12 ideas
12268 | Contradiction is impossible [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Antisthenes said that contradiction is impossible. | |
From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by Aristotle - Topics 104b21 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is giving an example of a 'thesis'. It should be taken seriously if a philosopher proposes it, but dismissed as rubbish if anyone else proposes it! No context is given for the remark. |
602 | Some fools think you cannot define anything, but only say what it is like [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is an application of that old chestnut of the cynic Antisthenes' followers (and other buffoons of that kind). Their claim was that a definition of what something is is impossible. You cannot define silver, though you can say it is like tin. | |
From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1043b |
18436 | Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed [Rodriquez-Pereyra] |
Full Idea: A and B are the sole truthmakers for 'A and B resemble each other'. There is no need to postulate extra entities - the resembling entities suffice to account for them. There is no regress of resemblances, ...since there are no resemblances at all. | |
From: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Resemblance Nominalism: a solution to universals [2002], p.115), quoted by Douglas Edwards - Properties 5.5.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to flatly reject the ordinary conversational move of asking in what 'respect' the two things resemble, which may be a genuine puzzle which gets an illuminating answer. We can't fully explain resemblance, but we can do better than this! |
2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
Full Idea: Belief might be accorded the status of core or chief propositional attitude. | |
From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.126) |
2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
Full Idea: In contrast with Brentano and Husserl, consciousness or attention are no longer seen as essential to intentionality. | |
From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being correct, although there seem to be plenty of current philosophers who do not accept it (e.g. Searle). I think philosophy of mind may be stuck in the dark ages if thinkers don't accept this proposal. |
2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
Full Idea: It is possible to give an account of concept-formation without a language of thought or representation, based on perception, which in the brain seems to involve information without representation. | |
From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.66) | |
A reaction: This claim strikes me as being a little too confident. One might say that a concept IS a representation. However, the perception of several horses might 'blur' together to form a generalised horse. |
2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
Full Idea: How else, other than via some form of representational system, could a human organism contain information as a content over which it could operate or 'attitudinise'? | |
From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'representational'. In its vaguest sense, this is just a tautology - content must be held in the mind in some form or other, but that tells us nothing. |
2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
Full Idea: It is not easy to employ our folk psychology in the understanding of persons in a very different culture. | |
From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.241) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a highly significant problem for the friends of folk psychology. It also breaks down in extreme situations, or with mental illness. It seems closer to culture than to brain structure. |
2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
Full Idea: I cannot say I am simply thinking but not thinking about anything. | |
From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
A reaction: Hard to disagree. However, I can plausibly reply to 'What are you thinking?' with 'Nothing', if my consciousness is freewheeling. Utterly disconnected content isn't really what we call 'thinking'. |
1664 | I would rather go mad than experience pleasure [Antisthenes (I)] |
Full Idea: I would rather go mad than experience pleasure. | |
From: Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.3 | |
A reaction: Did he actually prefer pain? If both experiences would drive him mad, it seems like a desire for death. I cannot understand why anyone is opposed to harmless pleasures. |
21385 | Antisthenes said virtue is teachable and permanent, is life's goal, and is like universal wealth [Antisthenes (I), by Long] |
Full Idea: The moral propositions of Antisthenes foreshadowed the Stoics: virtue can be taught and once acquired cannot be lost (fr.69,71); virtue is the goal of life (22); the sage is self-sufficient, since he has (by being wise) the wealth of all men (8o). | |
From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 1 | |
A reaction: [He cites Caizzi for the fragments] The distinctive idea here is (I think) that once acquired virtue can never be lost. It sounds plausible, but I'm wondering why it should be true. Is it like riding a bicycle, or like learning to speak Russian? |
2631 | Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature [Antisthenes (I), by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature. | |
From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.32 |