25 ideas
18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is the replacement of category-habits by category-disciplines. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949], Intro p.8), quoted by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.2 | |
A reaction: I rather like this. It fits the view the idea that metaphysics aims to give the structure of reality. If there are not reasonably uniform categories for things, then reality is indescribable. Improving our categories seems a thoroughly laudable aim. |
11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Many definitions have three elements: the term that is defined, an expression containing the defined term (the 'definiendum'), and another expression (the 'definiens') that is equated by the definition with this expression. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2) | |
A reaction: He notes that the definiendum and the definiens are assumed to be in the 'same logical category', which is a right can of worms. |
11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Notable examples of definitions in philosophy have been Plato's (e.g. of piety, in 'Euthyphro'), Anselm's definition of God, the Frege-Russell definition of number, and Tarski's definition of truth. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: All of these are notable for the extensive metaphysical conclusions which then flow from what seems like a fairly neutral definition. We would expect that if we were defining essences, but not if we were just defining word usage. |
11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
Full Idea: In a modal logic in which names are non-vacuous and rigid, not only must existence and uniqueness in a definition be shown to hold necessarily, it must be shown that the definiens is satisfied by the same object across possible worlds. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The 'revision theory' of definitions says definitions impart a hypothetical character, giving a rule of revision rather than a rule of application. ...The output interpretation is better than the input one. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.7) | |
A reaction: Gupta mentions the question of whether such definitions can extend into the trans-finite. |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Traditional definitions are generalized identities (so definiendum and definiens can replace each other), in which the sentential is primary (for use in argument), and they involve reduction (and hence eliminability in a ground language). | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.2) |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
Full Idea: A traditional definition requires that the definiendum contains the defined term, that definiendum and definiens are of the same logical category, and the definition is conservative (adding nothing new), and makes elimination possible. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
Full Idea: A definition is 'extensionally adequate' iff there are no actual counterexamples to it. It is 'intensionally adequate' iff there are no possible counterexamples to it. It is 'sense adequate' (or 'analytic') iff it endows the term with the right sense. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.4) |
11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The chemist aims at real definition, whereas the lexicographer aims at nominal definition. ...Perhaps real definitions investigate the thing denoted, and nominal definitions investigate meaning and use. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Very helpful. I really think we should talk much more about the neglected chemists when we discuss science. Theirs is the single most successful branch of science, the paradigm case of what the whole enterprise aims at. |
11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Some definitions aim at precision, others at fairness, or at accuracy, or at clarity, or at fecundity. But if definitions 'give the essence of things' (the Aristotelian formula), then it may not be a unitary kind of activity. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: We don't have to accept this conclusion so quickly. Human interests may shift the emphasis, but there may be a single ideal definition of which these various examples are mere parts. |
11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Stipulative definition imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.3) | |
A reaction: A nice question is how far one can go in stretching received usage. If I define 'democracy' as 'everyone is involved in decisions', that is sort of right, but pushing the boundaries (children, criminals etc). |
11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
Full Idea: Ostensive definitions look simple (say 'this stick is one meter long', while showing a stick), but they are effective only because a complex linguistic and conceptual capacity is operative in the background, of which it is hard to give an account. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The full horror of the situation is brought out in Quine's 'gavagai' example (Idea 6312) |
11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
Full Idea: The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}. This does captures its essential uses. Pairs <x,y> <u,v> are identical iff x=u and y=v, and the definition satisfies this. Function matters here, not meaning. | |
From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is offered as an example of Carnap's 'explications', rather than pure definitions. Quine extols it as a philosophical paradigm (1960:§53). |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
Full Idea: To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state;..it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realized. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949], II (7)) | |
A reaction: Whether this view is correct is the central question about dispositions. Ryle's view is tied in with Humean regularities and behaviourism about mind. The powers view, which I favour, says a disposition is a drawn bow, an actual state of power. |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
Full Idea: The old error treating the term 'Force' as denoting an occult force-exerting agency has been given up in the physical sciences. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949], V (1)) | |
A reaction: Since 1949 they seem to have made a revival, once they are divested of their religious connotations. The word 'agency' is the misleading bit. Even Leibniz's monads weren't actual agents - he always said that was 'an analogy'. |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
Full Idea: The dogma of the Ghost in the Machine maintains that there exist both minds and bodies; that there are mechanical causes of corporeal movements, and mental causes of corporeal movements. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949], I (3)) | |
A reaction: This nicely identifies the problem of double causation, which can be found in Spinoza (Idea 4862). The dualists have certainly got a problem here, but they can deny a conflict. The initiation of a hand movement is not mechanical at all. |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
Full Idea: My reports on myself are subject to the same kinds of defects as are my reports on you. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This may be true of memories or of motives, but it hardly seems to apply to being in pain, where you might be totally lying, where the worst I could do to myself is exaggerate. "You're fine; how am I?" |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
Full Idea: No one could introspectively scrutinize the state of panic or fury. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: It depends what you mean by 'scrutinize'. No human being ever loses their temper or panics without a background thought of "Oh dear, I'm losing it - it would probably be better if I didn't" (or, as Aristotle might say, "I'm angry, and so I should be"). |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
Full Idea: One thing that I cannot prepare myself for is the next thought that I am going to think. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949], VI (7)) |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
Full Idea: The official theory of mind (as private, non-spatial, outside physical laws) I call 'the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'. I hope to prove it entirely false, and show that it is one big mistake, namely a 'category mistake'. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949], I (2)) | |
A reaction: This is the essence of Ryle's eliminitavist behaviourism. Personally I agree that the idea of a separate 'ghost' running the machine is utterly implausible, but it isn't a 'category mistake'. The mind clearly exists, but the confusion is about what it is. |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
Full Idea: Another problem for Ryle (from Chisholm and Geach) is that no mental state could be defined by a single range of behavioural dispositions, independent of any other mental states. (Behaviour depends upon desires as well as beliefs). | |
From: comment on Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949]) by David J.Chalmers - The Conscious Mind 1.1.2 | |
A reaction: The defence of behaviourism is to concede this point, but suggest that behavioural dispositions come in large groups of interdependent sets, some relating to beliefs, others relating to desires, and each group leads to a behaviour. |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
Full Idea: Ryle is tough-minded to the point of incoherence when he combines a dispositional account of the mind with an anti-realist account of dispositions. | |
From: comment on Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.22 | |
A reaction: A nice point, but it strikes me that Ryle was, by temperament at least, an eliminativist about the mind, so the objection would not bother him. Maybe a disposition and a property are the same thing? |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
Full Idea: A problem for Ryle is that mental states may cause behaviour, but if mental states are themselves behavioural or behavioural dispositions, as opposed to internal states, then it is hard to see how they could do the job. | |
From: comment on Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949]) by David J.Chalmers - The Conscious Mind 1.1.2 | |
A reaction: I strongly approve of this, as an objection to any form of behaviourism or functionalism. If you identify something by its related behaviour, or its apparent function, this leaves the question 'WHY does it behave or function in this way?' |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |