31 ideas
13011 | New axioms are being sought, to determine the size of the continuum [Maddy] |
Full Idea: In current set theory, the search is on for new axioms to determine the size of the continuum. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §0) | |
A reaction: This sounds the wrong way round. Presumably we seek axioms that fix everything else about set theory, and then check to see what continuum results. Otherwise we could just pick our continuum, by picking our axioms. |
13013 | The Axiom of Extensionality seems to be analytic [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Most writers agree that if any sense can be made of the distinction between analytic and synthetic, then the Axiom of Extensionality should be counted as analytic. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.1) | |
A reaction: [Boolos is the source of the idea] In other words Extensionality is not worth discussing, because it simply tells you what the world 'set' means, and there is no room for discussion about that. The set/class called 'humans' varies in size. |
13014 | Extensional sets are clearer, simpler, unique and expressive [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The extensional view of sets is preferable because it is simpler, clearer, and more convenient, because it individuates uniquely, and because it can simulate intensional notions when the need arises. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.1) | |
A reaction: [She cites Fraenkel, Bar-Hillet and Levy for this] The difficulty seems to be whether the extensional notion captures our ordinary intuitive notion of what constitutes a group of things, since that needs flexible size and some sort of unity. |
13021 | The Axiom of Infinity states Cantor's breakthrough that launched modern mathematics [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Infinity is a simple statement of Cantor's great breakthrough. His bold hypothesis that a collection of elements that had lurked in the background of mathematics could be infinite launched modern mathematics. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.5) | |
A reaction: It also embodies one of those many points where mathematics seems to depart from common sense - but then most subjects depart from common sense when they get more sophisticated. Look what happened to art. |
13022 | Infinite sets are essential for giving an account of the real numbers [Maddy] |
Full Idea: If one is interested in analysis then infinite sets are indispensable since even the notion of a real number cannot be developed by means of finite sets alone. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.5) | |
A reaction: [Maddy is citing Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel and Levy] So Cantor's great breakthrough (Idea 13021) actually follows from the earlier acceptance of the real numbers, so that's where the departure from common sense started. |
13023 | The Power Set Axiom is needed for, and supported by, accounts of the continuum [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The Power Set Axiom is indispensable for a set-theoretic account of the continuum, ...and in so far as those attempts are successful, then the power-set principle gains some confirmatory support. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.6) | |
A reaction: The continuum is, of course, notoriously problematic. Have we created an extra problem in our attempts at solving the first one? |
13024 | Efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice have failed [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Jordain made consistent and ill-starred efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.7) | |
A reaction: This would appear to be the fate of most axioms. You would presumably have to use a different system from the one you are engaged with to achieve your proof. |
13025 | Modern views say the Choice set exists, even if it can't be constructed [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Resistance to the Axiom of Choice centred on opposition between existence and construction. Modern set theory thrives on a realistic approach which says the choice set exists, regardless of whether it can be defined, constructed, or given by a rule. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.7) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a key case for the ontology that lies at the heart of theory. Choice seems to be an invaluable tool for proofs, so it won't go away, so admit it to the ontology. Hm. So the tools of thought have existence? |
13026 | A large array of theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Many theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice, including that a countable union of sets is countable, and results in analysis, topology, abstract algebra and mathematical logic. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.7) | |
A reaction: The modern attitude seems to be to admit anything if it leads to interesting results. It makes you wonder about the modern approach of using mathematics and logic as the cutting edges of ontological thinking. |
13019 | The Iterative Conception says everything appears at a stage, derived from the preceding appearances [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The Iterative Conception (Zermelo 1930) says everything appears at some stage. Given two objects a and b, let A and B be the stages at which they first appear. Suppose B is after A. Then the pair set of a and b appears at the immediate stage after B. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.3) | |
A reaction: Presumably this all happens in 'logical time' (a nice phrase I have just invented!). I suppose we might say that the existence of the paired set is 'forced' by the preceding sets. No transcendental inferences in this story? |
13018 | Limitation of Size is a vague intuition that over-large sets may generate paradoxes [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The 'limitation of size' is a vague intuition, based on the idea that being too large may generate the paradoxes. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.3) | |
A reaction: This is an intriguing idea to be found right at the centre of what is supposed to be an incredibly rigorous system. |
9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
Full Idea: To say that a class is natural is to say that when some of its members are shown to people they pick out others without hesitation and in agreement. | |
From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat') | |
A reaction: He concedes a number of problems with his view, but I admire his attempt to at least begin to distinguish the natural (real!) classes from the ersatz ones. A mention of causal powers would greatly improve his story. |
15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
Full Idea: Pure, extreme nominalism sees all classification as the product of arbitrary convention. | |
From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat') | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what the word 'arbitrary' is doing there. Nominalists are not daft, and if they can classify any way they like, they are not likely to choose an 'arbitrary' system. Pragmatism tells the right story here. |
15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
Full Idea: The naturalness of a class depends as essentially on the nature of the observers who classify as it does on the nature of the objects that they classify. ...It depends on our perceptual apparatus, and on our relatively mutable needs and interests. | |
From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat') | |
A reaction: This seems to translate 'natural' as 'natural for us', which is not much use to scientists, who spend quite a lot of effort combating folk wisdom. Do desirable sports cars constitute a natural class? |
9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
Full Idea: To say there are properties is to say there are natural classes, classes introduction to some of whose members enables people to pick out others without hesitation and in agreement. | |
From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat') | |
A reaction: Aristotle would like this approach, but it doesn't find many friends among modern logician/philosophers. We should go on to ask why people agree on these things. Causal powers will then come into it. |
15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
Full Idea: Properties that have no concrete instances must be defined in terms of those that have. | |
From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat') | |
A reaction: I wonder what the dodo used to smell like? |
8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: Quinton proposes that an individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position. | |
From: report of Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], Pt I) by Keith Campbell - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars §5 | |
A reaction: This seems the obvious defence of a bundle account of objects against the charge that indiscernibles would have to be identical. It introduces, however, 'positions' into the ontology, but maybe that price must be paid. Materialism needs space. |
6685 | 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham] |
Full Idea: What is called 'subjectivism' is really just an extension of relativism from the level of the social group to the level of the individual. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I prefer to stick with 'relativism', at any level. 'Relative' is a two-place predicate, so we should always specify what is relative to what, unless it is obvious from context. Morality might be relative to God, for example. |
6699 | The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham] |
Full Idea: From a utilitarian point of view, the error of Archduke Ferdinand's driver (he turned up a cul-de-sac) was the worst in history, ...but the chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Can you cause something, and yet not be responsible for it? The driver was presumably fully conscious, rational and deliberate. He must share the responsibility for catastrophe, just as he shares in the causing of all the consequences. |
6698 | Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham] |
Full Idea: Negative consequences make the extension of the consequences of our actions indefinite, and this means that it is difficult to assess them; it may make it impossible, since there is now no clear sense to the idea of THE consequences of an action at all. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: The general slogan of 'Do your best' covers most objections to the calculation of consequences. It is no excuse for stealing a wallet that 'at least I wasn't committing genocide'. How easy were the alternative actions to do? |
6700 | We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham] |
Full Idea: It is unreasonable to say that people have acted badly because of consequences which were not merely unforeseen but unforeseeable. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Interesting, and it sounds right. A key question in moral philosophy is how much effort people should make to assess the consequences of their actions. We must surely absolve them of the truly 'unforeseeable' consequence. |
6704 | Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham] |
Full Idea: Egoism is inadequate as a guide to good living. Though it tells us what to do, given pre-existent desires, it cannot help us critically form those desires. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: A crucial point in morality. It also applies to utilitarianism (should I change my capacity for pleasure?), and virtue theory (how should I genetically engineer 'human nature'?). I think these problems push us towards Platonism. See Idea 4840. |
6701 | Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham] |
Full Idea: If more lives are to be saved in natural disasters, what is needed is spontaneity on the part of the rescuers, a willingness not to stop and think but to act spontaneously. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This seems right, but must obviously be applied with caution, as when people are drowned attempting hopeless rescues. The most valuable person in an earthquake may be the thinker, not the digger. |
6693 | 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham] |
Full Idea: I can object to your walking on the grass by asking 'What if everybody did that?', but the advantages of cheating depend upon the fact that most people don't cheat, so justifying my own cheating must involve special pleading. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: It is, of course, reasonable to ask 'What if everybody cheated?', but it is also reasonable to reply that 'the whole point of cheating is that it exploits the honesty of others'. This shows that Kant cannot simply demolish the 'free rider'. |
6691 | It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham] |
Full Idea: To say that individuals are free to choose their own values is more naturally interpreted as meaning that they are free to choose between pre-existent values. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Existentialism seems absurdly individualistic in its morality. Nietzsche was the best existentialist, who saw that most people have to be sheep. Strong personalities can promote or demote the old values on the great scale of what is good. |
6688 | Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham] |
Full Idea: If 'life is absurd' just means 'there is no logical explanation for human existence', we have no reason for anguish, unless we think there should be such an explanation. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Kierkegaard and Camus. 'Absurd' certainly seems to be a relative notion, and we have nothing to compare life with. However, life does strike us as a bit odd sometimes, don't you think? |
6705 | Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham] |
Full Idea: It is the freedom to transcend our nature which eudaimonism seems to ignore and existentialism brings to the fore. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: It is wildly exciting to 'transcend our nature', and very dreary to polish up the nature which is given to us. In this I am a bit conservative. We should not go against the grain, but we shouldn't assume current living is the correct line of the grain. |
6690 | A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham] |
Full Idea: A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi'; there were undoubtedly some true believers, who saw in Nazism a creed that they wanted to believe, and who freely chose to endorse it. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: The failing of Nazis was that they were not good citizens. They might have been good members of a faction, but they were (in my opinion) poor citizens of Germany, and (obviously) appalling citizens of Europe. The objection to existentialism is good. |
6689 | The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham] |
Full Idea: The chief implication of existentialism is this: what you choose to do, how you choose to spend your life, is not as important as the way you choose it. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: While existentialists place emphasis on some notion of 'pure' choice, this is very close to the virtue theory idea that in a dilemma there may be several different choices which could all be rightly made by virtuous people. Integrity is a central virtue. |
6706 | The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham] |
Full Idea: The fact is that the great religions of the world are not principally concerned with ethics at all, but with the religious life for its own sake. ..The Sermon on the Mount, for example, is mainly concerned with how to pray and worship. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a highly significant point, given that most people nowadays seem to endorse religion precisely because they wish to endorse morality, and think religion is its essential underpinning. See Idea 336 for the core problem ('Euthyphro'). |
6709 | Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham] |
Full Idea: For Western minds, religion entails the belief and hope that we will be saved from death and live forever, but the belief of Eastern religions is that we do live forever, and it is from this dreadful fate that we must look to spirituality to save us. | |
From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: Nice. I have certainly come to prefer the Eastern view, simply on the grounds that human beings have a limited capacity. I quite fancy three hundred years of healthy life, but after that I am sure that any potential I have will be used up. |