9 ideas
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13) | |
A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy. |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5) | |
A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy. |
10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
Full Idea: It would be natural to label one extreme view 'maximal essentialism' - that all of an object's properties are essential - and the other extreme 'minimal' - that only trivial properties such as self-identity of being either F or not-F are essential. | |
From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008]) | |
A reaction: Personally I don't accept the trivial ones as being in any way describable as 'properties'. The maximal view destroys any useful notion of essence. Leibniz is a minority holder of the maximal view. I would defend a middle way. |
10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
Full Idea: An 'individual essence' is a property that in addition to being essential is also unique to the object, in the sense that it is not possible that something distinct from that object possesses that property. | |
From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §5) | |
A reaction: She cites a 'haecceity' (or mere bare identity) as a trivial example of an individual essence. |
10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
Full Idea: According to 'sortal essentialism', an object could not have been of a radically different kind than it in fact is. | |
From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §4) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as thoroughly wrong. Things belong in kinds because of their properties. Could you remove all the contingent features of a tiger, leaving it as merely 'a tiger', despite being totally unrecognisable? |
10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
Full Idea: It is easy to confuse the notion of an essential property that a thing could not lack, with a property it could not lose. My having spent Christmas 2007 in Tennessee is a non-essential property I could not lose. | |
From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1) | |
A reaction: The idea that having spent Christmas in Tennessee is a property I find quite bewildering. Is my not having spent my Christmas in Tennessee one of my properties? I suspect that real unlosable properties are essential ones. |
10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
Full Idea: The usual view is that 'physical possibilities' are a natural subset of the 'metaphysical possibilities', which in turn are a subset of the 'logical possibilities'. | |
From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1) | |
A reaction: [She cites Fine 2002 for an opposing view] I prefer 'natural' to 'physical', leaving it open where the borders of the natural lie. I take 'metaphysical' possibility to be 'in all naturally possible worlds'. So is a round square a logical possibility? |
10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
Full Idea: There is 'epistemic possibility' when it is 'for all I know'. That is, P is epistemically possible for agent A just in case P is consistent with what A knows. | |
From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1) | |
A reaction: Two problems: maybe 'we' know, and A knows we know, but A doesn't know. And maybe someone knows, but we are not sure about that, which seems to introduce a modal element into the knowing. If someone knows it's impossible, it's impossible. |
7482 | Resurrection developed in Judaism as a response to martyrdoms, in about 160 BCE [Anon (Dan), by Watson] |
Full Idea: The idea of resurrection in Judaism seems to have first developed around 160 BCE, during the time of religious martyrdom, and as a response to it (the martyrs were surely not dying forever?). It is first mentioned in the book of Daniel. | |
From: report of Anon (Dan) (27: Book of Daniel [c.165 BCE], Ch.7) by Peter Watson - Ideas | |
A reaction: Idea 7473 suggests that Zoroaster beat them to it by 800 years. |