7 ideas
| 23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
| Full Idea: 'Logical constants', which might seem to be entities occurring in logical propositions, are really concerned with pure form, and are not actually constituents of the propositions in the verbal expressions of which their names occur. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
| A reaction: This seems to entirely deny the existence of logical constants, and yet he says that they are named. Russell was obviously under pressure here from Wittgenstein. |
| 23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Such words as or, not, all, some, plainly involve logical notions; since we use these intelligently, we must be acquainted with the logical objects involved. But their isolation is difficult, and I do not know what the logical objects really are. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 23476, from the previous page. Russell is struggling. Wittgenstein was telling him that the constants are rules (shown in truth tables), rather than objects. |
| 18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A touchstone by which logical propositions may be distinguished from all others is that they result from a process of generalisation which has been carried to its utmost limits. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], p.129), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What' |
| 22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
| Full Idea: On Russell's pre-war conception it is obvious that a complex cannot be negative. If a complex were true, what would make it false would be its non-existence, not the existence of some other complex. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 41 'Neg' | |
| A reaction: It might be false because it doesn't exist, but also 'made' false by a rival complex (such as Desdemona loving Othello). |
| 1389 | If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: If memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it would have to be the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than ourselves. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §4) | |
| A reaction: From Locke's point of view, he is much less certain about the continued identity of other people, because he allows the possibility of transference of minds. Even we might reject physical identity, if a person had suffered a severe trauma. |
| 1390 | Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Bodily identity must be one of the criteria for personal identity (to establish that a rememberer was present at a past event), but memory itself must also be accepted as one of the criteria. | |
| From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: This concerns the epistemology of personal identity, not the ontology. Someone with total amnesia would probably accept a driving licence as a criterion. Is personal identity a mental state, or a precondition which makes mental states possible? |
| 7482 | Resurrection developed in Judaism as a response to martyrdoms, in about 160 BCE [Anon (Dan), by Watson] |
| Full Idea: The idea of resurrection in Judaism seems to have first developed around 160 BCE, during the time of religious martyrdom, and as a response to it (the martyrs were surely not dying forever?). It is first mentioned in the book of Daniel. | |
| From: report of Anon (Dan) (27: Book of Daniel [c.165 BCE], Ch.7) by Peter Watson - Ideas | |
| A reaction: Idea 7473 suggests that Zoroaster beat them to it by 800 years. |