Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals'' and 'De Veritate (On Truth)'

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9 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Contradiction is impossible [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Antisthenes said that contradiction is impossible.
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by Aristotle - Topics 104b21
     A reaction: Aristotle is giving an example of a 'thesis'. It should be taken seriously if a philosopher proposes it, but dismissed as rubbish if anyone else proposes it! No context is given for the remark.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Some fools think you cannot define anything, but only say what it is like [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There is an application of that old chestnut of the cynic Antisthenes' followers (and other buffoons of that kind). Their claim was that a definition of what something is is impossible. You cannot define silver, though you can say it is like tin.
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1043b
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Anselm of Canterbury identified truth with God [Anselm, by Engel]
     Full Idea: Anselm of Canterbury identified truth with God.
     From: report of Anselm (De Veritate (On Truth) [1095]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §1.6
     A reaction: An interesting claim, perhaps, depending on what it means. God decrees truth, God knows all truth, God makes truth possible, God connects us to the world, God is the world…?
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH]
     Full Idea: We have three different ways in which we arrive at concepts or universals: there is a clarification, where we have a ready-made concept and define it; we have a combination (where a definition creates a concept); and an experience can lead to a habit.
     From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.190)
     A reaction: [very compressed] He cites Russell as calling the third one a 'condensed induction'. There seems to an intellectualist and non-intellectualist strand in the abstractionist tradition.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH]
     Full Idea: A 'felt familiarity' with universals seems to be more primitive than explicit abstraction.
     From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.188)
     A reaction: This I take to be part of the 'given' of the abstractionist view, which is quite well described in the first instance by Aristotle. Price says that it is 'pre-verbal'.
Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH]
     Full Idea: Whether you call it inductive or not, our understanding of such a word as 'dog' or 'house' does arise from a repeated experience of concomitances.
     From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.191)
     A reaction: Philosophers don't use phrases like that last one any more. How else could we form the concept of 'dog' - if we are actually allowed to discuss the question of concept-formation, instead of just the logic of concepts.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
I would rather go mad than experience pleasure [Antisthenes (I)]
     Full Idea: I would rather go mad than experience pleasure.
     From: Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.3
     A reaction: Did he actually prefer pain? If both experiences would drive him mad, it seems like a desire for death. I cannot understand why anyone is opposed to harmless pleasures.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Antisthenes said virtue is teachable and permanent, is life's goal, and is like universal wealth [Antisthenes (I), by Long]
     Full Idea: The moral propositions of Antisthenes foreshadowed the Stoics: virtue can be taught and once acquired cannot be lost (fr.69,71); virtue is the goal of life (22); the sage is self-sufficient, since he has (by being wise) the wealth of all men (8o).
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 1
     A reaction: [He cites Caizzi for the fragments] The distinctive idea here is (I think) that once acquired virtue can never be lost. It sounds plausible, but I'm wondering why it should be true. Is it like riding a bicycle, or like learning to speak Russian?
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature [Antisthenes (I), by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature.
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.32