22 ideas
7990 | Serene wisdom is freedom from ties, and indifference to fortune [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Who everywhere is free from all ties, who neither rejoices nor sorrows if fortune is good or is ill, his is a serene wisdom. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.57) | |
A reaction: This is very similar to the 'apatheia' of the Stoics, though they are always more committed to rationality. This is quite a good strategy when times are hard, but as a general rule it offers a bogus state of 'wisdom' which is really half way to death. |
7396 | Hobbes created English-language philosophy [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
Full Idea: Hobbes created English-language philosophy. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Pref | |
A reaction: Tuck mentions Hooker as a predecessor in jurisprudence. Otherwise, an impressive label. |
7989 | Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.49) | |
A reaction: Quotations like this can usually be counterbalanced in eastern philosophy by wild irrationality, but they certainly felt to tug of reason. Only the Dhaoists seem really opposed to reason (e.g. Idea 7289). |
7996 | I am all the beauty and goodness of things, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: I am the beauty of all things beautiful; ...I am the goodness of those who are good, says Krishna. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.36) | |
A reaction: Another attempt to annexe everything which is admirable to the nature of God. This sounds strikingly Platonic (c.f. Idea 7992, which seems Aristotelian). One scholar dates the text to 150 BCE. I think there is influence, one way or the other. |
12155 | Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry] |
Full Idea: Statements of 'relative' identity are not identity statements at all, but what I would prefer to call 'statements of resemblance' or 'common property staztements'. | |
From: John Perry (The Same F [1970], n12) | |
A reaction: This seems like a neat way to sweep the problem from our sight. There remains a nervous metaphysical problem, though, because something seems to be identical when we spot a resemblance. Even two shades of red have something identical in them. |
16638 | The qualities of the world are mere appearances; reality is the motions which cause them [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings and apparitions only. The things that really are in the world without us are those motions by which these seemings are caused. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.2.10), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to count as a sense-datum theory, rather than a representative theory of perception, since it makes no commitment to the qualities containing any accurate information at all. We just start from the qualities and try to work it out. |
16688 | Evidence is conception, which is imagination, which proceeds from the senses [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: All evidence is conception, as it is said, and all conception is imagination and proceeds from sense. And spirits we suppose to be those substances which work not upon the sense, and therefore not conceptible. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.11.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 16.2 | |
A reaction: This is exactly the same as Hume's claim that all ideas are the result of impressions, and is the very essence of empiricism. We see here that such an epistemology can have huge consequences. |
7405 | Experience can't prove universal truths [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Experience concludeth nothing universally. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.4.10), quoted by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Empiricists seem proud to claim this limitation on human understanding, where rationalists like Leibniz use it as an argument against empiricism. Kripke says (e.g. Idea 4966) they are both wrong! I sympathise with Kripke. |
7995 | In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.22) | |
A reaction: Everything grand seems to be claimed for God at this stage of culture, but I am not sure how coherent this view is, unless this is pantheism. In what sense could we possibly be Krishna, when none of us (except Arjuna) is aware of it? |
7999 | All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Whatever a man does, good or bad, in thought, word or deed, has these five sources of action: the body, the lower 'I am', the means of perception, the means of action, and Fate. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 18.14/15) | |
A reaction: The 'means of action' will presumably take care of anything we haven't thought of! Nothing quite matches the idea of 'the will' here. A twitch from the first, eating from the second, a startled jump from the third, struck by lightning from the fifth. |
7408 | It is an error that reason should control the passions, which give right guidance on their own [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
Full Idea: Hobbes (and Descartes, and many contemporaries) argued that the traditional idea that reason should control the passions was an error, and that (properly understood) our emotions would guide us in the right direction. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: I'm an intellectualist on this one. It strikes me as rather naïve and romantic to think that unthinking emotion could ever consistently approach what is right. A recipe for disaster. |
7407 | Good and evil are what please us; goodness and badness the powers causing them [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: We call good and evil the things that please and displease us; and so we call goodness and badness, the qualities of powers whereby they do it. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.7.3), quoted by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: It is pointed out by Tuck that this is just like his treatment of colour terms (values as secondary qualities). I would have thought it was obvious that I could say 'x pleases me, although I disapprove of it' (e.g. black humour). |
7991 | Hate and lust have their roots in man's lower nature [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Hate and lust for things of nature have their roots in man's lower nature. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 3.34) | |
A reaction: It seems outmoded now (since Freud) to label parts of human nature as 'higher' and 'lower'. I would defend the distinction, but it is not self-evident. The basis of morality is good citizenship, and parts of our nature are detrimental to that. |
7410 | Self-preservation is basic, and people judge differently about that, implying ethical relativism [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
Full Idea: If men are their own judges of what conduces to their preservation, ..all men make different decisions about what counts as a danger, so (for Hobbes) the grimmest version of ethical relativism seems to be the only possible ethical vision. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This might depend on self-preservation being the only fundamental value. But if self-preservation is not a pressing issue, presumably other values might come into play, some of them less concerned with the individual's own interests. |
7409 | Hobbes shifted from talk of 'the good' to talk of 'rights' [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
Full Idea: Hobbes (like Grotius) shifted from talking about 'the good', which had been the traditional subject for both ancient and Renaissance moralists, to talking instead about 'rights'. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is part of the crucial shift away from the Greek interest in excellence of character, towards the Enlightenment legalistic interest in right actions, as well as social rights. Bad move, well analysed by MacIntyre. |
7988 | There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in a just war [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in righteous war. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.31) | |
A reaction: What worries me now is not the urging to fight, as long as a good cause can be found, but the idea that someone should see his social role as 'warrior'. The modern 'soldier' is ready to fight, but a traditional 'warrior' is obliged to fight. |
7992 | The visible forms of nature are earth, water, fire, air, ether; mind, reason, and the sense of 'I' [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: The visible forms of nature are eight: earth, water, fire, air, ether; the mind, reason, and the sense of 'I'. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 7.4) | |
A reaction: Presumably there is an implication that there are also invisible forms. The Bhuddists launched an attack on 'I' as one of the categories. The first five appear to be Aristotle's, which must be of scholarly (and chronological) interest. |
7994 | Everything, including the gods, comes from me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: All the gods come from me, says Krishna. ...I am the one source of all | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.2/8) | |
A reaction: This seems very close to monotheism, and sounds very similar to the position that Zeus seems to occupy in later Greek religion, where he is shading off into a supreme and spiritual entity. |
7411 | The attributes of God just show our inability to conceive his nature [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: All the attributes of God signify our inability and defect of power to conceive any thing concerning his nature. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.10.2), quoted by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Presumably he means that 'omnipotence' should just be translated as 'mind-boggling power'. St Anselm's concept of God (Idea 1405) is helpful here, placing it at the upper limit of what can actually be conceived. |
7993 | Brahman is supreme, Atman his spirit in man, and Karma is the force of creation [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Brahman is supreme, the Eternal. Atman is his Spirit in man. Karma is the force of creation, wherefrom all things have their life. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 8.3) | |
A reaction: I can't help wondering how they know all this stuff, but then I'm just a typical product of my culture. We seem to have a trinity here. Who's in charge? Is Atman just a servant? Is Karma totally under the control of Brahman? |
7997 | Only by love can men see me, know me, and come to me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Only by love can men see me, and know me, and come unto me, says Krishna | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 11.54) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a paradox here, as it is unclear how you can love Krishna, if you have not already seen him in some way. This is another paradox of fideism - that faith cannot possibly be the first step in a religion, as faith needs a target. |
7998 | The three gates of hell are lust, anger and greed [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Three are the gates of this hell, the death of the soul: the gate of lust, the gate of wrath, and the gate of greed. Let a man shun the three. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 16.21) | |
A reaction: Anyone who wishes to procreate, champion justice, and make a living, has to pursue all three. Wisdom consists of pursuing the three appropriately, not in shunning them. How did this bizarre puritanism ever come to grip the human race? |