86 ideas
14857 | The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Truth tends to reveal its highest wisdom in the guise of simplicity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 609) |
14854 | Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whoever thinks more deeply knows that he is always wrong, whatever his acts and judgments. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 518) |
14833 | Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The transition from momentary fear to short-lived exuberance is called the 'comic'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 169) |
14853 | Truth finds fewest champions not when it is dangerous, but when it is boring [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The champions of truth are hardest to find, not when it is dangerous to tell it, but rather when it is boring. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 506) |
24075 | Convictions, more than lies, are the great enemy of truth [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 483) | |
A reaction: Love this one. Especially in western democracies in the 2020s. If we value truth, we must be fallibilists. |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
Full Idea: If the kinds there are depend not on the essences of the objects but on their observed distinguishing particulars, ...then for any kind that we think there is, it is possible that there are many underlying essences which are observably indistinguishable. | |
From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV) | |
A reaction: Eagle is commenting on Locke's reliance on nominal essences. This seems to be the genuine problem with jadeite and nephrite (both taken to be 'jade'), or with 'fool's gold'. This isn't an objection to Locke; it just explains the role of science. |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
Full Idea: Nominal essence does not allow for gradations in significance for the underlying properties. Those are all essential for the object behaving as it observably does, and they must all be given equal weight when deciding what the object does. | |
From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV) | |
A reaction: This is where 'scientific' essentialism comes in. If we take one object, or one kind of object, in isolation, Eagle is right. When we start to compare, and to set up controlled conditions tests, we can dig into the 'gradations' he cares about. |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
Full Idea: It is clear the nominal essences really are the properties of the things which have them: they are (a subset of) the observable properties of the things. | |
From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV) | |
A reaction: I think this is wrong. The surface characteristics are all that is available to us, so our classifications must be based on those, but it is on the ideas of them, not their intrinsic natures. That is empiricsm! What makes the properties 'essential'? |
14858 | Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Conviction is the belief that in some point of knowledge one possesses absolute truth. Such a belief presumes, then, that absolute truths exists; likewise, that the perfect methods for arriving at them have been found. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 630) |
14830 | Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'To intuit' does not mean to recognise the existence of a thing to any extent, but rather to hold it to be possible, in that one wishes or fears it. 'Intuition' takes us not one step farther into the land of certainty. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 131) | |
A reaction: I like this remark. I am sympathetic to the view that the actual world has modal properties (in opposition to Sider, for example). To apprehend dispositions is precisely to apprehend possibilities. Intuition is a thousand interwoven inductions. |
20378 | Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Just as the bones, flesh, intestines, and blood vessels are enclosed with skin, which makes the sight of a man bearable, so the stirrings and passions of the soul are covered up by vanity: it is the skin of the soul. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 082) | |
A reaction: What a glorious analogy! None of us should underestimate our vanity. The least vain people you ever meet can reveal their vanity if you challenge them close to home. Try accusing them of vanity! Attack their essential character! (No, don't do that). |
14820 | People always do what they think is right, according to the degree of their intellect [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Socrates and Plato are right: whatever man does, he always acts for the good; that is, in a way that seems to him good (useful) according to the degree of his intellect, the prevailing measure of his rationality. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 102) | |
A reaction: I associate this doctrine much more with Socrates than with Plato - but Nietzsche was a great classical scholar. |
14856 | Our judgment seems to cause our nature, but actually judgment arises from our nature [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It seems that our thinking and judging are to be made the cause of our nature after the fact, but actually our nature causes us to think and judge one way or the other. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 608) |
14842 | Why are the strong tastes of other people so contagious? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Why are likes and dislikes so contagious that one can scarcely live in proximity to a person of strong sensibilities without being filled like a vessel with pros and cons? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 371) | |
A reaction: I was on the receiving end of this when young, and I think it influenced me to propound stronger views about things than I could ever justify, since my natural disposition is to be cautious about all views. Nice question. Why? |
14835 | Artists are not especially passionate, but they pretend to be [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Artists are by no means people of great passion, but they often pretend to be. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 211) | |
A reaction: Presumably people can gradually become what they consistently pretend to be. |
14807 | The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The history of moral feelings is the history of an error, an error called 'responsibility', which in turn rests on an error called 'freedom of the will'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 039) | |
A reaction: I totally agree with this, though I think the term 'responsible' is useful in ethics, though only in the sense that the lightning was responsible for the thunder. Nietzsche appears to have anticipated Mackie's error theory about morality. |
14823 | Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Man's complete lack of responsibility, for his behaviour and for his nature, is the bitterest drop which the man of knowledge must swallow, if he had been in the habit of seeing responsibility and duty as humanity's claim to nobility. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107) | |
A reaction: If you were seeing humanity as little transient angels, living a moral life that was an echo of God's, then you needed cutting down to size. But if you ask if there is anything 'noble' in the universe, it will still be the fine deeds of humanity. |
14824 | It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Man may no longer praise, no longer blame, for it is nonsensical to praise and blame nature and necessity. Just as he loves a work of art (or a plant) but does not praise it, because it can do nothing about itself, so he must regard human actions. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107) | |
A reaction: But humans can 'do something about themselves'. They can read the works of Nietzsche. He overestimates the importance of the loss of free will, when we grasp that there is no such thing. |
22473 | Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche challenged belief in free will, on the ground that will itself …is non-existent. The will is in truth nothing but a complex of sensations, as of power and resistance, and it is illusion to think of it as a basis for 'moral responsibility'. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107) by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche's Immoralism p.153 | |
A reaction: Modern neuroscience seems to support Nietzsche on this, though I will continue to use the concept of 'will' in philosophy, to mean the main brain events which normally combine in decision-making. That makes the will a process, not a entity. |
14812 | Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One must have a good memory to be able to keep the promises one has given. One must have strong powers of imagination to be able to have pity. So closely is morality bound to the quality of the intellect. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 059) | |
A reaction: Nice to see him say that strong powers of imagination are an 'intellectual' quality, which I think is not properly understood by the more geeky sort of intellectual. |
14810 | Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In the soul of the original ruling clans and castes, the man who has the power to requite goodness with goodness, evil with evil, and really does practice requital by being grateful and vengeful, is called 'good'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 045) | |
A reaction: The idea that evil should indeed repay evil was very much a feature of goodness until the philosophers came in on the act. In those days no one else had any power, so they had no scope for goodness. |
14831 | No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Never has a man done anything that was only for others and without any personal motivation. …How could the ego act without ego? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 133) | |
A reaction: This is only a denial of the purest of 'pure' altruism. It is hard to imagine anyone performing an altruistic action which permanently shamed the reputationof its performer - though it might be possible in a nicely contrived fiction. |
14855 | Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to be loved and respected by the same person. For the man who respects another acknowledges his power; his condition is one of awe. But love acknowledges no power, nothing that separates, differentiates, ranks higher or subordinates. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 603) | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'respect', but this looks like nonsense. Do we 'respect' someone because they point a gun at us? I would say love and respect are inseparable. |
14815 | We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: How much pleasure we get from morality! Just think what a river of agreeable tears has flowed at tales of noble, generous actions. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 091) | |
A reaction: How can anyone not adore Nietzsche? The pleasure of a noble deed is the most piercing and the deepest pleasure known to us. It isn't 'just' a pleasure. |
14849 | We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The destiny of men is designed for happy moments (every life has those), but not for happy eras. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 471) | |
A reaction: The vicissitudes of life (my favourite word!) are such that even the most serene and well-adjusted person is going to be perturbed on several days of the week, even if only by the unhappiness of the people around them. |
14818 | First morality is force, then custom, then acceptance, then instinct, then a pleasure - and finally 'virtue' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Force precedes morality; for a time morality itself is force, to which others acquiesce. Later it becomes custom, and then free obedience, and finally almost instinct; then it is coupled to pleasure, like all habitual things, and is now called 'virtue'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 099) | |
A reaction: How few philosophers delve into the history of the concepts they work with, and yet how revealing it can be. Richard Taylor was wonderful on 'duty'. You will never grasp the 'problem of free will' if you don't examine its history. |
20103 | You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: You had to become your own master, and also the master of your own virtues. Previously, your virtues were your master; but they must be nothing more than your tools. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 006) | |
A reaction: What on earth would Aristotle make of that? Nietzsche offers a sort of metatheory for virtues. I take this to be a form of particularism - that you live by your virtues, but occasionally you can discard a virtue if it seems right. Lie, steal... |
14817 | The 'good' man does the moral thing as if by nature, easily and gladly, after a long inheritance [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We call 'good' the man who does the moral thing as if by nature, after a long history of inheritance - that is, easily, and gladly, whatever it is. …He is called 'good' because he is good 'for' something. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 096) | |
A reaction: I am amazed at the brief and rather disrespectful remarks that Nietzsche makes about Aristotle's ethics, given how close this idea is to the ideal of Aristotle (though the latter who not emphasise 'inheritance'!). |
14809 | All societies of good men give a priority to gratitude [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every society of good men (that is, originally, of powerful men) places gratitude among its first duties. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 044) | |
A reaction: His reason here is that gratitude is a way of displaying the power of the powerful! |
14816 | Justice (fairness) originates among roughly equal powers (as the Melian dialogues show) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Justice (fairness) originates among approximately equal powers, as Thucydides (in the horrifying conversation between the Athenian and Melian envoys) rightly understood. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 092) | |
A reaction: The moral position of the powerless is a notorious problem for social contract theories of morality. They have nothing to offer in a mere contract. |
14821 | Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Aside from a few philosophers, men have always placed pity rather low in the hierarchy of moral feelings - and rightly so. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 103) | |
A reaction: Presumably this includes Jesus among the 'philosophers'. |
20112 | Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The pity that the spectators express consoles the weak and suffering, inasmuch as they see that , despite all their weakness, they still have at least one power: the power to hurt. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 050) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints how the will to power led to the inversion of values. |
14843 | Women can be friends with men, but only some physical antipathy will maintain it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Women can very well enter into a friendship with a man, but to maintain it - a little physical antipathy must help out. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 390) |
14841 | Many people are better at having good friends than being a good friend [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In many people the gift of having good friends is much greater than the gift of being a good friend. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 368) |
14811 | In Homer it is the contemptible person, not the harmful person, who is bad [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In Homer, both the Trojan and the Greek are good. Not the man who inflicts harm on us, but the man who is contemptible, is bad. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 045) |
20111 | We could live more naturally, relishing the spectacle, and not thinking we are special [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I can imagine a life much more simple...than the present one. ...One would live among men and with oneself as in nature, without praise, reproach, overzealousness, delighting in things as in a spectacle. One would no longer feel one was more than nature. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 034) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Safranski says this passage is a big turning point for Nietzsche, replacing his earlier idea that art could be salvation. Eternal Recurrence puts a seal on this new view. Nietzsche adds that this life needs to be 'cheerful'. |
14844 | People do not experience boredom if they have never learned to work properly [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Many people, especially women, do not experience boredom, because they have never learned to work properly. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 391) | |
A reaction: It certainly seems right that boredom is a response to expectations and past habits. Life in a medieval village looks like boredom verging on torture for your busy modern urban sophisticate, but I daresay it was quite absorbing. |
14808 | Over huge periods of time human character would change endlessly [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If a man eighty thousand years old were conceivable, his character would in fact be absolutely variable. …The brevity of human life misleads us… | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 041) | |
A reaction: This would be one of my many exhibits for claiming Nietzsche as an existentialist. I think he is largely right, and we do detect slow shifts in our characters over long periods of time. They may be as much a response to culture as a personal matter. |
14822 | If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If we accept self-defense as moral, then we must also accept nearly all expressions of so-called immoral egoism. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 104) | |
A reaction: I find this idea rather disconcerting, because I have always thought that the clearest possible 'natural right' was that of self-defence - but this implication (if it be so) had never struck me. Hm. |
22849 | Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Rawls's theory presupposes that the contractors are conceived, and conceive themselves, to be free and equal persons. Consequently, the theory cannot be presented as a justificatory theory of liberalism. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 14) | |
A reaction: Nice. If you imagine diverse groups with many strong beliefs coming together to form a society, Rawls is asking them all to become liberals before they all decide how to live together. |
22848 | People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Why would a group of people with strong beliefs (e.g. religious beliefs) agree to debate the problem of what norms should govern their association from behind a veil of ignorance? …They would not accept the veil of ignorance as fair. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 14) | |
A reaction: Nice. Rawls's experiment assumes liberal people with very few beliefs. No racial supremacist is going to enter a society in which they may be of a different race. Charvet says the entrants would all need to be pluralists about the good. |
14838 | The state aims to protect individuals from one another [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The state is a clever institution for protecting individuals from one another. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 235) | |
A reaction: This is Nietzsche allying with Hobbes, and presumably aiming this remark at Hegel. |
14852 | Culture cannot do without passions and vices [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Culture absolutely cannot do without passions, vices and acts of malice. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 477) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how you test the truth of that aphorism, given that humanity is perpetually doomed to live with such things. If those qualities disappeared, I suppose we would drift apart. We are 'dependent' beings, as MacIntyre says. |
22838 | Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Were it true that rational discussion of values is impossible, then a conservative attitude would seem to be the only viable position. Some set of common values is necessary to maintain the unity of a political society. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 07) | |
A reaction: Better to say that the less values can be both discussed and changed the stronger is the case for a degree of conservatism. Conservatives tend to favour values asserted by authority, rather than by popular (undiscussed) consensus. |
22846 | The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Utilitarianism is a universalist ethic, so the political realisation of this ethic would seem to be a world state seeking to maximise happiness for the world's population. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 12) | |
A reaction: It certainly doesn't seem to favour the citizens of the state where it is implemented, since miserable people just across the border would have priority, and all miserable migrants must be welcomed. There is no loyalty to citizens. |
14846 | If we want the good life for the greatest number, we must let them decide on the good life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If the business of politics is to make life tolerable for the greatest number, this greatest number may also determine what they understand by a tolerable life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 438) |
22835 | Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet] |
Full Idea: While freedom and equality are liberal values …they are fundamental regulative ideas of an independent society that is self-regulating …and decides what its own social and political arrangements should be. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 06) | |
A reaction: So the central political activity is persuasion, not enforcement. Illiberal societies all contain liberal individuals. |
22831 | Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet] |
Full Idea: No society today is libertarian in the extreme sense. Even the freest economically, such as Singapore have their governments provide education services and public housing. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 05) | |
A reaction: There is a good argument that many other services should be provided by a libertarian state, on the grounds that it is more efficient, and the services must otherwise paid for by much higher salaries. |
22839 | Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet] |
Full Idea: To get a liberal society one would have to claim that either everyone possesses autonomy to an equal degree or that everyone possesses a threshold level of the capacity that entitles them to enjoy the full liberal rights. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 07) | |
A reaction: This leaves out the more right-wing attitude that people can increase their capacity for autonomy if they are forced to stand on their own feet. A liberal society must decide how to treat persons incapable of proper autonomy. |
22847 | Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet] |
Full Idea: For Kant what is of absolute worth is the universal rational will which become an individual's actual will. Insofar as the individual fails to will the universal, they have no absolute worth, so whether or not they exist is unimportant. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 14) | |
A reaction: A lovely demolition of the claims of Kant to be the patriarch of liberalism! Liberalism must place supreme value on each individual, not on some abstracted realm of pure reason and moral good. Liberals are motivated by love, not reason. |
22821 | Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Liberalism attaches fundamental value to leaving individuals as free as possible … - but there is another fundamental value implicit in this idea - the equal status of the participants in the practice. By this I mean that they all have the same rights. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], Intro) | |
A reaction: Libertarian liberalism (e.g. Nozick) only asserts the fundament principle of freedom, but such a society swiftly deprives most of its members of those very freedoms. Egalitarian Liberalism should be our default political ideology. |
22834 | Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Rather than libertarianism, egalitarian liberals promote equality, either of outcomes (of happiness or of well-being), or of inputs (such as opportunities, capacities or resources), which they favour ahead of freedom. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 06) | |
A reaction: This is my team, I think. I think I'm a liberal who thinks liberty is a bit overrated. Equal outcome according to capacity (promoted by Nussbaum) seems attractive. |
22822 | Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Community and well-being are not specifically liberal values. They are values any independent political society must pursue whether it is a liberal society or not. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems, at a stroke, to undermine the familiar debate between liberals and communitarians. I've switched to the former from the latter, because communitarians is potentially too paternalistic and conservative. Persuade individuals to be communal! |
22841 | Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Identity-based multiculturalism developed from communitarianism. …People come to consciousness of themselves as members of some community before they identify themselves as members of the human race. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 08) | |
A reaction: This is 'identity politics', which Carvet sees as a problem from liberalism. Is it more important to be a woman or a Muslim or a Scot than to be a human being? It seems to create institutional antagonisms. |
22842 | For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Communitarians have difficulty avoiding the relativist trap. It seems they must claim that if one is born into a liberal society one cannot but be a liberal, and if one is born into a communist society one cannot but be a communist. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 08) | |
A reaction: Anyone who accepts the Hegelian view of history and culture seems doomed to such relativism, and Hegel is a communitarian precursor. This is a good reason for me to reject communitarianism, after a long flirtation. We can criticise our own culture. |
22830 | Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Only the most extreme collective socialism denies the freedom to sell one's labour power and buy that of others, under the communist slogan 'from each according to his ability, and to each according to his needs'. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 05) | |
A reaction: [He cites Marx 'Critique of the Gotha Programme'] I would guess that this practice is not abnormal in old traditional villages, though a community would be tempted to reward highly a very successful member. |
14819 | Slavery cannot be judged by our standards, because the sense of justice was then less developed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The injustice of slavery, the cruelty in subjugating persons and peoples, cannot be measured by our standards. For the instinct for justice was not so widely developed then. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 101) | |
A reaction: Why do we value the instinct for justic which we have subsequently developed? Why do we think it is important, and battle to preserve it? This is the sort of creepy relativism that Nietzsche drifted into, and for the worse. |
22829 | Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet] |
Full Idea: The argument for restricting defamatory speech is that unrestricted speech makes it impossible, or too difficult, to distinguish between those who deserve a trustworthy reputation and those who don't - a distinction in society's best interests. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 03) | |
A reaction: A nice example of appeal to the common good, in opposition to the normal freedoms of liberalism. An example of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Should assertion of the common good of a group be a prime value of liberalism? |
22836 | 'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Berlin's distinction of 'freedom from' and 'freedom to' is worthless …because to say that I want to be free from something for absolutely no reason makes no sense. Unfreedom is being blocked from what I want to do, which ceases if I no longer want it. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 07) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The government could guarantee us against attacks by albatrosses, but we would hardly have a national holiday to celebrate the freedom. Still, there is freedom from incoming troubles, and freedom to output things. |
22837 | Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Berlin saw positive freedom as a justification for illiberal coercion. If I am positively free only in doing X, then if I am forced to do X, I will still be free. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 07) | |
A reaction: I suppose Berlin is thinking of Russian farmers, who wanted to farm, but then found they were forced to do what they were going to do anyway. It's better than being forced to do what you didn't want to do. Forcing clearly isn't freedom. |
22844 | First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet] |
Full Idea: First level autonomy is being able to apply one's scheme of values to one's actions and life; second level autonomy is being able to subject those values to critical evaluation. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 10) | |
A reaction: Charvet sees this as a key issue for liberalism. How do you treat citizens who cannot advance beyond the first level? He mentions the elitism of Plato's Republic that results. |
22840 | Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet] |
Full Idea: That the relation of equality might be considered a value in itself is an absurdity. Would the equality of blinding the only sighted person in a blind society be good? Is it inherently good that two trees are the same height? This is nonsense. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 08) | |
A reaction: He cites Temkin 1993 as defending the blinding example! Obviously equality is only possible in certain respects (though electrons might be equal in all respects). So the point is to identify the important respects. The rest is rhetoric. |
22843 | Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Inequality is worse in a meritocracy than in a stratified society, because everyone enjoys a formal equality of status and your position in the social order is due to your merit or lack of merit, so you have only yourself to blame for being at the bottom. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 10) | |
A reaction: This is the simple point that it is worse to lack some good if you might have possessed it, rather than it being entirely out of reach. It also makes the false assumption that people are largely responsible for their merit or lack of it (ignoring luck). |
22845 | Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet] |
Full Idea: The introduction of money allows people to accumulate wealth without limit. Since money only works through everyone's agreement …everyone can be taken to have agreed to the consequences of money in the unequal distribution of wealth. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 11) | |
A reaction: [Locke] Presumably large inequalities of possessions and territory were possible before money, but there was at least an upper limit. The current owner of Amazon may end up with more wealth than the whole of the rest of humanity combined. |
14847 | Laws that are well thought out, or laws that are easy to understand? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Lawyers argue whether that law which is most thoroughly thought out, or that which is easiest to understand, should prevail in a people. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 459) | |
A reaction: Our system of speed limits is radically simplified, to save money on road signs, and facilitate enforcement. But then its inflexibility brings it into disrepute. |
22825 | The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet] |
Full Idea: The 1689 Bill of Rights said the monarch could not create new courts of law, or act as a judge at law. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 02) | |
A reaction: The background was the abolition of the court of Star Chamber in 1641, which had been secret, severe, and controlled by the monarch. Is it possible to create a new type of court, or are we stuck with the current ones? |
22826 | From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet] |
Full Idea: In 1701 UK judges were given secure tenure, being removable only by parliament which at the same time undertook to follow a convention not to discuss particular judicial decisions. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 02) | |
A reaction: In recent years the UK Daily Mail published the pictures of three judges, and labelled them 'traitors' because of their verdict about leaving the European Union. |
22828 | The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet] |
Full Idea: A rule of law regime will primarily benefit those possessing property and liberty rights. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 02) | |
A reaction: Important. It's no good fighting for the law if the law doesn't protect what you have got, or if you have got nothing to protect. Important steps must precede assertion of the rule of law. |
22823 | The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet] |
Full Idea: The rule of law is directed at the restriction of the power of governments as much, if not more, then the power of private individuals. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 02) | |
A reaction: The more powerful you are the more restricting is the rule of law. Every government is tempted to change the law to expand its powers. The UK government has just legislated to restrict public demonstrations. Law is the people's weapon against autocrats. |
22827 | Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet] |
Full Idea: Communist leaders justify themselves as the embodiment of the people's will as workers, and fascist leaders as expressing the will of the nation. Both believe their policies contain a superior justice on this basis. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 02) | |
A reaction: [compressed] A neat summary of why the rule of law might be rejected (other than by simple tyrrany justified only by force). In modern democracies recent right-wing governments have pushed back the law and attacked justice on this basis. |
14814 | Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Why does execution offend us more than murder? It is the coldness of the judges, the painful preparation, the use of a man to deter others. For guilt is not being punished, which lies in the educators, parents, environment, in us, not in the murderer. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 070) | |
A reaction: Someone was stabbed to death in Oxford Street yesterday (26 Dec 11), and we all feel horribly that London is responsible for producing this event, even if we try and load all the blame onto one youth with a knife. Oscar Wilde endorsed this idea. |
14836 | People will enthusiastically pursue an unwanted war, once sacrifices have been made [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All things for which we have made sacrifices are in the right. This explains why, just as soon as sacrifices are made, people continue with enthusiasm a war that was begun against their wishes. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 229) |
22832 | Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet] |
Full Idea: The welfare state provides the background conditions under which it is reasonable to expect one's fellow citizens to commit to liberal principles of interaction, even if those conditions can only be achieved through a degree of compulsion. | |
From: John Charvet (Liberalism: the basics [2019], 05) | |
A reaction: You cannot expect people to accept the role of 'free' citizen if that is likely to result in swift misery. A liberal state will only command loyalty if it has a safety net. Fully committed liberalism implies modest socialism. |
14845 | Don't crush girls with dull Gymnasium education, the way we have crushed boys! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: For heaven's sake, do not pass our Gymnasium education on to girls too! For it often turns witty, inquisitive, fiery youths - into copies of their teachers! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 409) |
14848 | Education in large states is mediocre, like cooking in large kitchens [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The educational system in large states will always be mediocre at best, for the same reason that the cooking in large kitchens is at best mediocre. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 467) | |
A reaction: I wish he had said what that 'same reason' is. Something to do with too many cooks, I suppose. Nothing seems harder than reaching a wide concensus on how the young should be educated. Like interior design by a committee. |
14839 | Interest in education gains strength when we lose interest in God [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Interest in education will gain great strength only at the moment when belief in a God and his loving care is given up. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 242) | |
A reaction: This remark may well sum up the motivation of my entire life. What effect would it have had if I had read it when I was twenty? |
14834 | Teachers only gather knowledge for their pupils, and can't be serious about themselves [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A teacher is incapable of doing anything of his own for his own good. He always thinks of the good of his pupils, and all new knowledge gladdens him only to the extent that he can teach it. He is a thoroughfare for learning, and has lost seriousness. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 200) | |
A reaction: Oh dear. I look in the mirror. Do I only delight in finding all these quotations so that I can stick them in the database and pass them on to someone else? Are they actually impingeing on my life? Could I meet an idea that made me abandon this project? |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
Full Idea: The natural thought is to think that real kinds are given only by classification on the basis of essential properties: properties that make an object the kind of thing that it is. | |
From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], II) | |
A reaction: Circularity alert! Circularity alert! Essence gives a thing its kind - and hence we can see what the kind is? Test for a trivial property! Eagle is not unaware of these issues. Does he mean 'necessary' rather than 'essential'? |
14825 | In religious thought nature is a complex of arbitrary acts by conscious beings [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In the mind of religious men, all nature is the sum of actions of conscious and intentioned beings, an enormous complex of arbitrary acts. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 111) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of the process, I think, which then sees the gods as dictating through laws, and then the laws themselves doing the dictating, then seeing the laws as inhering in nature - and finally realising there aren't any laws! |
14826 | Modern man wants laws of nature in order to submit to them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In present times, man wishes to understand the lawfulness of nature in order to submit to it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 111) | |
A reaction: They don't make philosophers like Nietzsche any more (or at least, in the analytic tradition I am following!). No one who is trying to give an analysis of the laws of nature has any interest in why we are so keen to find them. Stoics 'live by nature'. |
14827 | The Greeks saw the gods not as their masters, but as idealised versions of themselves [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The Greeks did not see the Homeric gods above them as masters and themselves below them as servants, as did the Jews. They saw, as it were, only the reflection of the most successful specimens of their own caste - an ideal, not a contrast. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 114) |
14832 | The Sermon on the Mount is vanity - praying to one part of oneself, and demonising the rest [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: This shattering of oneself, this scorn of one's own nature, is actually a high degree of vanity. The whole morality of the Sermon on the Mount belongs here; in ascetic morality man prays to one part of himself as a god, and has to diabolify the rest. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 137) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the core of Nietzsche's objection to Christian teaching - that it doesn't provide a direction of life for the whole human being. The modern rejection of religions agrees with Nietzsche, especially in disputes over the place of sex. |
14837 | Christ seems warm hearted, and suppressed intellect in favour of the intellectually weak [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Christ, whom we like to imagine as having the warmest of hearts, furthered men's stupidity, took the side of the intellectually weak, and kept the greatest intellect from being produced: and this was consistent. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 235) | |
A reaction: Thomas Aquinas was a stupendous intellect. The surest way to be swept forward on a wave of popularity is to find some reason why the uneducated are superior to the educated. |
14813 | Science rejecting the teaching of Christianity in favour of Epicurus shows the superiority of the latter [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We can determine whether Christianity or Greek philosophy has the greater truth by noting that the awakening sciences have carried on point for point with the philosophy of Epicurus, but have rejected Christianity point for point. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 068) |
14850 | Christ was the noblest human being [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Christ was the noblest human being. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 475) | |
A reaction: That one will come as a surprise to those who only know of Nietzsche's religion that 'God is dead'! |
14828 | Religion is tempting if your life is boring, but you can't therefore impose it on the busy people [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: People who think their daily lives too empty and monotonous easily become religious: this is understandable and forgivable; however, they have no right to demand religiosity from those whose daily life does not pass in emptiness and monotony. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 115) | |
A reaction: Well wicked, that Nietzsche. Richard Dawkins and the hated new atheists are a right bunch of wimps in comparison. |