10 ideas
8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
Full Idea: Being a constituent of probabilistic laws of nature is all there is to being a property. There is no more to temperature than the thermodynamics and other laws they occur in. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: How could thermodynamics be worked out without a prior concept of temperature? I think it is at least plausible to deny that there are any 'laws' of nature. But even Quine can't deny that some things are too hot to touch. |
8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
Full Idea: To every property there obviously corresponds a possible predicate applying to all and only those particulars with that property. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This doesn't strike me as at all obvious. If nature dictates the properties, there may be vastly more than any human language could cope with. It is daft to say that a property can only exist if humanity can come up with a predicate for it. |
8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
Full Idea: I take the main reason for believing in contingent universals to be the roles they play in causation and in laws of nature, and those laws are what I take to give those universals their identity. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: He agrees with Armstrong. Sounds a bit circular - laws are built on universals, and universals are identified by laws. It resembles a functionalist account of mental events. I think it is wrong. A different account of laws will be needed... |
8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
Full Idea: One reason for denying that properties just are the meanings of our predicates is that, if they were, they could not give our predicates their meanings. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: Neither way round sounds quite right to me. Predicate nominalism is wrong, but what is meant by a property 'giving' a predicate its meaning? It doesn't seem to allow room for error in our attempts to name the properties. |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
Full Idea: If the kinds there are depend not on the essences of the objects but on their observed distinguishing particulars, ...then for any kind that we think there is, it is possible that there are many underlying essences which are observably indistinguishable. | |
From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV) | |
A reaction: Eagle is commenting on Locke's reliance on nominal essences. This seems to be the genuine problem with jadeite and nephrite (both taken to be 'jade'), or with 'fool's gold'. This isn't an objection to Locke; it just explains the role of science. |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
Full Idea: It is clear the nominal essences really are the properties of the things which have them: they are (a subset of) the observable properties of the things. | |
From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV) | |
A reaction: I think this is wrong. The surface characteristics are all that is available to us, so our classifications must be based on those, but it is on the ideas of them, not their intrinsic natures. That is empiricsm! What makes the properties 'essential'? |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
Full Idea: Nominal essence does not allow for gradations in significance for the underlying properties. Those are all essential for the object behaving as it observably does, and they must all be given equal weight when deciding what the object does. | |
From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV) | |
A reaction: This is where 'scientific' essentialism comes in. If we take one object, or one kind of object, in isolation, Eagle is right. When we start to compare, and to set up controlled conditions tests, we can dig into the 'gradations' he cares about. |
19000 | Read 'all ravens are black' as about ravens, not as about an implication [Belnap] |
Full Idea: 'All ravens are black' might profitably be read as saying not that being a raven 'implies' being black, but rather something more like 'Consider the ravens: each one is black'. | |
From: Nuel D. Belnap (Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification [1970], p.7), quoted by Stephen Yablo - Aboutness 04.5 | |
A reaction: Belnap is more interested in the logic than in the paradox of confirmation, since he evidently thinks that universal generalisations should not be read as implications. I like Belnap's suggestion. |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
Full Idea: The natural thought is to think that real kinds are given only by classification on the basis of essential properties: properties that make an object the kind of thing that it is. | |
From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], II) | |
A reaction: Circularity alert! Circularity alert! Essence gives a thing its kind - and hence we can see what the kind is? Test for a trivial property! Eagle is not unaware of these issues. Does he mean 'necessary' rather than 'essential'? |
8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
Full Idea: Singular causation entails physical probabilities or chances. ...Causal laws require causes to raise their effects' chances, as when fires have a greater chance of occurring when explosions do. | |
From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props') | |
A reaction: It seems fairly obvious that a probability can be increased without actually causing something. Just after a harmless explosion is a good moment for arsonists, especially if Mellor will be the investigating officer. |