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All the ideas for 'Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments', 'What Numbers Are' and 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
     Full Idea: The objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested.
     From: Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934], p.22), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 2.4
     A reaction: Does this mean that objectivity is the same as consensus? A bunch of subjective prejudiced fools can reach a consensus. And in the middle of that bunch there can be one person who is objecfive. Sounds wrong.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: There is no difference between a true statement and a false statement, because they can use exactly the same words.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §4)
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Löwenheim-Skolem says any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers [White,NP]
     Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem tells us that any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers.
     From: Nicholas P. White (What Numbers Are [1974], V)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Finite cardinalities don't need numbers as objects; numerical quantifiers will do [White,NP]
     Full Idea: Statements involving finite cardinalities can be made without treating numbers as objects at all, simply by using quantification and identity to define numerically definite quantifiers in the manner of Frege.
     From: Nicholas P. White (What Numbers Are [1974], IV)
     A reaction: [He adds Quine 1960:268 as a reference]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: Thracians think that tattooing enhances a girl's beauty, whereas for everyone else tattooing is a punishment for a crime.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: Anything can be acceptable under the right circumstances, and unacceptable under the wrong circumstances.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: The Lydians find it acceptable for their daughters to work as prostitutes to raise money for getting married, but no one in Greece would be prepared to marry such a girl.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
     Full Idea: Popper implies that we should be giving Nobel Prizes to scientists who use severe tests to show us what the world is not like!
     From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Geoffrey Gorham - Philosophy of Science 2
     A reaction: A lovely simple point. The refuters are important members of the scientific team, but not the leaders.
Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
     Full Idea: According to Popper, falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science.
     From: report of Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Bryan Magee - Popper Ch.3
     A reaction: If I propose something which might be falsified in a hundred years, is it science NOW? Suppose my theory appeared to be falsifiable, but (after much effort) it turned out not to be? Suppose I just see a pattern (like quark theory) in a set of facts?
We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
     Full Idea: Popper's mistake is to hold that disconfirmation and elimination work exclusively through refutation.
     From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Peter Lipton - Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) 05 'Explanation'
     A reaction: The point is that we reject hypotheses even if they have not actually been refuted, on the grounds that they don't give a good explanation. I agree entirely with Lipton.
If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
     Full Idea: In Popper's sense of the word 'falsify', whereby an observation statement falsifies a hypothesis only by being logically inconsistent with it, nothing can ever falsify a probabilistic or statistical hypothesis, which is therefore unscientific.
     From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.5
     A reaction: In general, no prediction can be falsified until the events occur. This seems to be Aristotle's 'sea fight' problem (Idea 1703).
When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
     Full Idea: It is a feature of Popper's philosophy that when the going gets tough, induction is quietly called upon to help out.
     From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.5
     A reaction: This appears to be the central reason for the decline in Popper's reputation as the saviour of science. It would certainly seem absurd to say that you know nothing when you have lots of verification but not a glimmer of falsification.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: Popper's principles are roughly that one theory is superior to another if it has greater empirical content, if it can account for the successes of the first theory, and if it has not been falsified (unlike the first theory).
     From: report of Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by W.H. Newton-Smith - The Rationality of Science I.6
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
     Full Idea: According to Popper, induction is a dispensable concept, a myth. It does not exist. There is no such thing.
     From: report of Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Bryan Magee - Popper Ch.2
     A reaction: This is a nice bold summary of the Popper view - that falsification is the underlying rational activity which we mistakenly think is verification by repeated observations. Put like this, Popper seems to be wrong. We obviously learn from experiences.
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
     Full Idea: If Popper follows Hume in abandoning induction, there is no way in which he can justify the claims that there is growth of scientific knowledge and that science is a rational activity.
     From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by W.H. Newton-Smith - The Rationality of Science III.3
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: If someone knows the nature of everything, how could he fail to be able also to act correctly in every case?
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §8)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG]
     Full Idea: It can be right, in certain circumstances, to steal, to break a solemn promise, to rob temples, and even (as Orestes did) to murder one's nearest and dearest.
     From: report of Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: Not sure about the last one! I suppose you can justify any hideousness if the fate of the universe depends on it. It must be better to die than the perform certain extreme deeds.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: It is right to lie to your parents, in order to get them to take a good medicine they are reluctant to take.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3)
     A reaction: I dread to think what the medicines were which convinced the writer of this. A rule such as this strikes me as dangerous. Justifiable in extreme cases. House on fire etc.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: A lottery is not democratic, because every state contains people who are not democratic, and if the lottery chooses them they will destroy the democracy. People should elect those who are observed to favour democracy.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §7)
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §6)