28 ideas
19404 | Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The principle of contradiction is the principle of necessity, and the principle that a sufficient reason must be given is the principle of contingency. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95) | |
A reaction: [this paragraph is actually undated] Contradictions occur in concrete actuality, as well as in theories and formal systems. If so, then there are necessities in nature. Are they discoverable a posteriori? Leibniz says not. |
1553 | No perceptible object is truly straight or curved [Protagoras] |
Full Idea: No perceptible object is geometrically straight or curved; after all, a circle does not touch a ruler at a point, as Protagoras used to say, in arguing against the geometers. | |
From: Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE], B07), quoted by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a1 |
1549 | Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras] |
Full Idea: Everything that exists consists in being perceived. | |
From: Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]), quoted by Didymus the Blind - Commentary on the Psalms (frags) | |
A reaction: A striking anticipation of Berkeley's "esse est percipi" (to be is to be perceived). |
1545 | Protagoras was the first to claim that there are two contradictory arguments about everything [Protagoras, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Protagoras was the first to claim that there are two contradictory arguments about everything. | |
From: report of Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE], A01) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.51 |
1547 | Man is the measure of all things - of things that are, and of things that are not [Protagoras] |
Full Idea: He began one of his books as follows: 'Man is the measure of all things - of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not'. | |
From: Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE], B01), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.51 |
3305 | There is no more purely metaphysical doctrine than Protagorean relativism [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
Full Idea: No purer metaphysical doctrine can possibly be found than the Protagorean thesis that to be (anything at all) is to be relative ( to something or other). | |
From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.3 |
3317 | You can only state the problem of the relative warmth of an object by agreeing on the underlying object [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
Full Idea: Only if the thing that is cold to me is precisely identical with the thing that is not cold to you can Protagoras launch his argument, but then it is seen to be the thing in itself that exists absolutely speaking. | |
From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.8 |
3313 | If my hot wind is your cold wind, then wind is neither hot nor cold, and so not as cold as itself [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
Full Idea: Because the wind is cold to me but not you, Protagoras takes it to in itself neither cold nor not-cold. Accordingly, I very much doubt that he can allow the wind to be exactly as cold as itself. | |
From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.8 |
247 | God is "the measure of all things", more than any man [Plato on Protagoras] |
Full Idea: In our view it is God who is pre-eminently the "measure of all things", much more so than any "man", as they say. | |
From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Plato - The Laws 716c |
606 | Protagoras absurdly thought that the knowing or perceiving man is 'the measure of all things' [Aristotle on Protagoras] |
Full Idea: When Protagoras quipped that man is the measure of all things, he had in mind, of course, the knowing or perceiving man. The grounds are that they have perception/knowledge, and these are said to be the measures of objects. Utter nonsense! | |
From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1053b |
612 | Relativists think if you poke your eye and see double, there must be two things [Aristotle on Protagoras] |
Full Idea: In fact there is no difference between Protagoreanism and saying this: if you stick your finger under your eyes and make single things seem two, then they are two, just because they seem to be two. | |
From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1063a06 |
6016 | Early sophists thought convention improved nature; later they said nature was diminished by it [Protagoras, by Miller,FD] |
Full Idea: Protagoras and Hippias evidently believed that convention was an improvement on nature, whereas later sophists such as Antiphon, Thrasymachus and Callicles seemed to contend that conventional morality was undermined because it was 'against nature'. | |
From: report of Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Fred D. Miller jr - Classical Political Thought | |
A reaction: This gets to the heart of a much more interesting aspect of the nomos-physis (convention-nature) debate, rather than just a slanging match between relativists and the rest. The debate still goes on, over issues about the free market and intervention. |
1580 | For Protagoras the only bad behaviour is that which interferes with social harmony [Protagoras, by Roochnik] |
Full Idea: For Protagoras the only constraint on human behaviour is that it not interfere with social harmony, the essential condition for human survival. | |
From: report of Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.63 |
205 | Protagoras contradicts himself by saying virtue is teachable, but then that it is not knowledge [Plato on Protagoras] |
Full Idea: Protagoras claimed that virtue was teachable, but now tries to show it is not knowledge, which makes it less likely to be teachable. | |
From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Plato - Protagoras 361b |
1659 | Protagoras seems to have made the huge move of separating punishment from revenge [Protagoras, by Vlastos] |
Full Idea: The distinction of punishment from revenge must be regarded as one of the most momentous of the conceptual discoveries ever made by humanity in the course of its slow, tortuous, precarious, emergence from barbaric tribalism. Protagoras originated it. | |
From: report of Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.187 |
532 | Successful education must go deep into the soul [Protagoras] |
Full Idea: Education does not take root in the soul unless one goes deep. | |
From: Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE], B11), quoted by Plutarch - On Practice 178.25 |
1552 | He spent public money on education, as it benefits the individual and the state [Protagoras, by Diodorus of Sicily] |
Full Idea: He used legislation to improve the condition of illiterate people, on the grounds that they lack one of life's great goods, and thought literacy should be a matter of public concern and expense. | |
From: report of Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Diodorus of Sicily - Universal History 12.13.3.3 |
19403 | Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: As there are an infinity of possible worlds, there are also an infinity of laws, some proper to one, another to another, and each possible individual of any world contains in its own notion the laws of its world. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95) | |
A reaction: Hence Leibniz is not really a scientific essentialist, in that he doesn't think the laws arise out of the nature of the matter consituting the world. I wonder if the primitive matter of bodies which attaches to the monads is the same in each world? |
21243 | An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm] |
Full Idea: Something can be thought of as existing, which cannot be thought of as not existing, and this is greater than that which cannot be thought of as not existing. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 3) | |
A reaction: This is a necessary addition, to single out the concept of God as special. But you really must give reasons for saying God's non-existence is inconceivable. Atheists seem to manage. |
21244 | Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm] |
Full Idea: If some mind could think of something better than thou, the creature would rise above the Creator and judge its Creator; but this is altogether absurd. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 3) | |
A reaction: An error, revealing a certain desperation. If a greafer being could be conceived than the being so far imagined as God (a necessarily existing being), that being would BE God, by his own argument (and not some arrogant 'creature'). |
21241 | Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm] |
Full Idea: Even the fool must be convinced that a being than which none greater can be thought exists at least in his understanding, since when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 2) | |
A reaction: Psalm 14.1: 'The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God'. But how does the fool interpret the words, if he has limited imagination? He might get no further than an attractive film star. He would need prompting to think of a spiritual being. |
21242 | If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm] |
Full Idea: Clearly that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the understanding alone. For it it is actually in the understanding alone, it can be thought of as existing also in reality, and this is greater. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 2) | |
A reaction: The suppressed premise is 'something actually existing is greater than the mere conception of it'. As it stands this is wrong. I can imagine a supreme evil. But see Idea 21243. |
1421 | A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm] |
Full Idea: Anselm's second proof works, because he sees that necessary existence (or the impossibility of non-existence) really is a perfection. This is because a perfection requires no dependence or limit or impediment. | |
From: comment on Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 3) by Norman Malcolm - Anselm's Argument Sect II | |
A reaction: I have the usual problem, that it doesn't seem to follow that the perfect existence of something bestows a perfection. It may be necessary that 'for every large animal there exists a disease'. Satan may exist necessarily. |
21245 | The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm] |
Full Idea: We think of a thing when we say the world, and in another way when we think of the very thing itself. In the second sense God cannot be thought of as nonexistent. No one who understands can think God does not exist. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 4) | |
A reaction: It seems open to the atheist to claim the exact opposite - that you can commit to God's existence if it is just a word, but understanding shows that God is impossible (perhaps because of contradictions). How to arbitrate? |
21246 | Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm] |
Full Idea: Guanilo supposes that we imagine an island surpassing all lands in its fertility. We might then say that we cannot doubt that it truly exists is reality, because anyone can conceive it from a verbal description. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Reply 3) | |
A reaction: Guanilo was a very naughty monk, who must have had sleepless nights over this. One could further ask whether an island might have necessary existence. Anselm needs 'a being' to be a special category of thing. |
21247 | Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm] |
Full Idea: If anyone does think of something a greater than which cannot be thought, then he thinks of something which cannot be thought of as nonexistent, ...for then it could be thought of as having a beginning and an end. And this is impossible. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Reply 3) | |
A reaction: A nice idea, but it has a flip side. If the atheist denies God's existence, then it follows that (because no beginning is possible for such a being) the existence of God is impossible. Anselm adds that contingent existents have parts (unlike God). |
1420 | Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm] |
Full Idea: Anselm's first proof fails, because he treats existence as being a perfection, which it isn't, because that would make it a real predicate. | |
From: comment on Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 2) by Norman Malcolm - Anselm's Argument Sect I | |
A reaction: Not everyone accepts Kant's claim that existence cannot be a predicate. They all seem to know what a perfection is. Can the Mona Lisa (an object) not be a perfection? Must it be broken down into perfect predicates? |
1551 | He said he didn't know whether there are gods - but this is the same as atheism [Diogenes of Oen. on Protagoras] |
Full Idea: He said that he did not know whether there were gods - but this is the same as saying that he knew there were no gods. | |
From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE], A23) by Diogenes (Oen) - Wall inscription 11 Chil 2 |