Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Bhagavad Gita', 'De rebus naturalibus' and 'Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Serene wisdom is freedom from ties, and indifference to fortune [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Who everywhere is free from all ties, who neither rejoices nor sorrows if fortune is good or is ill, his is a serene wisdom.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.57)
     A reaction: This is very similar to the 'apatheia' of the Stoics, though they are always more committed to rationality. This is quite a good strategy when times are hard, but as a general rule it offers a bogus state of 'wisdom' which is really half way to death.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.49)
     A reaction: Quotations like this can usually be counterbalanced in eastern philosophy by wild irrationality, but they certainly felt to tug of reason. Only the Dhaoists seem really opposed to reason (e.g. Idea 7289).
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty]
     Full Idea: Powers explain behaviours regardless of whether they are necessary for membership in a particular class of things.
     From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 3)
     A reaction: This seems right, and is important for driving a wedge between powers and essences. If there are essences, they are not simply some bunch of powers.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
     Full Idea: A power is not the cause of an operation, but only the cause's aptitude for operating.
     From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], De fac anim 4:col 692), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5
     A reaction: His example is the power of running, which is actually caused by the soul (or whatever), which generates the power. A power is a very superficial thing.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
I am all the beauty and goodness of things, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: I am the beauty of all things beautiful; ...I am the goodness of those who are good, says Krishna.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.36)
     A reaction: Another attempt to annexe everything which is admirable to the nature of God. This sounds strikingly Platonic (c.f. Idea 7992, which seems Aristotelian). One scholar dates the text to 150 BCE. I think there is influence, one way or the other.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty]
     Full Idea: The modern concept of a kind essence is a set of intrinsic properties that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the membership of something in a class of things, or 'kind'.
     From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
     A reaction: I am always struck by the problem that the kind itself is constructed from the individuals, so circularity always seems to loom.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
     Full Idea: The fact that members of some cluster kinds are subjects of causal generalizations reflects the degree to which they share causally efficacious properties, not the fact that they may be composed of essence kinds per se.
     From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
     A reaction: I think this is right. I am a fan of individual essences, but not of kind essences. I take kinds, and kind explanations, to be straightforward inductive generalisations from individuals. Extreme stabilities give the illusion of a kind essence.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty]
     Full Idea: Scientific practices such as prediction and explanation regarding causal phenomena are concerned not merely with kinds having essences, but also with kinds lacking them.
     From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 1)
     A reaction: Not quite clear what he has in mind, but explanation should certainly involve a coherent picture, and not just the citation of some underlying causal mechanism.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.22)
     A reaction: Everything grand seems to be claimed for God at this stage of culture, but I am not sure how coherent this view is, unless this is pantheism. In what sense could we possibly be Krishna, when none of us (except Arjuna) is aware of it?
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Whatever a man does, good or bad, in thought, word or deed, has these five sources of action: the body, the lower 'I am', the means of perception, the means of action, and Fate.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 18.14/15)
     A reaction: The 'means of action' will presumably take care of anything we haven't thought of! Nothing quite matches the idea of 'the will' here. A twitch from the first, eating from the second, a startled jump from the third, struck by lightning from the fifth.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Hate and lust have their roots in man's lower nature [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Hate and lust for things of nature have their roots in man's lower nature.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 3.34)
     A reaction: It seems outmoded now (since Freud) to label parts of human nature as 'higher' and 'lower'. I would defend the distinction, but it is not self-evident. The basis of morality is good citizenship, and parts of our nature are detrimental to that.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in a just war [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in righteous war.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.31)
     A reaction: What worries me now is not the urging to fight, as long as a good cause can be found, but the idea that someone should see his social role as 'warrior'. The modern 'soldier' is ready to fight, but a traditional 'warrior' is obliged to fight.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is exceptionally obscure [Zabarella]
     Full Idea: Nothing in the natural world seems to be more obscure and difficult to grasp than the prime matter of things.
     From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], I.1 col 133), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 2.1
     A reaction: This spells the beginning of the end for 'prime matter', since a late scholastic is doubting it, even before the scientists got to work. Most modern Aristotelians slide quietly past prime matter, as unhelpful.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The visible forms of nature are earth, water, fire, air, ether; mind, reason, and the sense of 'I' [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: The visible forms of nature are eight: earth, water, fire, air, ether; the mind, reason, and the sense of 'I'.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 7.4)
     A reaction: Presumably there is an implication that there are also invisible forms. The Bhuddists launched an attack on 'I' as one of the categories. The first five appear to be Aristotle's, which must be of scholarly (and chronological) interest.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
     Full Idea: Many of the kinds we theorize about and experiment on today simply do not have essences. We can distinguish 'essence kinds', such as electrons, and 'cluster kinds', such as biological species.
     From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
     A reaction: This is an important point for essentialists. He offers a strict criterion, in Idea 15145, for mind membership, but we might allow species to have essences by just relaxing the criteria a bit, and acknowledging some vagueness, especially over time.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty]
     Full Idea: Causal laws often do not make reference to kinds of objects at all, but rather summarize relations between quantitative, causally efficacious properties of objects.
     From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 3)
     A reaction: This would only be a serious challenge if it was not possible to translate talk of properties into talk of kinds, and vice versa.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
Everything, including the gods, comes from me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: All the gods come from me, says Krishna. ...I am the one source of all
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.2/8)
     A reaction: This seems very close to monotheism, and sounds very similar to the position that Zeus seems to occupy in later Greek religion, where he is shading off into a supreme and spiritual entity.
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Brahman is supreme, Atman his spirit in man, and Karma is the force of creation [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Brahman is supreme, the Eternal. Atman is his Spirit in man. Karma is the force of creation, wherefrom all things have their life.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 8.3)
     A reaction: I can't help wondering how they know all this stuff, but then I'm just a typical product of my culture. We seem to have a trinity here. Who's in charge? Is Atman just a servant? Is Karma totally under the control of Brahman?
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Only by love can men see me, know me, and come to me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Only by love can men see me, and know me, and come unto me, says Krishna
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 11.54)
     A reaction: There seems to be a paradox here, as it is unclear how you can love Krishna, if you have not already seen him in some way. This is another paradox of fideism - that faith cannot possibly be the first step in a religion, as faith needs a target.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / e. Hell
The three gates of hell are lust, anger and greed [Anon (Bhag)]
     Full Idea: Three are the gates of this hell, the death of the soul: the gate of lust, the gate of wrath, and the gate of greed. Let a man shun the three.
     From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 16.21)
     A reaction: Anyone who wishes to procreate, champion justice, and make a living, has to pursue all three. Wisdom consists of pursuing the three appropriately, not in shunning them. How did this bizarre puritanism ever come to grip the human race?