12 ideas
304 | Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are fine things different from or identical to fineness? They are different from fineness itself, but fineness itself is in a sense present in each of them. | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 301a) |
16120 | Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato] |
Full Idea: If there exists the knowledge of how to make men immortal, but without the knowledge of how to use this immortality, there seems to be no value in it. | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 289b) | |
A reaction: I take this to be not a gormless utilitarianism about knowledge, but a plea for holism, that knowledge only has value as part of some larger picture. The big view is the important view. He's wrong, though. Work out the use later. |
8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
Full Idea: A characteristic case in which a belief is justified though the cognizer doesn't know that it's justified is where the original evidence for the belief has long since been forgotten. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
A reaction: This is a central problem for any very literal version of internalism. The fully rationalist view (to which I incline) will be that the cognizer must make a balanced assessment of whether they once had the evidence. Were my teachers any good? |
8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
Full Idea: If one shares my view that justified belief is, at least roughly, well-formed belief, surely animals and young children can have justified beliefs. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], III) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a key hallmark of the externalist view of knowledge. Personally I think we should tell the animals that they have got true beliefs, but that they aren't bright enough to aspire to 'knowledge'. Be grateful for what you've got. |
303 | Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato] |
Full Idea: If each of you says how many teeth the other has, and when they are counted we find you do know, we will believe your other claims as well. | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 294c) | |
A reaction: This is the clairvoyant problem for reliabilism, if truth is delivered for no apparent reason. Useful, but hardly knowledge. HOW did you know the number of teeth? |
8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
Full Idea: The justificational status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the processes that cause it, where (provisionally) reliability consists in the tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
A reaction: Goldman's original first statement of reliabilism, now the favourite version of externalism. The obvious immediate problem is when a normally very reliable process goes wrong. Wise people still get it wrong, or right for the wrong reasons. |
8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Introspection should be regarded as a form of retrospection. Thus, a justified belief that I am 'now' in pain gets its justificational status from a relevant, though brief, causal history. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
A reaction: He cites Hobbes and Ryle as having held this view. See Idea 6668. I am unclear why the history must be 'causal'. I may not know the cause of the pain. I may not believe an event which causes a proposition, or I may form a false belief from it. |
302 | What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato] |
Full Idea: What knowledge would enable us to live finely for the rest of our lives? | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 293a) | |
A reaction: A successful grasp of other people's points of view might lead to respect for them. Also a realisation that we are not isolated individuals. We really are all in it together. |
301 | Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato] |
Full Idea: Nothing is good except knowledge of some sort. | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 292b) | |
A reaction: I've heard it suggested that truth is the only value. This is the Socratic idea that moral goodness is a matter of successful rational judgement. Not convinced, but interesting. |
305 | Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato] |
Full Idea: Something which is composed of two factors which are bad for different purposes and lies midway between them is better than either of the factors. | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 306a) |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |