10180
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Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects [Poincaré]
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Full Idea:
Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects; it is a matter of indifference if the objects are replaced by others, provided the relations do not change. They are interested in form alone, not matter.
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From:
Henri Poincaré (Science and Hypothesis [1902], p.20), quoted by E Reck / M Price - Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths §6
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A reaction:
This connects modern structuralism with Aritotle's interest in the 'form' of things. Contrary to the views of the likes of Frege, it is hard to see that the number '7' has any properties at all, apart from its relations. A daffodil would do just as well.
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15643
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Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
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Full Idea:
Nominal essence does not allow for gradations in significance for the underlying properties. Those are all essential for the object behaving as it observably does, and they must all be given equal weight when deciding what the object does.
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From:
Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV)
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A reaction:
This is where 'scientific' essentialism comes in. If we take one object, or one kind of object, in isolation, Eagle is right. When we start to compare, and to set up controlled conditions tests, we can dig into the 'gradations' he cares about.
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21379
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Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer]
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Full Idea:
Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice and compassion, are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue.
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From:
Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.192), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Egoism'
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A reaction:
A well chosen trio. Kant would be shocked that he has left out duty, which is supposed to rise above such feelings.
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21376
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Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer]
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Full Idea:
In philosophical morals animals are mere 'things', mere means to any end whatsoever. ...Shame on such a morality, that fails to recognise the eternal essence that lives in every living thing, and shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes.
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From:
Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.96), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
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A reaction:
Good. I find Kant's theoretical indifference to animals very creepy (despite his kind attitude to them). And I also think the utilitarians are wrong to only value animals for their pain, as if any animal could be shredded for fun, if it felt no pain.
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