22 ideas
22180 | Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Philosophers have often invoked multiple realisability to explain why psychology cannot be reduced to physics or chemistry, but in principle the explanation works for any higher-level science. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 3) | |
A reaction: He gives the example of a 'cell' in biology, which can be implemented in all sorts of ways. Presumably that can be reduced to many sorts of physics, but not just to one sort. The high level contains patterns that vanish at the low level. |
22172 | Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Not all sciences are experimental - astronomers obviously cannot do experiments on the heavens, but have to content themselves with careful observation instead. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 1) | |
A reaction: Biology too. Psychology tries hard to be experimental, but I doubt whether the main theories emerge from experiments. |
22177 | Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha] |
Full Idea: In the Randomised Controlled Trial for a new drug, patients are divided at random into a treatment group who receive the drug, and a control group who do not. Randomisation is important to eliminate confounding factors. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Devised in the 1930s, and a major breakthrough in methodology for that kind of trial. Psychologists use the method all the time. Some theorists say it is the only reliable method. |
22174 | The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Adams and Leverrier began with Newton's theory of gravity, which made an incorrect prediction about the orbit of Uranus. They explained away the conflicting observations by postulating a new planet, Neptune. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 1) | |
A reaction: The falsificationists can say that the anomalous observation did not falsify the theory, because they didn't know quite what they were observing. It was not in fact an anomaly for Newtonian theory at all. |
22175 | Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha] |
Full Idea: The goal of science is not solely to refute theories, but also to determine which theories are true (or probably true). When a scientist collects data …they are trying to show that their own theory is true. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: This is the aim of 'accommodation' to a wide set of data, rather than prediction or refutation. |
22182 | Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha] |
Full Idea: According to anti-realists, scientific theories which posit unobservable entities are underdetermined by the empirical data - there will always be a number of competing theories which can account for the data equally well. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 4) | |
A reaction: The fancy version is Putnam's model theoretic argument, explored by Tim Button. The reply, apparently, is that there are other criteria for theory choice, apart from the data. And we don't have to actually observe everything in a theory. |
22185 | Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha] |
Full Idea: If two things are incommensurable they cannot be incompatible. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 5) | |
A reaction: Kuhn had claimed that two rival theories are incompatible, which forces the paradigm shift. He can't stop the slide off into total relativism. The point is there cannot be a conflict if there cannot even be a comparison. |
22176 | Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers use 'inductive' to just mean not deductive, …but we reserve it for inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: The instances must at least be comparable. Must you know the kind before you start? Surely you can examine a sequence of things, trying to decide whether or not they are of one kind? Is checking the uniformity of a kind induction? |
22178 | If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha] |
Full Idea: If the only objective constraints concern how we should change our credences, but what our initial credences should be is entirely subjective, then individuals with very bizarre opinions about the world will count as perfectly rational. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: The important rationality has to be the assessement of a diverse batch of evidence, for which there can never be any rules or mathematics. |
2176 | There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: There is a problem of free will only for those who think that the notion of voluntary can be metaphysically deepened. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.68) | |
A reaction: Years later, I now see that his refers to a pet hate of mine in discussions of free will, which is the idea that a person can have something called 'ultimate' responsibility for an action (which is the 'deep' version of 'you did it'). |
2181 | It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: There is a deluded Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom will totally coincide. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], VI - p.158) |
4317 | We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham] |
Full Idea: Williams has shown that whether an action was weakness of will depends on an evaluation after the event, as in the question of whether Gauguin was right to abandon his family to pursue his art. | |
From: report of Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993]) by John Cottingham - Reason, Emotions and Good Life p.1 | |
A reaction: The 'Gauguin Problem' is that Gauguin's actions only become weakness of will if the pictures are no good, and he can't know that till he's painted them. Good point. |
2174 | Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The four elements of any conception of responsibility are cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.53) |
2178 | In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: In what I have done, the guilt points in one direction towards what has happened to others, and the shame in another direction to what I am. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.92) | |
A reaction: Not convinced. I think shame has the fear of being observed as an inescapable component. Even when alone shame involves imagining what others might think. |
2169 | Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: There was moral progress in the ancient Greek world, notably to the extent that the idea of areté, human excellence, was freed to some extent from determination by social position. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], I - p.7) |
2172 | The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Duty in some abstract modern sense is largely unknown to the Greeks, in particular to archaic Greeks. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], II - p.41) |
2180 | If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: If we think the power of reason is not enough by itself to distinguish good and bad, then we would hope that people have limited autonomy, that there is an internalised other in them that carries some social weight. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.100) |
2179 | If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The conception of the moral self as characterless leaves only a limited positive role to other people in one's moral life. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.95) |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
22173 | Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Galileo's most enduring contribution lay in mechanics, where he refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: This must the first idea in the theory of mechanics, allowing mathematical treatment and accurate comparisons. |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
2175 | There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: There is a "problem of evil" only for those who expect the world to be good. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.68) |