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20327
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Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson]
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Full Idea:
In modern discussions, rather than look for intrinsic properties of objects, including aesthetic or formal properties, attention has turned to extrinsic or relational properties, notably of a social, historical, or 'institutional' nature.
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From:
Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 1)
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A reaction:
Lots of modern branches of philosophy have made this move, which seems to me like a defeat. We want to know why things have the relations they do. Just mapping the relations is superficial Humeanism.
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20326
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Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson]
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Full Idea:
In the early twentieth century there were numerous attempts at defining the essence art. Significant form, intuition, the expression of emotion, organic unity, and other notions, were offered to this end.
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From:
Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 1)
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A reaction:
As far as I can see the whole of aesthetics was demolished in one blow by Marcel Duchamp's urinal. Artists announce: we will tell you what art is; you should just sit and listen. Compare the invention of an anarchic sport.
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20330
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The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson]
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Full Idea:
The dualistic view of the arts holds that works of art come in two fundamentally different kinds: those that are abstract entities, i.e. types, and those that are physical objects (tokens).
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From:
Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 2)
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A reaction:
Paintings are the main reason for retaining physical objects. Strawson 1974 argues that paintings are only physical because we cannot yet perfectly reproduce them. I agree. Works of art are types, not tokens.
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20167
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Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
Blame rests, in part, on a fiction; the idea that ethical reasons, in particular the special kind of ethical reasons that are obligations, must, really, be available to the blamed agent.
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From:
Bernard Williams (How free does the will need to be? [1985], 5)
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A reaction:
In blaming someone, you may be telling them that they should know their obligations, rather than assuming that they do know them. How else can we give children a moral education?
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