Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments', 'On the Basis of Morality' and 'On the Algebra of Logic'

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13 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: There is no difference between a true statement and a false statement, because they can use exactly the same words.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §4)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The utility of [truth-functional conditionals] is that it puts us in possession of a rule...[namely] The hypothetical proposition may be ...falsified by a single state of things, but only by one in which A [antecedent] is true and B [consequent] is false.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (On the Algebra of Logic [1895], p.218), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions
     A reaction: Personally I am rather more interested in verifying conditionals than in falsifying them. I certainly don't accept them until they are falsified, unless they have massive support from surrounding facts.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: Anything can be acceptable under the right circumstances, and unacceptable under the wrong circumstances.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: The Lydians find it acceptable for their daughters to work as prostitutes to raise money for getting married, but no one in Greece would be prepared to marry such a girl.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: Thracians think that tattooing enhances a girl's beauty, whereas for everyone else tattooing is a punishment for a crime.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: If someone knows the nature of everything, how could he fail to be able also to act correctly in every case?
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §8)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Reasonable and vicious are quite consistent with each other, in fact, only through their union are great and far-reaching crimes possible.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.83), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: This is opposed to Kant, who always looks wildly optimistic in his hope that high rationality entails a morally good will. Good people seem to have a fairly irrational empathy with their fellow citizens.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice and compassion, are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.192), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Egoism'
     A reaction: A well chosen trio. Kant would be shocked that he has left out duty, which is supposed to rise above such feelings.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG]
     Full Idea: It can be right, in certain circumstances, to steal, to break a solemn promise, to rob temples, and even (as Orestes did) to murder one's nearest and dearest.
     From: report of Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: Not sure about the last one! I suppose you can justify any hideousness if the fate of the universe depends on it. It must be better to die than the perform certain extreme deeds.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: It is right to lie to your parents, in order to get them to take a good medicine they are reluctant to take.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3)
     A reaction: I dread to think what the medicines were which convinced the writer of this. A rule such as this strikes me as dangerous. Justifiable in extreme cases. House on fire etc.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: A lottery is not democratic, because every state contains people who are not democratic, and if the lottery chooses them they will destroy the democracy. People should elect those who are observed to favour democracy.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §7)
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §6)
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: In philosophical morals animals are mere 'things', mere means to any end whatsoever. ...Shame on such a morality, that fails to recognise the eternal essence that lives in every living thing, and shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.96), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: Good. I find Kant's theoretical indifference to animals very creepy (despite his kind attitude to them). And I also think the utilitarians are wrong to only value animals for their pain, as if any animal could be shredded for fun, if it felt no pain.