7 ideas
| 6408 | Russell needed three extra axioms to reduce maths to logic: infinity, choice and reducibility [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: In order to deduce the theorems of mathematics from purely logical axioms, Russell had to add three new axioms to those of standards logic, which were: the axiom of infinity, the axiom of choice, and the axiom of reducibility. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (Russell [1996], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: The third one was adopted to avoid his 'barber' paradox, but many thinkers do not accept it. The interesting question is why anyone would 'accept' or 'reject' an axiom. |
| 6414 | Two propositions might seem self-evident, but contradict one another [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Two propositions might contradict each other despite appearing self-evident when considered separately. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (Russell [1996], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Russell's proposal (Idea 5416) is important here, that self-evidence comes in degrees. If self-evidence was all-or-nothing, Grayling's point would be a major problem, but it isn't. Bonjour explores the idea more fully (e.g. Idea 3704) |
| 19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
| Full Idea: Evidentialism does not support beginning epistemology by taking for granted that evidentialism is true. ...Rather, what potentially justifies belief in intial epistemic data and initial procedures of inquiry is the evidence itself. | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting') | |
| A reaction: This sounds good. I much prefer talk of 'evidence' to talk of 'perceptions', because evidence has been licked into shape, and its significance has been clarified. That is the first step towards the coherence we seek. |
| 19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
| Full Idea: Reliabilism would count pure guesses as good reasons if guessing were properly reliable. | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting') | |
| A reaction: See D.H. Lawrence's short story 'The Rocking Horse Winner'. This objection strikes me as being so devastating that it is almost conclusive. Except that pure guesses are never ever reliable, over a decent period of time. |
| 19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
| Full Idea: Sheer reliability does not justify belief. ...It may be, for instance, that we have strong though misleading reason to deny the method's reliability. | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Circles') | |
| A reaction: That is, we accept a justification if we judge the method to be reliable, not if it IS reliable. I can disbelieve all the reliable information that arrives in my mind. People do that all the time! Hatred of experts! Support for internalism? |
| 19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
| Full Idea: An unrefined reliability theory does a poor job at capturing reflective judgements about hypothetical cases | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Stroud's') | |
| A reaction: Reliability can only be a test for tried and tested ways. No one can say whether imagining a range of possibilities is reliable or not. Is prediction a reliable route to knowledge? |
| 7482 | Resurrection developed in Judaism as a response to martyrdoms, in about 160 BCE [Anon (Dan), by Watson] |
| Full Idea: The idea of resurrection in Judaism seems to have first developed around 160 BCE, during the time of religious martyrdom, and as a response to it (the martyrs were surely not dying forever?). It is first mentioned in the book of Daniel. | |
| From: report of Anon (Dan) (27: Book of Daniel [c.165 BCE], Ch.7) by Peter Watson - Ideas | |
| A reaction: Idea 7473 suggests that Zoroaster beat them to it by 800 years. |