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All the ideas for '27: Book of Daniel', 'Why there isn't a ready-made world' and 'Theological and other works'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism

17644	Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
	Full Idea: What makes the metaphysical realist a 'metaphysical' realist is his belief that there is somewhere 'one true theory' (two theories which are true and complete descriptions of the world would be mere notational variants of each other).
	From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Causation')
	A reaction: This is wrong!!!!! Commitment to one reality doesn't imply that only one comprehensive theory is possible. Theory-making (at least in any human language, or in mathematics) is an inherently limited activity.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

17648	It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
	Full Idea: The idea of a coherent theory of the noumena; consistent, systematic, and arrived at by 'the scientific method' seems to me to be chimerical.
	From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Failure')
	A reaction: I sort of agree with this, but it definitely doesn't make me an anti-realist.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers

15312	We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley]
	Full Idea: A rope sustains weight, a magnet attracts iron, a charged electrical jar gives a shock, and from these and other similar observations, we get the idea of power, universally and abstractly considered.
	From: Joseph Priestley (Theological and other works [1790], p.191), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B
	A reaction: I agree with this, in that we appear to be observing powers directly, and are not observing something which can then be reduced to non-powers. Nature just can't be a set of inert structures, with forces 'imposed' on them.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

17643	Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
	Full Idea: Relative to the description 'that statue', a certain shape is an essential property of the object; relative to the description 'that piece of clay', the shape not an essential property (but being clay is).
	From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Intro')
	A reaction: Relative to the description 'that loathsome object', is the statue essentially loathsome? Asserting the essence of an object is a response to the object, not a response to a description of it. This is not the solution to the statue problem.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data

17642	The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
	Full Idea: Moore and Russell held the strange view that 'sensibilia' (sense data) are mind-independent entities: a view so dotty, on the face of it, that few analytic philosophers like to be reminded that this is how analytic philosophy started.
	From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Intro')
	A reaction: I suspect the view was influenced by the anti-psychologism of Frege, and his idea that all the other concepts are mind-independent, living by their own rules in a 'third realm'. Personally I think analytic philosophy needs more psychology, not less.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause

17645	An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
	Full Idea: Imagine a Venusian lands on Earth and observes a forest fire, and says 'I know what caused that - the atmosphere is saturated with oxygen!'. Thus one man's 'background condition' can easily be another man's 'cause'.
	From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Causation')
	A reaction: You can't sweep 'the' cause of a fire away so easily. There is always oxygen on Earth, but only occasional forest fires. The oxygen doesn't 'trigger' the fire (i.e. it isn't the proximate cause).

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter

15311	Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley]
	Full Idea: Attraction or repulsion appear to me not to be properly what is imparted to matter, but what really makes it what it is, in so much that, without it, it would be nothing at all.
	From: Joseph Priestley (Theological and other works [1790], p.237), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B
	A reaction: This is music to the ears of anyone who thinks that powers are the fundamentals of nature (like me).

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality

7482	Resurrection developed in Judaism as a response to martyrdoms, in about 160 BCE [Anon (Dan), by Watson]
	Full Idea: The idea of resurrection in Judaism seems to have first developed around 160 BCE, during the time of religious martyrdom, and as a response to it (the martyrs were surely not dying forever?). It is first mentioned in the book of Daniel.
	From: report of Anon (Dan) (27: Book of Daniel [c.165 BCE], Ch.7) by Peter Watson - Ideas
	A reaction: Idea 7473 suggests that Zoroaster beat them to it by 800 years.