hell
The three gates of hell are lust, anger and greed [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Three are the gates of this hell, the death of the soul: the gate of lust, the gate of wrath, and the gate of greed. Let a man shun the three.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 16.21)
     A reaction: Anyone who wishes to procreate, champion justice, and make a living, has to pursue all three. Wisdom consists of pursuing the three appropriately, not in shunning them. How did this bizarre puritanism ever come to grip the human race?