27 ideas
18365 | If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David] |
Full Idea: According to the identity theory of truth, a proposition is true if and only if it is identical with a fact. ...This leads to the unacceptable claim that every true proposition makes itself true (because it is identical to its fact). | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], n 14) |
18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
Full Idea: That 'there is at least one proposition' ...is a case where something makes itself true, which generates a counterexample to the natural assumption that truth-making is asymmetric; truth-making, it seems, is merely non-symmetric. | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], 4) |
18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
Full Idea: Friends of the truth-maker principle usually hold that the following states a crucial necessary condition on truth-making: if x makes y true, then, necessarily, if x exists then y is true. | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: My objection is that the proposition y is taken to pre-exist, primly awaiting the facts that will award it 'truth'. An ontology that contains an infinity of propositions, most of which so far lack a truth-value, is incoherent. You can have x, but no y! |
18358 | Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David] |
Full Idea: Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker. For example, 'L is happy or L is hungry', and 'L is happy or L is thirsty', which are both made true by the fact that L is happy. | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], 1) |
18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
Full Idea: The term 'truthmaker' just labels whatever stands in the truth-making relation to a truth. The truth-making relation is crucial. It would have been just as well to refer to the truth-'maker' principle as the truth-'making' principle. | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], 1) | |
A reaction: This is well said. The commitment of this theory is to something which makes each proposition true. There is no initial commitment to any theories about what sorts of things do the job. |
18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
Full Idea: Correspondence theorists are committed to the view that, since truth is correspondence with a fact, only facts can make true propositions true. | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], 4) |
18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
Full Idea: Truth-maker theory says that the attempt by correspondence to fill in the generic truth-maker principle with something more informative fails. It is too ambitious, offering a whole zoo of funny facts that are not needed. | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], 1) | |
A reaction: A typical funny fact is a disjunctive fact, which makes 'he is hungry or thirsty' true (when it can just be made true by the simple fact that he is thirsty). |
18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
Full Idea: Correspondence appears to be a symmetric relation while truth-making appears to be, or is supposed to be, an asymmetric relation. | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], Intro) |
18364 | Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David] |
Full Idea: Correspondence theorists tend to promote ideal languages, ...which is intended to mirror perfectly the structure of the propositions it expresses. | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], n 03) |
18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
Full Idea: The proposition that 'L is happy or hungry' can be made true by the fact that L is happy. This does not have the same complexity or constituent structure as the proposition it makes true. | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], 1) |
18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
Full Idea: One proposition can be made true by many different facts (such as 'there are some happy dogs'). | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], 1) |
18361 | A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David] |
Full Idea: An asymmetric relation must be irreflexive: any case of aRa will yield a reductio of the assumption that R is asymmetric. | |
From: Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], 4) |
12056 | An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: x bears to y the 'ancestral' of the relation R just if either x bears R to y, or x bears R to some w that bears R to y, or x bears R to some w that bears R to some z that bears R to y, or..... | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.10.1) | |
A reaction: A concept invented by Frege (1879). |
12050 | Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Substances are things that have a source of change or principle of activity within them. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.4.1) | |
A reaction: A vey significant concession. I think we can talk of 'essences' and 'powers', and drop talk of 'substances'. 'Powers' is a much better word, because it immediately pushes the active ingredient to the forefront. |
12052 | We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: What is singled out is never a bare this or that, but this or that something or other. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: I like, in ontological speculation, to contemplate the problem of the baffling archaeological find. 'This thing I have dug up - what the hell IS it?'. Wiggins is contemptuous of the term 'thisness', and the idea of bare particulars. |
12055 | Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Predications which answer the question 'what is x?' are often called 'sortal predications' in present-day philosophy. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.10.1) | |
A reaction: The word 'sortal' comes from Locke. Wiggins is the guru of 'sortal essentialism'. I just can't believe that in answer to the question 'what really is David Wiggins?' that he would be happy with a sequence of categorisations. |
12059 | A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: To say that the river is changing constantly in every respect is not to say that it is changing in respect of being a river. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.11.2) | |
A reaction: Can't a river become a lake, or a mere stream? Wiggins's proposal does not help with the problem of a river which sometimes dries up (as my local river sometimes does). At what point do we decide it is no longer a river? |
12063 | Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The sense of the sortal term under which we pick out an individual expands into the scientific account of things of that kind, where the account clarifies what is at issue in questions of sameness and difference of specimens of that kind. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.13.1) | |
A reaction: This is how the sortal approach is supposed to deal with individuals. So the placid tiger reveals much by falling under 'tiger', and a crucial extra bit by falling under 'placid'. See Idea 12053 for problems with this proposal. |
12051 | If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Substance are what the world is articulated into when the segments of kinds corresponds to the real divisions in reality. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: This is very helpful in clarifying Wiggins's very obscurely expressed views. He appears to be saying that if we divide the sheep from the goats correctly, we reveal sheep-substance and goat-substance (one substance per species). Crazy! |
12053 | 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: One person can be more or less of a poet than another, so 'poet' is not a conclusory answer to the question 'What is it that is singled out here?' 'Poet' rides on the back of the answer 'human being'. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: So apparently one must assign a natural kind, and not just a class. Wiggins lacks science fiction imagination. In the genetic salad of the far future, being a poet may be more definitive than being a human being. See Idea 12063. |
12054 | Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A system of secondary substances with a claim to separate reality into its genuine primary substances must arise from an understanding of a set of principles of activity on the basis of which identities can be glossed in terms of determinate relations. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: I translate this as saying that individual essences are categorised according to principles which explain behaviour and relations. I'm increasingly bewildered by the 'secondary substances' Wiggins got from 'Categories', and loves so much. |
12047 | We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A substance is a persisting and somehow basic object of reference that is there to be discovered in perception and thought, an object whose claim to be recognized as a real entity is a claim on our aspirations to understand the world. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.1) | |
A reaction: A lot of components are assigned by Wiggins to the concept, and the tricky job, inititiated by Aristotle, is to fit all the pieces together nicely. Personally I am wondering if the acceptance of 'essences' implies dropping 'substances'. |
12057 | Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Matter ex hypothesi is what ultimately underlies (to huperkeimenon) a thing; it is that from which something comes to be and which remains as a non-coincidental component in the thing's make-up. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 192a30) | |
A reaction: This is an interesting prelude to the much more comprehensive discussion of matter in Metaphysics, where he crucially adds the notion of 'form', and gives it priority over the underlying matter. |
12064 | The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: For us the importance of the category of substance, if it has any importance, is not so much ontological as relative to our epistemological circumstances and the conditions under which we have to undertake inquiry. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.13.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather significant concession. Wiggins has revived the notion of substance in recent times, but he is not quite adding it to the furniture of the world. Personally I increasingly think we can dump it, in ontology and epistemology. |
12049 | Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Answering 'what is it?' with the secondary substance identifies an object with a class of continuants which survive certain changes, come into being in certain ways, are qualified in certain ways, behave in certain ways, and cease to be in certain ways. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.3.3) | |
A reaction: Thus the priority of this sort of answer is that a huge range of explanations immediately flow from it. I take the explanation to be prior, and the primary substance to be prior, since secondary substance is inductively derived from it. |
12065 | Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: It seems mandatory to an observer of soldiers to give 'the final touch of unity' to their aggregate entity (the army). ...Similar claims arise with the ontological and explanatory claims of other corporate entities. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.13.3) | |
A reaction: Wiggins must say (following Leibniz Essays II.xxiv,1) that we add the unity, but I take the view that an army has powers, and hence offers explanations, which are lacking in a merely group of disparate soldiers. So an army has an essence and identity. |
7482 | Resurrection developed in Judaism as a response to martyrdoms, in about 160 BCE [Anon (Dan), by Watson] |
Full Idea: The idea of resurrection in Judaism seems to have first developed around 160 BCE, during the time of religious martyrdom, and as a response to it (the martyrs were surely not dying forever?). It is first mentioned in the book of Daniel. | |
From: report of Anon (Dan) (27: Book of Daniel [c.165 BCE], Ch.7) by Peter Watson - Ideas | |
A reaction: Idea 7473 suggests that Zoroaster beat them to it by 800 years. |