89 ideas
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01) |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02) |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03) | |
A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense. |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04) | |
A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation. |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
Full Idea: Aletheia: truth | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05) |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06) | |
A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives. |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
Full Idea: Ananke: necessity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07) |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08) |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09) |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10) | |
A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element. |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11) |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12) |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13) |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14) | |
A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical. |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15) | |
A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'. |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
Full Idea: Chronismos: separation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16) |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17) |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18) |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21) |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
Full Idea: Diaphora: difference | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22) |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23) | |
A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation. |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24) |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25) |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26) | |
A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27) |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
Full Idea: Empeiron: experience | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28) |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power? | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31) |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
Full Idea: Enkrateia: control | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32) | |
A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled. |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33) |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34) |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35) | |
A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'. |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36) |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
Full Idea: Ergon: function, work | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37) |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38) | |
A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly? |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
Full Idea: Eros: love, desire | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41) |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42) | |
A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure. |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43) |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44) |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
Full Idea: Horismos: definition | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45) |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
Full Idea: Hule: matter | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46) | |
A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'! |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47) | |
A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'. |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48) | |
A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects. |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51) |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52) |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53) |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54) |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
Full Idea: Meson: the mean | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55) | |
A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances. |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56) | |
A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic. |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57) |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
Full Idea: Morphe: form | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58) |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59) |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61) |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62) | |
A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19 |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
Full Idea: Orexis: desire | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63) |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia'] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64) | |
A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer. |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65) |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66) |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
Full Idea: Philia: friendship | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67) |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68) | |
A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise. |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71) | |
A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English. |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
Full Idea: Physis: nature | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72) |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73) |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74) | |
A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem. |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75) | |
A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too. |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76) |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77) |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78) |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81) |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82) |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83) |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84) |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
Full Idea: Theos: god | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85) |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86) |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87) |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory. |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
Full Idea: To ti estin: essence | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91) |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92) |
9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
Full Idea: To say that a class is natural is to say that when some of its members are shown to people they pick out others without hesitation and in agreement. | |
From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat') | |
A reaction: He concedes a number of problems with his view, but I admire his attempt to at least begin to distinguish the natural (real!) classes from the ersatz ones. A mention of causal powers would greatly improve his story. |
15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
Full Idea: Pure, extreme nominalism sees all classification as the product of arbitrary convention. | |
From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat') | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what the word 'arbitrary' is doing there. Nominalists are not daft, and if they can classify any way they like, they are not likely to choose an 'arbitrary' system. Pragmatism tells the right story here. |
15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
Full Idea: The naturalness of a class depends as essentially on the nature of the observers who classify as it does on the nature of the objects that they classify. ...It depends on our perceptual apparatus, and on our relatively mutable needs and interests. | |
From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat') | |
A reaction: This seems to translate 'natural' as 'natural for us', which is not much use to scientists, who spend quite a lot of effort combating folk wisdom. Do desirable sports cars constitute a natural class? |
9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
Full Idea: To say there are properties is to say there are natural classes, classes introduction to some of whose members enables people to pick out others without hesitation and in agreement. | |
From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat') | |
A reaction: Aristotle would like this approach, but it doesn't find many friends among modern logician/philosophers. We should go on to ask why people agree on these things. Causal powers will then come into it. |
15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
Full Idea: Properties that have no concrete instances must be defined in terms of those that have. | |
From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat') | |
A reaction: I wonder what the dodo used to smell like? |
8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
Full Idea: Quinton proposes that an individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position. | |
From: report of Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], Pt I) by Keith Campbell - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars §5 | |
A reaction: This seems the obvious defence of a bundle account of objects against the charge that indiscernibles would have to be identical. It introduces, however, 'positions' into the ontology, but maybe that price must be paid. Materialism needs space. |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
Full Idea: It is not clear how the emotivist can accommodate the amoralist - one who recognises moral requirements but is indifferent to them. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche recognised current morals, but was indifferent to them. It is hard to imagine, though, an amoralist who lacked all the feelings which imply morality. |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
Full Idea: Critics of emotivism claim that moral agreement need not track agreement in attitude; moralists with the same attitude can disagree in their views, and they can hold the same view while disagreeing in attitude. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: Thus two racists can disagree about how racists should behave. Sounds like a good criticism. |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
Full Idea: It is hard for the emotivist to give an analysis of the occurrence of moral ideas in unasserted contexts, such as "IF he did wrong, then he should be punished". | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: This is the 'Frege-Geach Problem'. |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
Full Idea: By stressing the intimate connection between moral judgements and the agent's non-cognitive attitudes, emotivists claim to capture the motivational properties of moral judgement. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.223) | |
A reaction: The same claim is made by contractarians, who start from our universal self-interest. Emotivists also nicely capture the motivation properties of immoral judgements. |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
Full Idea: If you want to recognise the truth of some moral judgements, perhaps to make room for the possibility of moral mistakes, then one may not be satisfied with the emotivists' tendency to appeal to the redundancy theory of truth. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: Probably thinking of Simon Blackburn. People who adopt a redundancy view of truth for semantics are left floundering when discussing what is true in the rest of philosophy. |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
Full Idea: Emotivism suggests that different feelings lead to different individual meanings for moral terms, but critics say that meanings are the same, and disagreement is about the extension (range of reference) of the terms. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: It's hard to see how 'ought to p' could have quite different meanings for an emotivist and (say) a theistic moralist. 'Ought' is an obvious and simple word. Good criticism. |