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All the ideas for 'Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments', 'Philosophy as a way of life' and 'Finkish dispositions'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot]
     Full Idea: Personally I firmly believe, perhaps naively, that it is possible for modern man to live, not as a sage (sophos) - most of the ancients did not hold this to be possible - but as a practitioner of the ever-fragile exercise of wisdom.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 7)
     A reaction: It seems to me quite plausible that the philosophical life might yet become a widespread ideal, even though philosophers seem to still be sheltering from storms two thousand years after Plato gave us that image.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot]
     Full Idea: The logos represents a demand for universal rationality.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.3)
     A reaction: That is at one end of the spectrum. At the other, in parts of 'Theaetetus', it is just a polite request to be given a few reasons, instead of a splattering of hopes and prejudices.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: There is no difference between a true statement and a false statement, because they can use exactly the same words.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §4)
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
     Full Idea: To avoid the danger of claiming that dispositions are their own categorical bases, we do better to eschew the alleged distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties altogether.
     From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II)
     A reaction: Since I have been unable to form any intuitive notion of what a 'categorical' property is, I like this, though not necessarily for his reason.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Prior, Pargetter and Jackson have argued convincingly for the thesis that all dispositions must have causal bases.
     From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II)
     A reaction: [Their paper is 1982] This key thesis is tackled by modern defenders of powers. The question is not who has the best arguments, but who offers the most coherent picture. What is a 'causal basis'? What sort of thing could be primitive or fundamental?
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A disposition which would straight away vanish if put to the test is called 'finkish'. A finkishly fragile thing is fragile so long as it is not struck. But if it were struck, it would straight away cease to be fragile, and it would not break.
     From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I)
     A reaction: There are also 'antidotes'. Finks kill the disposition, antidotes kill the effect. These cases are problems for the simple conditional analysis of a disposition - because we never achieved the consequent.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
     Full Idea: 'Backtracking' counterfactual reasoning runs from a counterfactually supposed event to the causal antecedents it would have to have had.
     From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I)
     A reaction: Why not call it a 'transcendental' counterfactual? Presumably you go thisworld>> counterfactualevent>> worldneededtocauseit. It conjures up two possible worlds instead of one.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: Anything can be acceptable under the right circumstances, and unacceptable under the wrong circumstances.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: The Lydians find it acceptable for their daughters to work as prostitutes to raise money for getting married, but no one in Greece would be prepared to marry such a girl.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: Thracians think that tattooing enhances a girl's beauty, whereas for everyone else tattooing is a punishment for a crime.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: If someone knows the nature of everything, how could he fail to be able also to act correctly in every case?
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §8)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG]
     Full Idea: It can be right, in certain circumstances, to steal, to break a solemn promise, to rob temples, and even (as Orestes did) to murder one's nearest and dearest.
     From: report of Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: Not sure about the last one! I suppose you can justify any hideousness if the fate of the universe depends on it. It must be better to die than the perform certain extreme deeds.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: It is right to lie to your parents, in order to get them to take a good medicine they are reluctant to take.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3)
     A reaction: I dread to think what the medicines were which convinced the writer of this. A rule such as this strikes me as dangerous. Justifiable in extreme cases. House on fire etc.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot]
     Full Idea: For epicureans, the only genuine pleasure there is is the pleasure of existing.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.1)
     A reaction: I don't know Hadot's source for this claim, but it is a nice idea, which I shall endeavour to incorporate into my own attitude to daily living. I'm not quite clear, though, why the pleasure of music is not a 'genuine' one.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: A lottery is not democratic, because every state contains people who are not democratic, and if the lottery chooses them they will destroy the democracy. People should elect those who are observed to favour democracy.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §7)
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §6)