Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Actual and the Possible' and 'works'

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8 ideas

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
A state of affairs is only possible if there has been an actual substance to initiate it [Pruss]
     Full Idea: Non-actual states of affairs are possible if there actually was a substance capable of initiating a causal chain, perhaps non-deterministic, that could lead to the state of affairs that we claim is possible.
     From: Alexander R. Pruss (The Actual and the Possible [2002]), quoted by Jonathan D. Jacobs - A Powers Theory of Modality §4.2
     A reaction: This is roughly my view. There are far fewer possibilities in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy, Horatio. Logical possibilities and fantasy possibilities are not real possibilities.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
     Full Idea: Fodor asks the stirring and basic question 'How does anything get outside itself?'
     From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by C.B. Martin - The Mind in Nature 03.6
     A reaction: Is this one of those misconceived questions, like major issues concerning 'what's it like to be?' In what sense am I outside myself? Is a mind any more mysterious than a shadow?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor]
     Full Idea: For Fodor the intentionality of the propositional-attitude vocabulary of our folk psychology is the outward expression of the inward intentionality of the language of the brain.
     From: comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.39
     A reaction: I would be very cautious about this. Folk psychology works, so it must have a genuine basis in how brains work, but it breaks down in unusual situations, and might even be a total (successful) fiction.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
     Full Idea: Fodor holds that beliefs are brain states or processes, but picked out at a 'higher' or 'special science' level.
     From: comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.82
     A reaction: I don't think you can argue with this. Levels of physical description exist (e.g. pure physics tells you nothing about the weather), and I think 'process' is the best word for the mind (Idea 4931).
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey]
     Full Idea: The modest mentalism of the Computational/Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT), associated with Fodor, says mental processes are computational, defined over syntactically specified entities, and these entities represent the world (are also semantic).
     From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind Int.3
     A reaction: This seems to imply that if you built a machine that did all these things, it would become conscious, which sounds unlikely. Do footprints 'represent' feet, or does representation need prior consciousness?
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor]
     Full Idea: Fodor is concerned with producing a realist and physicalist account of 'narrow content' (i.e. wholly in-the-head content).
     From: comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.54
     A reaction: The emergence of 'wide' content has rather shaken Fodor's game plan. We can say "Oh dear, I thought I was referring to H2O", so there must be at least some narrow aspect to reference.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.