27 ideas
19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
Full Idea: There is a seasoned method of turning your opponent's modus ponens into your own modus tollens. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.VII) | |
A reaction: That is, they say 'if he's coming he'll be hear by now, and he's definitely coming', to which you say 'I'm afraid he's not here, so he obviously isn't coming after all'. They say if-A-then-B, and A, so B. You say not-B, so you're wrong about A. |
19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
Full Idea: It is contingently true that 'snow is white' expresses the proposition that snow is white. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.V n14) | |
A reaction: Tarski stuck to sentences, but Merricks rightly argues that truth concerns propositions, not sentences. Sentences are subservient entities - mere tools used to express what matters, which is our thoughts (say I). |
1564 | True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: There is no difference between a true statement and a false statement, because they can use exactly the same words. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §4) |
19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Logical consequence guarantees preservation of truth. The Converse Barcan, a theorem of Simple Quantified Modal Logic, says that an obvious truth implies an obvious falsehood. So SQML gets logical consequence wrong. So SQML is mistaken. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.V) | |
A reaction: I admire this. The Converse Barcan certainly strikes me as wrong (Idea 19208). Merricks grasps this nettle. Williamson grasps the other nettle. Most people duck the issue, I suspect. Merricks says later that domains are the problem. |
19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The Converse Barcan Formula has a startling result. Simple Quantified Modal Logic (SQML) has the following as a theorem: □∀xFx → ∀x□Fx. So 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists'. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.V) | |
A reaction: He says this is blatantly wrong. Williamson is famous for defending it. I think I'm with Merricks on this one. |
19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The models for sentential logic map sentences to truth-values. The models for predicate logic map parts of sentences to objects and sets. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.II) | |
A reaction: Logic books rarely tell you important things like this. That is why this database is so incredibly important! You will never understand the subject if you don't collect together the illuminating asides of discussion. They say it all so much more simply. |
19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Origin essentialists claim that parental union results in a person, and that person could not have resulted from any other union. However, if the fertilised egg undergoes twinning, at least one of the resultant persons is not the original person. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.V) | |
A reaction: Merricks says that therefore that origin could have just produced the second twin, rather than the original person. This is interesting, but doesn't seem to threaten the necessity of origin thesis. Once I'm here, I have that origin, despite my twin. |
1559 | Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: Thracians think that tattooing enhances a girl's beauty, whereas for everyone else tattooing is a punishment for a crime. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
1561 | Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: Anything can be acceptable under the right circumstances, and unacceptable under the wrong circumstances. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
1560 | Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: The Lydians find it acceptable for their daughters to work as prostitutes to raise money for getting married, but no one in Greece would be prepared to marry such a girl. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: We might say that the concept just is the mental representation, ...but there are concepts that human beings may never acquire. ...But if concepts are individuated by their possession conditions this will not be a problem. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Rationale and Maxims in Study of Concepts [2005], p.169), quoted by E Margolis/S Laurence - Concepts 1.3 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand the notion of a concept we (or any other creature) may never acquire. They no more seem to exist than buildings that were never even designed. |
19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The Aboutness Assumption says that necessarily, if a proposition is directly about an entity, then that proposition stands in a relation to the entity. I shall argue that the Assumption is false. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.VII) | |
A reaction: This feels sort of right, though the nature of aboutness remains elusive. He cites denials of existence. I take speech to be fairly internal, even though its main role is communication. Maybe its a Cambridge relation, as far as the entity is concerned. |
19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
Full Idea: A sentence has truth conditions only in a context of use. And the truth conditions of many sentences can differ from one context of use to another (as in 'I am a philosopher'). | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.II) | |
A reaction: He is building a defence of propositions, because they are eternal, and have their truth conditions essentially. I too am a fan of propositions. |
19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The thesis that propositions are sets of possible worlds is one of the two leading accounts of the nature of propositions. The other leading account endorses structured propositions. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], Intro) | |
A reaction: Merricks sets out to reject both main views. I take the idea that propositions actually are sets of possible worlds to be ridiculous (though they may offer a way of modelling them). The idea that they have no structure at all strikes me as odd. |
19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The proposition expressed by 'Cicero is an orator' represents things as being exactly the same way as does the proposition expressed by 'Tully is an orator'. Hence two sentences express the same proposition. Fregeans about names deny this. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 2.II) | |
A reaction: Merricks makes the situation in the world fix the contents of the proposition. I don't agree. I would expand the first proposition as 'The person I know as 'Cicero' was an orator', but I might never have heard of 'Tully'. |
19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
Full Idea: My account says that each proposition is a necessary existent that essentially represents things as being a certain way, ...and there is no explanation of how propositions do that. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], Intro) | |
A reaction: Since I take propositions to be brain events, I don't expect much of an explanation either. The idea that propositions necessarily exist strikes me as false. If there were no minds, there would have been no propositions. |
19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
Full Idea: 1,000 years ago, no sentence had ever expressed, and no one had believed, the true proposition 'a water molecule has two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms'. There are surely true propositions that have never been, and never will be, expressed or believed. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.V) | |
A reaction: 'Surely'? Surely not! How many propositions exist? Where do they exist? What are they made of? If they already exist when we think them, how do we tune into them? When did his example come into existence? Before water did? No! No! |
19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The standard view among philosophers nowadays seems to be that propositions do not and even cannot change in truth-value. But my own view is that some propositions can, and do, change in truth value. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 3.VII) | |
A reaction: He gives 'that A sits' as an example of one which can change, though 'that A sits at time t' cannot change. I take Merricks to be obviously right, and cannot get my head round the 'standard' view. What on earth do they think a proposition is? |
19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
Full Idea: If a singular proposition is 'directly about' an entity, I argue that a singular proposition does not have the entity that it is directly about as a constituent. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], Intro) | |
A reaction: This opposes the view of the early Russell, that propositions actually contain the entities they are about, thus making propositions real features of the external world. I take that view of Russell's to be absurd. |
19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
Full Idea: I describe Russell's 1903 account of propositions as the view that each proposition is identical with the state of affairs that makes that proposition true. That is, a proposition is identical with its 'truthmaking' state of affairs. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.II) | |
A reaction: Russell soon gave this view up (false propositions proving tricky), and I'm amazed anyone takes it seriously. I take it as axiomatic that if there were no minds there would be no propositions. Was the Big Bang a set of propositions? |
19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
Full Idea: What binds the constituents of a structured proposition together into a single unity, a proposition? Can the very same constituents constitute two distinct propositions? These are questions about 'the unity of the proposition'. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.II) | |
A reaction: Merricks solves it by saying propositions have no structure. The problem is connected to the nature of predication (instantiation, partaking). You can't just list objects and their properties. Objects are united, and thus propositions are too. |
19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
Full Idea: A successful account of the unity of the proposition tells us what unites the relevant constituents not merely into some entity or other, but into a proposition. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 4.X) | |
A reaction: Merrickes takes propositions to be unanalysable unities, but their central activity is representation, so if they needed uniting, that would be the place to look. Some people say that we unite our propositions. Others say the world does. I dunno. |
1567 | How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: If someone knows the nature of everything, how could he fail to be able also to act correctly in every case? | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §8) |
1563 | Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG] |
Full Idea: It can be right, in certain circumstances, to steal, to break a solemn promise, to rob temples, and even (as Orestes did) to murder one's nearest and dearest. | |
From: report of Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: Not sure about the last one! I suppose you can justify any hideousness if the fate of the universe depends on it. It must be better to die than the perform certain extreme deeds. |
1562 | It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: It is right to lie to your parents, in order to get them to take a good medicine they are reluctant to take. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) | |
A reaction: I dread to think what the medicines were which convinced the writer of this. A rule such as this strikes me as dangerous. Justifiable in extreme cases. House on fire etc. |
1566 | The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: A lottery is not democratic, because every state contains people who are not democratic, and if the lottery chooses them they will destroy the democracy. People should elect those who are observed to favour democracy. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §7) |
1565 | We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §6) |