12742
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A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The whole, if it is assumed to be body or matter, is nothing other than all of its parts; but this is absurd, since there aren't any smallest parts. Therefore there really exist only minds and their perceptions.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Calculus Ratiocinator [1679], A6.4.279), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
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A reaction:
Leibniz is sometimes labelled as an 'idealist', but this text is unusual in being so explicit, and he was mainly concerned to explain the reality of individual bodies. Monads were his final attempt to do this, not an attempt to escape into pure minds.
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22454
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We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]
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Full Idea:
Williams argued that we can tolerate inconsistency in moral principles though not in assertions, and that this is explained by the fact that it is the concern of the latter but not of the former to reflect an 'independent order of things'.
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From:
report of Bernard Williams (Consistency and realism (with 1972 note) [1966]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.37
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A reaction:
Put like this, Williams seems to beg the question, which is whether there is an independent moral order to things. There seems to be an easy answer, which is that we are only intolerant of inconsistency when we are confident about it.
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