9978
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Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait]
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Full Idea:
The tendency to attack forms of expression rather than attempting to appreciate what is actually being said is one of the more unfortunate habits that analytic philosophy inherited from Frege.
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], IV)
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A reaction:
The key to this, I say, is to acknowledge the existence of propositions (in brains). For example, this belief will make teachers more sympathetic to pupils who are struggling to express an idea, and verbal nit-picking becomes totally irrelevant.
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9986
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The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait]
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Full Idea:
The conception that what can be numbered is some object (including flocks of sheep) relative to a partition - a choice of unit - survived even in the late nineteenth century in the form of the rejection of the null set (and difficulties with unit sets).
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], IX)
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A reaction:
This old view can't be entirely wrong! Frege makes the point that if asked to count a pack of cards, you must decide whether to count cards, or suits, or pips. You may not need a 'unit', but you need a concept. 'Units' name concept-extensions nicely!
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9984
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We can have a series with identical members [Tait]
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Full Idea:
Why can't we have a series (as opposed to a linearly ordered set) all of whose members are identical, such as (a, a, a...,a)?
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], VII)
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A reaction:
The question is whether the items order themselves, which presumably the natural numbers are supposed to do, or whether we impose the order (and length) of the series. What decides how many a's there are? Do we order, or does nature?
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22449
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When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
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Full Idea:
One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
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A reaction:
True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.
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9982
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Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait]
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Full Idea:
Although (in Cantor and Dedekind) abstraction does not (as has often been observed) play any role in their proofs, but it does play a role, in that it fixes the grammar, the domain of meaningful propositions, and so determining the objects in the proofs.
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], V)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This is part of a defence of abstractionism in Cantor and Dedekind (see K.Fine also on the subject). To know the members of a set, or size of a domain, you need to know the process or function which created the set.
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9985
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Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait]
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Full Idea:
A different reading of abstraction is that it concerns, not the individuating properties of the elements relative to one another, but rather the individuating properties of the set itself, for example the concept of what is its extension.
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], VIII)
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A reaction:
If the set was 'objects in the room next door', we would not be able to abstract from the objects, but we might get to the idea of things being contain in things, or the concept of an object, or a room. Wrong. That's because they are objects... Hm.
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9980
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If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait]
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Full Idea:
If the power |A| is obtained by abstraction from set A, then if A is equipollent to set B, then |A| = |B|. But this does not imply that A = B. So |A| cannot just be A, taken in abstraction, unless that can identify distinct sets, ..or create new objects.
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], V)
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A reaction:
An elegant piece of argument, which shows rather crucial facts about abstraction. We are then obliged to ask how abstraction can create an object or a set, if the central activity of abstraction is just ignoring certain features.
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7999
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All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)]
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Full Idea:
Whatever a man does, good or bad, in thought, word or deed, has these five sources of action: the body, the lower 'I am', the means of perception, the means of action, and Fate.
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From:
Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 18.14/15)
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A reaction:
The 'means of action' will presumably take care of anything we haven't thought of! Nothing quite matches the idea of 'the will' here. A twitch from the first, eating from the second, a startled jump from the third, struck by lightning from the fifth.
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22451
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All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
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Full Idea:
There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
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A reaction:
There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.
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22452
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Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
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Full Idea:
Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
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A reaction:
Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.
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7992
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The visible forms of nature are earth, water, fire, air, ether; mind, reason, and the sense of 'I' [Anon (Bhag)]
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Full Idea:
The visible forms of nature are eight: earth, water, fire, air, ether; the mind, reason, and the sense of 'I'.
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From:
Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 7.4)
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A reaction:
Presumably there is an implication that there are also invisible forms. The Bhuddists launched an attack on 'I' as one of the categories. The first five appear to be Aristotle's, which must be of scholarly (and chronological) interest.
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7997
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Only by love can men see me, know me, and come to me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
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Full Idea:
Only by love can men see me, and know me, and come unto me, says Krishna
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From:
Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 11.54)
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A reaction:
There seems to be a paradox here, as it is unclear how you can love Krishna, if you have not already seen him in some way. This is another paradox of fideism - that faith cannot possibly be the first step in a religion, as faith needs a target.
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7998
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The three gates of hell are lust, anger and greed [Anon (Bhag)]
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Full Idea:
Three are the gates of this hell, the death of the soul: the gate of lust, the gate of wrath, and the gate of greed. Let a man shun the three.
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From:
Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 16.21)
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A reaction:
Anyone who wishes to procreate, champion justice, and make a living, has to pursue all three. Wisdom consists of pursuing the three appropriately, not in shunning them. How did this bizarre puritanism ever come to grip the human race?
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