Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Things', 'Structure and Nature' and 'fragments/reports'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton]
     Full Idea: To say that a class is natural is to say that when some of its members are shown to people they pick out others without hesitation and in agreement.
     From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat')
     A reaction: He concedes a number of problems with his view, but I admire his attempt to at least begin to distinguish the natural (real!) classes from the ersatz ones. A mention of causal powers would greatly improve his story.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine]
     Full Idea: My own line is a yet more sweeping structuralism (than David Lewis's account of classes), applying to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately.
     From: Willard Quine (Structure and Nature [1992], p.6), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9
     A reaction: Shapiro calls this 'breathtaking', and retreats from it, but it is something like my own view, starting from Mill's pebbles and working up.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
     Full Idea: My tentative ontology continues to consist of quarks and their compounds, also classes of such things, classes of such classes, and so on.
     From: Willard Quine (Structure and Nature [1992], p.9), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9
     A reaction: I would call this the Hierarchy of Abstraction (just coined it - what do you think?). Unlike Quine, I don't see why its ontology should include things called 'sets' in addition to the things that make them up.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton]
     Full Idea: Pure, extreme nominalism sees all classification as the product of arbitrary convention.
     From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat')
     A reaction: I'm not sure what the word 'arbitrary' is doing there. Nominalists are not daft, and if they can classify any way they like, they are not likely to choose an 'arbitrary' system. Pragmatism tells the right story here.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton]
     Full Idea: The naturalness of a class depends as essentially on the nature of the observers who classify as it does on the nature of the objects that they classify. ...It depends on our perceptual apparatus, and on our relatively mutable needs and interests.
     From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat')
     A reaction: This seems to translate 'natural' as 'natural for us', which is not much use to scientists, who spend quite a lot of effort combating folk wisdom. Do desirable sports cars constitute a natural class?
Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton]
     Full Idea: To say there are properties is to say there are natural classes, classes introduction to some of whose members enables people to pick out others without hesitation and in agreement.
     From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat')
     A reaction: Aristotle would like this approach, but it doesn't find many friends among modern logician/philosophers. We should go on to ask why people agree on these things. Causal powers will then come into it.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton]
     Full Idea: Properties that have no concrete instances must be defined in terms of those that have.
     From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat')
     A reaction: I wonder what the dodo used to smell like?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K]
     Full Idea: Quinton proposes that an individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position.
     From: report of Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], Pt I) by Keith Campbell - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars §5
     A reaction: This seems the obvious defence of a bundle account of objects against the charge that indiscernibles would have to be identical. It introduces, however, 'positions' into the ontology, but maybe that price must be paid. Materialism needs space.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes]
     Full Idea: No man has seen certain truth, and no man will ever know about the gods and other things I mentioned; for if he succeeds in saying what is fully true, he himself is unaware of it; opinion is fixed by fate on all things.
     From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B34), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.49.4
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes]
     Full Idea: If God had not created yellow honey, men would say that figs were sweeter.
     From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B38), quoted by Herodian - On Peculiar Speech 41.5
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato]
     Full Idea: The Eleatic tribe, which had its beginnings from Xenophanes and still earlier, proceed on the grounds that all things so-called are one.
     From: report of Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE]) by Plato - The Sophist 242d
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Xenophanes taught that the essence of God was of a spherical form, in no respect resembling man.
     From: report of Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.2.3
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes]
     Full Idea: Mortals believe the gods to be created by birth, and to have raiment, voice and body like mortals'.
     From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B14), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.109.2
Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes]
     Full Idea: Ethiopians have gods with snub noses and black hair, Thracians have gods with grey eyes and red hair.
     From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B16), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 7.22.1