|
23025
|
Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell]
|
|
Full Idea:
The progress of philosophy seems to demand that, like science, it should learn to practise induction, to test its premisses by the conclusions to which they lead, and not merely by their apparent self-evidence.
|
|
From:
Bertrand Russell (Explanations in reply to Mr Bradley [1899], nr end)
|
|
A reaction:
[from Twitter] Love this. It is 'one person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens'. I think all philosophical conclusions, without exception, should be reached by evaluating the final result fully, and not just following a line of argument.
|
|
7388
|
McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn]
|
|
Full Idea:
McGinn invites his readers to join him in surrender: It's just impossible to imagine how software could make a conscious robot. Don't even try, he says. Other philosophical experiments (involving China) "work" by dissuading readers from imagining.
|
|
From:
comment on Colin McGinn (The Problem of Consciousness [1991]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
|
|
A reaction:
I agree with Dennett. If you don't try to imagine how robots might do it, you are also denied the right to try to imagine how brains might manage it. Admittedly this is hard, but good imagination needs study, effort, discussion, time, information...
|