16 ideas
| 23326 | In the third century Stoicism died out, replaced by Platonism, with Aristotelian ethics [Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: By the second century CE Aristotelianism and Platonism had begun to eclipse Stoicism, and by the end of the third century Stoicism had no followers. All philosophers now opted for some form of Platonism, but including Aristotle's ethical principles. | |
| From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 04) | |
| A reaction: The idea that Aristotelian ethics dominated that period is new to me. Stoic influence remained strong in Augustine, and hence in Christianity. |
| 23335 | In late antiquity nearly all philosophers were monotheists [Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: I am inclined to think that almost all philosophers in late antiquity were monotheists. | |
| From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure when late antiquity begins, in this remark. Maybe as early as 100 CE. Epictetus talks of Zeus as if he is supreme. |
| 15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
| Full Idea: If the kinds there are depend not on the essences of the objects but on their observed distinguishing particulars, ...then for any kind that we think there is, it is possible that there are many underlying essences which are observably indistinguishable. | |
| From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV) | |
| A reaction: Eagle is commenting on Locke's reliance on nominal essences. This seems to be the genuine problem with jadeite and nephrite (both taken to be 'jade'), or with 'fool's gold'. This isn't an objection to Locke; it just explains the role of science. |
| 15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
| Full Idea: It is clear the nominal essences really are the properties of the things which have them: they are (a subset of) the observable properties of the things. | |
| From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV) | |
| A reaction: I think this is wrong. The surface characteristics are all that is available to us, so our classifications must be based on those, but it is on the ideas of them, not their intrinsic natures. That is empiricsm! What makes the properties 'essential'? |
| 15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
| Full Idea: Nominal essence does not allow for gradations in significance for the underlying properties. Those are all essential for the object behaving as it observably does, and they must all be given equal weight when deciding what the object does. | |
| From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV) | |
| A reaction: This is where 'scientific' essentialism comes in. If we take one object, or one kind of object, in isolation, Eagle is right. When we start to compare, and to set up controlled conditions tests, we can dig into the 'gradations' he cares about. |
| 23334 | For Christians man has free will by creation in God's image (as in Genesis) [Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: The Christian view, following Genesis, is that man is created in the image of God, and this is understood as crucially involving the idea that man has a free will in the image of God's will. | |
| From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
| A reaction: The idea of free will evidently originated with Epictetus, but was taken up by Christians because it fitted doctrinal needs. Even Epictetus saw free will as originating in Zeus. |
| 23333 | The idea of free will achieved universal acceptance because of Christianity [Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: There is no doubt that the notion of a free will found almost universal acceptance owing to the influence of Christianity. | |
| From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 07) | |
| A reaction: This is presumably because a free will not only elevates us above the animals, qualifying us for immortality, but also gives us absolute and ultimate responsibility for our lives, which thus justifies either salvation or damnation. |
| 23337 | The Stoics needed free will, to allow human choices in a divinely providential cosmos [Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: The Stoics said that everything happens according to a divine providential plan, so they had to explain how this was compatible with human choices. They tried to do this with their doctrine of freedom and a free will. | |
| From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 10) | |
| A reaction: Epictetus made our ability to choose central to moral life, so he particularly needed (and thus created, it seems) this doctrine. |
| 23336 | There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle do not have a notion of a will, since for them a willing, a desire of reason, is a direct result of one's cognitive state: once one sees something to be good, one will it. | |
| From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 09) | |
| A reaction: The point is that their decisions are 'direct', whereas the will introduces the concept of a final arbiter which weighs up the desires, reasons and drives. The historical steps were first the meta-choosing, then the will as entity, then the will as free. |
| 22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
| Full Idea: There is a sense in which morality is inescapable - in moral epithets such as 'dishonest', 'unjust', 'uncharitable'; these do not cease to apply to a man because he is indifferent to the ends of morality: they may indeed apply because of his indifference. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.172 n15) | |
| A reaction: Odysseus was admired for lying, and charity wasn't a virtue in the ancient world. They won't go away as factual descriptions, but the values attached to them vary quite a lot. |
| 23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| Full Idea: In her middle period she changed her mind, and attacks moral rationalism. | |
| From: report of Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
| A reaction: That is, she doubted whether moral reasons are sufficient to motivate moral actions, which presumably therefore need desires, as the Humeans claimed. Reasons rely on merely hypothetical rules. |
| 23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
| Full Idea: The man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.161) | |
| A reaction: This is 'middle period' Foot, when she decided that Hume was right about the need for a desire as moral motivator. Before and after this time, she thought there were reasons to be moral, as well as desires. |
| 22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
| Full Idea: 'One ought to be moral' makes no sense at all unless the 'ought' has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.169 n18) | |
| A reaction: This aims to undercut the Kantian view that morality is an absolute call to duty (filling us with wonder, like the starry heavens). Foot aims to root morality in the real world. |
| 22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Moral judgements have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements about matters of etiquette. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.164) | |
| A reaction: Her claim is that all moral judgements are responses to situations, and so are hypothetical. This judgement of hers is the culmination of a careful discussion. |
| 15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
| Full Idea: The natural thought is to think that real kinds are given only by classification on the basis of essential properties: properties that make an object the kind of thing that it is. | |
| From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], II) | |
| A reaction: Circularity alert! Circularity alert! Essence gives a thing its kind - and hence we can see what the kind is? Test for a trivial property! Eagle is not unaware of these issues. Does he mean 'necessary' rather than 'essential'? |
| 23313 | The Gnostic demiurge (creator) is deluded, and doesn't care about us [Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: The Gnostics thought the demiurge or creator pursues its own interests without regard for what this does to us, a being lacking in wisdom and goodness, as seen by its deluding itself into thinking that it is God, and demanding worship. | |
| From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Frede mentions Irenaeus as a source of this view. The idea that the Great Being doesn't care about us seems a fairly accurate observation. |