28 ideas
| 7990 | Serene wisdom is freedom from ties, and indifference to fortune [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: Who everywhere is free from all ties, who neither rejoices nor sorrows if fortune is good or is ill, his is a serene wisdom. | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.57) | |
| A reaction: This is very similar to the 'apatheia' of the Stoics, though they are always more committed to rationality. This is quite a good strategy when times are hard, but as a general rule it offers a bogus state of 'wisdom' which is really half way to death. |
| 14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We understand a defined object (what it is) through the objects on which it depends. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], II) | |
| A reaction: This places dependency relations right at the heart of our understanding of the world, and hence shifts traditional metaphysics away from existence and identity. The notion of explanation is missing from Fine's account. |
| 14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics has two main areas of concern: one is with the nature of things, with what they are; and the other is with the existence of things, with whether they are. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I) | |
| A reaction: This paper is part of a movement which has shifted metaphysics to a third target - how things relate to one another. The possibility that this third aim should be the main one seems quite plausible to me. |
| 7989 | Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason. | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.49) | |
| A reaction: Quotations like this can usually be counterbalanced in eastern philosophy by wild irrationality, but they certainly felt to tug of reason. Only the Dhaoists seem really opposed to reason (e.g. Idea 7289). |
| 14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: In Wooster as the witless bachelor and Jeeves as the crafty manservant, and one valet to the other, we will have the counterpart, within the framework of real definition, to the simultaneous definition of two terms. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], III) | |
| A reaction: This is wonderful grist to the mill of scientific essentialism, which endeavours to produce an understanding through explanation of the complex interactions of nature. |
| 7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Presumably Zeno appealed to the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts; so if Achilles were to overtake the tortoise, he would have been in more places than the tortoise, which he can't be; but the conclusion is absurd, so reject the axiom. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.89) | |
| A reaction: The point is that the axiom is normally acceptable (a statue contains more particles than the arm of the statue), but it breaks down when discussing infinity (Idea 7556). Modern theories of infinity are needed to solve Zeno's Paradoxes. |
| 10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.76) | |
| A reaction: A famous remark, though Musgrave is rather disparaging about Russell's underlying reasoning here. |
| 7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A collection of terms is infinite if it contains as parts other collections which have as many terms as it has; that is, you can take away some terms of the collection without diminishing its number; there are as many even numbers as numbers all together. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.86) | |
| A reaction: He cites Dedekind and Cantor as source for these ideas. If it won't obey the rule that subtraction makes it smaller, then it clearly isn't a number, and really it should be banned from all mathematics. |
| 14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It seems wrong to identify the 'being' of an object, its being what it is, with its existence. In one respect existence is too weak; for there is more to an object than mere existence; also too strong, for an object's nature need not include existence. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I) | |
| A reaction: The word 'being' has been shockingly woolly, from Parmenides to Heidegger, but if you identify it with a thing's 'nature' that strikes me as much clearer (even if a little misty). |
| 14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: An object 'weakly' depends upon another if it is ineliminably involved in one of its definitions; and it 'strongly' depends upon the other if it is ineliminably involved in all of its definitions. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], III) | |
| A reaction: It is important to remember that a definition can be very long, and not just what might go into a dictionary. |
| 14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: A natural account of dependence in terms of modality and existence is that one thing x will depend on another thing y just in case it is necessary that y exists if x exists (or in the symbolism of modal logic, □(Ex→Ey). | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I) | |
| A reaction: He is going to criticise this view (which he traces back to Aristotle and Husserl). It immediately seems possible that there might be counterexamples. x might depend on y, but not necessarily depend on y. Necessities may not produce dependence. |
| 14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The objects upon which a given object depends, according to the present account, are those which must figure in any of the logically equivalent definitions of the object. They will, in a sense, be ineliminable. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], II) | |
| A reaction: This is Fine's main proposal for the dependency relationship, with a context of Aristotelian essences understood as definitions. Sounds pretty good to me. |
| 14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The notion of one object depending upon another is the real counterpart to the nominal notion of one term being definable in terms of another. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], II) | |
| A reaction: This begins to fill out the Aristotelian picture very nicely, since definitions are right at the centre of the nature of things (though a much more transitional part of the story than Fine seems to think). |
| 7996 | I am all the beauty and goodness of things, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: I am the beauty of all things beautiful; ...I am the goodness of those who are good, says Krishna. | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.36) | |
| A reaction: Another attempt to annexe everything which is admirable to the nature of God. This sounds strikingly Platonic (c.f. Idea 7992, which seems Aristotelian). One scholar dates the text to 150 BCE. I think there is influence, one way or the other. |
| 14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We should understand the identity or being of an object in terms of the propositions rendered true by its identity rather than the other way round. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I) | |
| A reaction: Behind this is an essentialist view of identity, rather than one connected with necessary properties. |
| 14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: How and where are we to draw the line between what is basic to the essence and what is derived? | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], II) | |
| A reaction: He calls the basic essence 'constitutive' and the rest the 'consequential' essence. This question is obviously very challenging for the essentialist. See Idea 22. |
| 14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is natural to suppose, in the case of such objects as Wooster and Jeeves, that in addition to possessing constitutive essential properties they will also enter into constitutive essential relationships. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], III) | |
| A reaction: I like this. If we are going to have scientific essences as structures of intrinsic powers, then the relationships between the parts of the essence must also be essential. That is the whole point - that the powers dictate the relationships. |
| 14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We can say that an object essentially has a certain property if its having that property follows from every definition of the object, while an object will definitively have a given property if its having that property follows from some definition of it. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], III) | |
| A reaction: Presumably that will be every accurate definition. This nicely allows for the fact that at least nominal definitions may not be unique, and there is even room for real definitions not to be fully determinate (thus, how far should they extend?). |
| 7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp, which is sure to lead us astray if we take it as our guide. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.78) | |
| A reaction: The sort of nice crisp remark you would expect from a good empiricist philosopher. Compare Idea 4948. However Russell qualifies it with the word 'often', and all philosophers eventually realise that you have to start somewhere. |
| 7995 | In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna. | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.22) | |
| A reaction: Everything grand seems to be claimed for God at this stage of culture, but I am not sure how coherent this view is, unless this is pantheism. In what sense could we possibly be Krishna, when none of us (except Arjuna) is aware of it? |
| 7999 | All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: Whatever a man does, good or bad, in thought, word or deed, has these five sources of action: the body, the lower 'I am', the means of perception, the means of action, and Fate. | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 18.14/15) | |
| A reaction: The 'means of action' will presumably take care of anything we haven't thought of! Nothing quite matches the idea of 'the will' here. A twitch from the first, eating from the second, a startled jump from the third, struck by lightning from the fifth. |
| 7991 | Hate and lust have their roots in man's lower nature [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: Hate and lust for things of nature have their roots in man's lower nature. | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 3.34) | |
| A reaction: It seems outmoded now (since Freud) to label parts of human nature as 'higher' and 'lower'. I would defend the distinction, but it is not self-evident. The basis of morality is good citizenship, and parts of our nature are detrimental to that. |
| 7988 | There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in a just war [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in righteous war. | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.31) | |
| A reaction: What worries me now is not the urging to fight, as long as a good cause can be found, but the idea that someone should see his social role as 'warrior'. The modern 'soldier' is ready to fight, but a traditional 'warrior' is obliged to fight. |
| 7992 | The visible forms of nature are earth, water, fire, air, ether; mind, reason, and the sense of 'I' [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: The visible forms of nature are eight: earth, water, fire, air, ether; the mind, reason, and the sense of 'I'. | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 7.4) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there is an implication that there are also invisible forms. The Bhuddists launched an attack on 'I' as one of the categories. The first five appear to be Aristotle's, which must be of scholarly (and chronological) interest. |
| 7994 | Everything, including the gods, comes from me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: All the gods come from me, says Krishna. ...I am the one source of all | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.2/8) | |
| A reaction: This seems very close to monotheism, and sounds very similar to the position that Zeus seems to occupy in later Greek religion, where he is shading off into a supreme and spiritual entity. |
| 7993 | Brahman is supreme, Atman his spirit in man, and Karma is the force of creation [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: Brahman is supreme, the Eternal. Atman is his Spirit in man. Karma is the force of creation, wherefrom all things have their life. | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 8.3) | |
| A reaction: I can't help wondering how they know all this stuff, but then I'm just a typical product of my culture. We seem to have a trinity here. Who's in charge? Is Atman just a servant? Is Karma totally under the control of Brahman? |
| 7997 | Only by love can men see me, know me, and come to me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: Only by love can men see me, and know me, and come unto me, says Krishna | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 11.54) | |
| A reaction: There seems to be a paradox here, as it is unclear how you can love Krishna, if you have not already seen him in some way. This is another paradox of fideism - that faith cannot possibly be the first step in a religion, as faith needs a target. |
| 7998 | The three gates of hell are lust, anger and greed [Anon (Bhag)] |
| Full Idea: Three are the gates of this hell, the death of the soul: the gate of lust, the gate of wrath, and the gate of greed. Let a man shun the three. | |
| From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 16.21) | |
| A reaction: Anyone who wishes to procreate, champion justice, and make a living, has to pursue all three. Wisdom consists of pursuing the three appropriately, not in shunning them. How did this bizarre puritanism ever come to grip the human race? |