Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Truth' and 'The Problem of Consciousness'

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8 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta]
     Full Idea: The basic principles governing truth are Truth Elimination (sentence A follows from ''A' is true') and the converse Truth Introduction (''A' is true' follows from A), which combine into Tarski's T-schema - 'A' is true if and only if A.
     From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.1)
     A reaction: Introduction and Elimination rules are the basic components of natural deduction systems, so 'true' now works in the same way as 'and', 'or' etc. This is the logician's route into truth.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta]
     Full Idea: If a classical language is expressively weakened - for example, by dispensing with negation - then it can contain its own truth predicate.
     From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.2)
     A reaction: Thus the Tarskian requirement to move to a metalanguage for truth is only a requirement of a reasonably strong language. Gupta uses this to criticise theories that dispense with the metalanguage.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta]
     Full Idea: There is the idea that the Liar paradox is solved simply by noting that truth is a property of propositions (not of sentences), and the Liar sentence does not express a proposition. But we then say 'I am not now expressing a true proposition'!
     From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.1)
     A reaction: Disappointed to learn this, since I think focusing on propositions (which are unambiguous) rather than sentences solves a huge number of philosophical problems.
Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta]
     Full Idea: An example of the Strengthened Liar is the following statement SL: 'Either SL is neither-true-nor-false or it is not true'. This raises a serious problem for any theory that assesses the paradoxes to be neither true nor false.
     From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.4.2)
     A reaction: If the sentence is either true or false it reduces to the ordinary Liar. If it is neither true nor false, then it is true.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn]
     Full Idea: McGinn invites his readers to join him in surrender: It's just impossible to imagine how software could make a conscious robot. Don't even try, he says. Other philosophical experiments (involving China) "work" by dissuading readers from imagining.
     From: comment on Colin McGinn (The Problem of Consciousness [1991]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
     A reaction: I agree with Dennett. If you don't try to imagine how robots might do it, you are also denied the right to try to imagine how brains might manage it. Admittedly this is hard, but good imagination needs study, effort, discussion, time, information...
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn]
     Full Idea: The multiple realisability emphasised by functionalists rules out the hidden essences (and the 'deferential' move in semantics) that one finds in the cases, for example, of "water" and "gold" emphasised by Kripke and Putnam.
     From: Colin McGinn (The Problem of Consciousness [1991], p.132)
     A reaction: Presumably if they are 'hidden', then the people to whom we 'defer' for our concepts can't actually know about the essences we are supposed to be discussing. You can mean essences without knowing them. Cf. Loch Ness Monster.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.